Unbounded essence/item farming: every other reward trigger (summon,
question, fragment) had both a per-user and per-IP limiter, but
ritual_start and judgment had none at all — and judgment has no
"already resolved" state either. A scripted client could replay
{"type":"judgment","verdict":"cross_over"} in a tight loop and mint
CROSS_OVER_ESSENCE (25) plus a 20% item roll every iteration, forever.
Same for ritual_start -> 4x ritual_step. Added ritual/judgment limiters
in both flavors, matching the existing pattern.
WS session crash: _handle_question did `if state.entity is None:
await _handle_summon(state)` then `assert state.entity is not None`.
_handle_summon returns early *without* setting state.entity when the
seeker is rate-limited, so the assert fired unhandled — and the message
loop only catches WebSocketDisconnect, so it killed the whole connection.
Reachable with no malice: click summon a few times impatiently, then ask a
question. Now returns cleanly (the rate_limited frame was already sent).
Essence double-spend: purchase_unlock() deliberately uses SELECT ... FOR
UPDATE to serialize concurrent purchases, but the three credit_essence
call sites in ws.py did an unlocked db.get() read-modify-write. An
unlocked read doesn't block on a row lock, so a reward computed from a
pre-purchase balance could be written after the purchase committed,
silently reverting the deduction — user keeps the unlock and the essence.
All three now lock the row the same way.
Entity mint collision: _summon does a racy check-then-insert against
Entity.signature and Entity.name, both DB-unique, with no IntegrityError
handling — a concurrent mint of the same signature crashed the session.
Forceable by a user with two accounts (anomaly frequency/magnitude are
client-controlled), and plausible without malice in wire mode, where
sample_network() reads host-wide /proc/net/dev counters so two idle
sessions genuinely measure the same traffic. Now retries once, which
re-runs the match against whatever the winner committed.
Also added a unique constraint on unlocks(user_id, unlock_key) as
defense-in-depth, with an idempotent catalog-guarded migration.
221 backend tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
143 lines
5.4 KiB
Python
143 lines
5.4 KiB
Python
import asyncio
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import contextlib
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from contextlib import asynccontextmanager
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from pathlib import Path
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from fastapi import FastAPI, HTTPException
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from fastapi.responses import FileResponse
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from fastapi.staticfiles import StaticFiles
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from sqlalchemy import text
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import app.models # noqa: F401 — registers models on Base.metadata before create_all
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from app.config import settings
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from app.db import Base, async_session_maker, engine
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from app.routes.auth import router as auth_router
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from app.routes.codex import router as codex_router
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from app.routes.device import router as device_router
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from app.routes.inventory import router as inventory_router
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from app.routes.shop import router as shop_router
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from app.session_cleanup import delete_expired_sessions
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from app.ws import AUDIO_DIR
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from app.ws import router as ws_router
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FRONTEND_DIST = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent.parent / "frontend" / "dist"
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SESSION_CLEANUP_INTERVAL_SECONDS = 30 * 60
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async def _session_cleanup_loop() -> None:
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"""Periodically sweeps expired auth_sessions rows so the table doesn't
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grow forever — get_current_user already rejects expired sessions on
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read, this just deletes the rows themselves."""
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try:
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while True:
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await asyncio.sleep(SESSION_CLEANUP_INTERVAL_SECONDS)
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try:
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async with async_session_maker() as db:
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await delete_expired_sessions(db)
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except Exception:
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# A transient DB hiccup shouldn't kill the sweep loop —
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# just try again next interval.
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pass
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except asyncio.CancelledError:
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pass
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@asynccontextmanager
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async def lifespan(app: FastAPI):
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AUDIO_DIR.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
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async with engine.begin() as conn:
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await conn.run_sync(Base.metadata.create_all)
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# No Alembic in this repo — `create_all` never alters existing
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# tables, so columns added to live models need a manual, idempotent
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# migration here. Safe to run on every startup.
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await conn.execute(text(
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"ALTER TABLE entities ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS traits JSONB NOT NULL DEFAULT '{}'::jsonb"
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))
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# Workstream C (character-depth-ghost-log spec) — missing from C's
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# own commit, added by the integrator after Workstream B's report
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# flagged that User.essence had a live model column and application
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# code (auth/me, inventory purchases, summon trickle) but no
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# migration, which would have broken on the real production DB.
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await conn.execute(text(
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"ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS essence INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0"
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))
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# Workstream B (character-depth-ghost-log spec).
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await conn.execute(text(
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"ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS favor DOUBLE PRECISION NOT NULL DEFAULT 0.0"
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))
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await conn.execute(text(
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"ALTER TABLE entities ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS at_peace BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false"
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))
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# Defense-in-depth: purchase_unlock() already enforces one row per
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# (user, unlock_key) via a row-locked check-then-insert, so this
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# constraint should never actually find a conflict on a live DB.
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# `ADD CONSTRAINT` has no IF NOT EXISTS form, so the guard is a
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# catalog check instead — safe to run on every startup.
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await conn.execute(text(
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"DO $$ BEGIN "
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"IF NOT EXISTS ("
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" SELECT 1 FROM pg_constraint WHERE conname = 'uq_unlocks_user_key'"
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") THEN "
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" ALTER TABLE unlocks ADD CONSTRAINT uq_unlocks_user_key UNIQUE (user_id, unlock_key); "
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"END IF; "
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"END $$;"
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))
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cleanup_task = asyncio.create_task(_session_cleanup_loop())
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try:
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yield
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finally:
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cleanup_task.cancel()
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with contextlib.suppress(asyncio.CancelledError):
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await cleanup_task
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app = FastAPI(title="Quantumancy", lifespan=lifespan)
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app.include_router(auth_router)
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app.include_router(codex_router)
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app.include_router(device_router)
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app.include_router(inventory_router)
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app.include_router(shop_router)
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app.include_router(ws_router)
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@app.get("/healthz")
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async def healthz():
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return {"status": "ok"}
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app.mount(
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"/assets",
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StaticFiles(directory=FRONTEND_DIST / "assets", check_dir=False),
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name="frontend-assets",
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)
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app.mount(
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"/audio",
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StaticFiles(directory=AUDIO_DIR, check_dir=False),
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name="spirit-audio",
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)
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@app.get("/{full_path:path}")
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async def serve_spa(full_path: str):
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index_file = FRONTEND_DIST / "index.html"
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if not index_file.exists():
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=503,
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detail="Frontend not built. Run `npm run build` in frontend/ and restart.",
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)
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# Vite emits root-level static files (favicon.ico, favicon.svg,
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# apple-touch-icon.png, og-image.png, …) straight into dist/ rather than
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# dist/assets/ — the only mounted static dir. Without this, requests for
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# them fall through to the SPA fallback below and get index.html back
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# instead of the actual file (browsers silently ignore it; social-media
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# link-preview crawlers fetching og:image get an HTML page).
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if full_path:
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dist_root = FRONTEND_DIST.resolve()
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candidate = (dist_root / full_path).resolve()
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if candidate.is_file() and dist_root in candidate.parents:
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return FileResponse(candidate)
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return FileResponse(index_file)
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