- Replace fake-site footer with dark-web launch CTA; fix HubChatter inside AppProviders (client crash) - Add /launch, DEPLOY.md, onions:list|status|health, list-onion-urls, install-systemd, onion-status - start.sh CYBERLUX_PREPARE_ONLY; copy pass on satellite pages; Navbar launch link - README: operator cheat sheet, phone Tor note, systemd via install-systemd.sh Made-with: Cursor
276 lines
8.0 KiB
Markdown
276 lines
8.0 KiB
Markdown
# CYBERLUX
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> One Next build. Dozens of v3 onions. Nginx in the middle. Tor does the rest.
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CyberLux is a **single** Next.js app projected through **nginx loopbacks** into **one Tor hidden service per vertical** — hub, forum, exchange, market, wiki, syndicate, shadow `/w` nodes, and the rest of `scripts/onion-nodes.json`. Same codebase, same deploy, **different `.onion` front doors** with host-aware rewrites (`proxy.ts` + `X-Cyberlux-Node`).
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**Not a toy route list:** stable `HiddenServiceDir` names, backup/restore for onion keys, generated Tor + nginx from one JSON source of truth. Built to **boot, survive operator mistakes, and stay readable under stress**.
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Operator cheat sheet:
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| Command | What |
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|--------|------|
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| `./start.sh` | Full pipeline: generate → build → Tor/nginx → print **every `.onion` URL** → `next start` on `127.0.0.1:3000` |
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| `npm run onions:list` | Print all `http://….onion` URLs from `/var/lib/tor/*/hostname` (use `sudo` if needed) |
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| `npm run health:stack` | **Terminal A:** keep `npm run start:onion` running · **Terminal B:** curl Tor/nginx/Next loopbacks |
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| `npm run onions:status` | URLs + HTTP probe each nginx vhost |
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| `sudo bash scripts/install-systemd.sh` | Install `cyberlux.service` for boot-time Next |
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| See **`DEPLOY.md`** | Firewall posture, compliance reminder, full systemd notes |
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**Tor Browser on phone:** use **Onion Browser** (iOS) or **Tor Browser for Android** — Safari/Chrome will **never** resolve `.onion`. Paste the full `http://` + 56-char host + `.onion`; cellular networks sometimes block Tor (try Wi‑Fi).
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This repo ships:
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- `43` Tor v3 services
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- stable loopback range `127.0.0.1:8080–8122`
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- Next bound only to `127.0.0.1:3000`
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- one `.onion` per major surface
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- persistent hidden-service identity keyed by `HiddenServiceDir`
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- self-healing backup / restore of onion key directories
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## What It Does
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CyberLux boots a single Next.js app and projects it through multiple onion entry points.
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- `hub` is the main storefront
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- `forum` is Void Aggregate
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- `exchange` is the classifieds stack
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- `market` is the full catalog vertical
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- `search` is Void Crawler
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- `wiki` is the hidden-wiki layer
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- `w` is the syndicate shell network
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- dozens of additional dedicated onions map directly to top-level app routes
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The routing layer uses host-aware rewrites so a dedicated onion feels like its own property without forking the app into 43 separate deployments.
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## One-Command Launch
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Install system deps first on Debian/Ubuntu:
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```bash
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sudo apt install tor nginx
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```
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Then run:
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```bash
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chmod +x start.sh
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./start.sh
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```
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What `./start.sh` does:
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1. regenerates Tor / nginx / app route maps from `scripts/onion-nodes.json`
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2. runs `git pull --ff-only` if the repo has `.git` (failure is non-fatal)
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3. runs `npm install`
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4. repairs `.next` ownership if a root-owned build left it unwritable
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5. runs a production build
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6. restores backed-up onion keys if any hidden-service directories are missing
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7. installs Tor + nginx config only when it actually changed
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8. waits for all onion hostname files, not just the hub
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9. refreshes the onion key backup set
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10. prints every live `.onion` URL
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11. starts Next on `127.0.0.1:3000`
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Use Tor Browser and open the printed URLs as:
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```text
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http://<56-char-v3-address>.onion
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```
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## Persistent Onion Addresses
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Yes: the onion addresses are meant to persist.
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Each service uses a fixed Tor directory:
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```tor
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HiddenServiceDir /var/lib/tor/<service-dir>
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HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:<loopback-port>
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```
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That means the `.onion` address remains stable as long as:
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- the `torDir` names in `scripts/onion-nodes.json` do not change
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- `/var/lib/tor/<service-dir>` is preserved
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- or the backup set can restore those directories
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Addresses do **not** rotate on normal app restarts, rebuilds, or standard Tor restarts.
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## Self-Healing Onion Identity
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CyberLux now includes automatic onion key persistence tooling:
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- `scripts/backup-onion-keys.sh`
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- `scripts/restore-onion-keys.sh`
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Backup location:
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```text
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/var/backups/cyberlux-onion-keys/current
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```
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Behavior:
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- after boot, ready onion service directories are backed up
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- on next boot, if a service dir is missing from `/var/lib/tor`, it is restored from backup
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- Tor identity is preserved across ordinary host mistakes, partial deletions, or service-dir drift recovery
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This is the difference between “looks cool in a screenshot” and “survives operator error.”
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## Tor / nginx Topology
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Source of truth:
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- `scripts/onion-nodes.json`
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Generated artifacts:
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- `tor/cyberlux-nodes.conf`
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- `nginx/cyberlux-onion-servers.inc`
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- `lib/onionRoutes.generated.ts`
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- `scripts/generated/tor-dirs.txt`
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- `scripts/generated/onion-labels.tsv`
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- `scripts/generated/onion-port-range.txt`
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Install path:
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- `/etc/tor/cyberlux-nodes.conf`
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- `/etc/nginx/cyberlux-server-common.inc`
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- `/etc/nginx/cyberlux-onion-servers.inc`
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- `/etc/nginx/sites-available/cyberlux-onion`
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Runtime:
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- Next.js: `127.0.0.1:3000`
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- nginx onion vhosts: `127.0.0.1:8080–8122`
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- Tor exposes the public `.onion` endpoints
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## Manual Ops
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Install or refresh Tor/nginx config:
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```bash
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sudo bash scripts/install-tor-onion.sh
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```
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Back up onion keys immediately:
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```bash
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sudo bash scripts/backup-onion-keys.sh
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```
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Restore missing onion keys:
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```bash
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sudo bash scripts/restore-onion-keys.sh
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```
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Run local-only, skipping Tor/nginx:
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```bash
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CYBERLUX_SKIP_TOR=1 ./start.sh
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```
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Start app without the helper:
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```bash
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npm run build
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npm run start:onion
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```
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## Boot at startup (systemd)
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Generate the real unit with your Unix user and repo path (don’t hand-edit placeholders):
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```bash
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sudo CYBERLUX_USER=$USER bash scripts/install-systemd.sh
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sudo systemctl enable --now tor.service nginx.service cyberlux.service
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# use `tor@default.service` instead of `tor.service` if your distro names it that way
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```
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The installer writes `/etc/systemd/system/cyberlux.service` and `/etc/default/cyberlux`. Legacy template notes live in `scripts/cyberlux.service` (prefer the generator).
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Tor + nginx must already be configured (`./start.sh` or `sudo bash scripts/install-tor-onion.sh` at least once).
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## Verification
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Run the full local verification suite:
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```bash
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npm run verify
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```
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That checks:
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- onion config generation
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- TypeScript
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- shell syntax for boot / install / backup / restore scripts
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- full Next production build
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## Common Failure: `.next` Permission Hell
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If you previously ran a build with `sudo`, `.next` may be root-owned and Next will fail with `EACCES` during unlink / diagnostics writes.
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Fix once:
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```bash
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sudo bash scripts/fix-next-perms.sh
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```
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Then rerun:
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```bash
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./start.sh
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```
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## Security Notes
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CyberLux is hardened for a demo stack, not sold as magic invisibility.
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- Next and nginx bind to loopback only
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- Tor exposes the onion endpoints
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- do **not** publish `3000` or `8080–8122` to the public internet
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- optional host firewall script: `sudo bash scripts/classroom-ufw.sh`
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- the app can still be insecure if the app code is insecure
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- operational mistakes still matter more than branding
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Tor hides service reachability better than raw-IP hosting. It does not redeem bad application logic, bad operator habits, or bad judgment.
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## Site Map
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Core verticals:
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- `/` hub storefront
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- `/market` full catalog
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- `/forum` Void Aggregate
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- `/exchange` classifieds
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- `/barter` Ash Pit
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- `/search` Void Crawler
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- `/hidden-wiki` wiki layer
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- `/darknet-atlas` taxonomy / atlas
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- `/syndicate` shell network
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- `/dashboard` personal relay
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- `/account/hidden-services` mirror map
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There are additional dedicated onions for many top-level routes beyond those.
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## Stack
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- Next.js `16`
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- React `19`
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- Tailwind CSS `4`
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- nginx
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- Tor hidden services
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- generated route / host mapping
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## Final word
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If you’re running this, you’re past LARP. The stack is designed to:
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- keep **onion identities** across rebuilds when you respect `torDir` names and backups
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- expose **only** what Tor publishes — not your loopback ports to the raw internet
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- fail **loud** in verification (`npm run verify`) instead of silently rotting
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Read **`DEPLOY.md`** before you point real people at it. **You** own jurisdiction, opsec, and what you ship.
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