The Anthropic path could never activate: it gated on
`not ANTHROPIC_API_KEY.startswith("sk-ant-")`, but real Anthropic keys start
with `sk-ant-`, so any real key was treated as a placeholder and every request
fell back to mock. It also targeted the retired `claude-3-haiku-20240307`.
- ai_translator.py: add `_real_key()` placeholder detection (rejects `sk-ant-...`,
`changeme`, `your-`, etc. — accepts real secrets), centralize provider gating
in `_ai_enabled()`, and point all three AI features (finding translation,
security coach, attack-path narrative) at `claude-sonnet-5` with thinking
disabled for fast structured output. OpenAI kept as a secondary provider.
- config.py / .env.example: default AI_PROVIDER to anthropic.
Mock mode still works with no key configured; dropping in a real
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY now actually enables live Claude.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The frontend only worked from localhost:3000 — the browser made absolute
cross-origin calls to localhost:8000, which (a) points at the visitor's own
machine when accessed via the LAN IP or Cloudflare tunnel, and (b) was blocked
by CORS (backend only allowed localhost:3000). Now all API calls are
same-origin and proxied to the backend:
- api.ts: default API base to same-origin ("") instead of localhost:8000
- docker-compose: NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URL="" (client uses relative /api)
- next.config.ts: server-side rewrite uses API_INTERNAL_URL (http://backend:8000
inside Docker) so :3000 direct access proxies correctly
- main.py: broaden CORS via allow_origin_regex (localhost + private LAN) and an
optional CORS_ORIGINS env var, as defense-in-depth for direct :8000 access
Login was returning 500: passlib 1.7.4 is incompatible with the bcrypt 5.0.0
actually installed in the image (requirements pin 4.1.2, but the image drifted).
- security.py: call bcrypt directly, truncating to 72 bytes; existing $2b$
hashes verify unchanged, and it works under both bcrypt 4.x and 5.x
Security: SECRET_KEY was a known placeholder string while the app is exposed on
the LAN and via Cloudflare tunnel — anyone could forge admin JWTs. Regenerated
to a strong random value in backend/.env (gitignored; not committed).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
