import secrets
from datetime import datetime, timezone

from fastapi import APIRouter, Cookie, Depends, HTTPException, Request, Response, status
from sqlalchemy import select
from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession

from app.db import get_db
from app.deps import SESSION_COOKIE_NAME, get_current_user, get_optional_current_user
from app.models.auth_session import AuthSession, SESSION_TTL, generate_session_token, hash_token
from app.models.unlock import UnlockRecord
from app.models.user import User
from app.rate_limit import RateLimiter, resolve_client_ip
from app.schemas import LoginRequest, RegisterRequest, UserOut
from app.security import hash_password, verify_password

router = APIRouter(prefix="/auth", tags=["auth"])

_DUMMY_PASSWORD_HASH = hash_password("dummy-password-for-timing-safety")

# Guest creation writes a real user row per call — without a per-IP cap a
# single client could fill the users table. resolve_client_ip (not the raw
# socket peer) because internet traffic arrives via the Cloudflare Tunnel.
guest_limiter = RateLimiter(max_requests=5, window_seconds=3600)

# 4 hex chars = 65k names; a full retry budget failing means the wanderer
# namespace is effectively exhausted, not that we got unlucky.
_GUEST_NAME_ATTEMPTS = 8

# Shared with the guest-provisioning endpoint below, and with the frontend's
# own username-prefix check (SeancePage's claim-a-name nudge) — a wanderer
# is any user row whose username starts with this.
WANDERER_PREFIX = "wanderer-"


@router.post("/register", response_model=UserOut, status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED)
async def register(
    payload: RegisterRequest,
    db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
    current_user: User | None = Depends(get_optional_current_user),
):
    existing = await db.scalar(select(User).where(User.username == payload.username))
    if existing is not None:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_409_CONFLICT, detail="username taken")

    # A *wanderer* hitting /register is claiming a name for the account they
    # already have, not opening a new one — this is what makes the séance's
    # "claim a name to keep your codex" nudge true rather than a lie.
    # Previously register() always created a brand-new User row, so a
    # guest's essence, discovered entities, ritual/judgment history and
    # Ghost Log (all foreign-keyed to the guest's user_id) were silently
    # abandoned the moment they registered — the exact opposite of what the
    # UI promises. Renaming the SAME row in place keeps every one of those
    # relationships intact, and the existing AuthSession stays valid (same
    # user_id), so claiming a name doesn't log you out.
    #
    # Deliberately scoped to wanderers only: a caller who already has a real
    # name is registering a SECOND account (a legitimate thing to do while
    # logged in — shared computer, alt account), so their cookie is ignored
    # and the normal create-a-new-row path runs. An earlier version of this
    # rejected that case outright and broke exactly that flow.
    if current_user is not None and current_user.username.startswith(WANDERER_PREFIX):
        current_user.username = payload.username
        current_user.password_hash = hash_password(payload.password)
        current_user.email = payload.email
        await db.commit()
        await db.refresh(current_user)
        return current_user

    user = User(
        username=payload.username,
        password_hash=hash_password(payload.password),
        email=payload.email,
    )
    db.add(user)
    await db.commit()
    await db.refresh(user)
    return user


@router.post("/guest", response_model=UserOut, status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED)
async def guest(
    request: Request,
    response: Response,
    db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
):
    client_ip = resolve_client_ip(
        request.headers, request.client.host if request.client else None
    )
    if not guest_limiter.allow(client_ip):
        raise HTTPException(
            status.HTTP_429_TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
            "the veil admits only so many wanderers — return later",
        )

    for _ in range(_GUEST_NAME_ATTEMPTS):
        username = f"{WANDERER_PREFIX}{secrets.token_hex(2)}"
        existing = await db.scalar(select(User).where(User.username == username))
        if existing is None:
            break
    else:
        raise HTTPException(
            status.HTTP_503_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
            "the mist is too crowded — try again",
        )

    # A guest is a real user: the password is random and never disclosed, so
    # the row is unreachable via /auth/login but works everywhere else.
    user = User(
        username=username,
        password_hash=hash_password(secrets.token_urlsafe(32)),
    )
    db.add(user)
    await db.commit()
    await db.refresh(user)

    raw_token, token_hash = generate_session_token()
    session = AuthSession(
        user_id=user.id,
        token_hash=token_hash,
        expires_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc) + SESSION_TTL,
    )
    db.add(session)
    await db.commit()

    # Same dual-scheme cookie rule as /auth/login (https tunnel vs LAN http).
    response.set_cookie(
        SESSION_COOKIE_NAME,
        raw_token,
        httponly=True,
        samesite="lax",
        secure=request.url.scheme == "https",
        max_age=int(SESSION_TTL.total_seconds()),
    )
    return user


@router.post("/login", response_model=UserOut)
async def login(
    payload: LoginRequest,
    request: Request,
    response: Response,
    db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
):
    user = await db.scalar(select(User).where(User.username == payload.username))
    if user is None:
        verify_password(payload.password, _DUMMY_PASSWORD_HASH)
        raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="invalid credentials")
    if not verify_password(payload.password, user.password_hash):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="invalid credentials")

    raw_token, token_hash = generate_session_token()
    session = AuthSession(
        user_id=user.id,
        token_hash=token_hash,
        expires_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc) + SESSION_TTL,
    )
    db.add(session)
    await db.commit()

    # The app is reached two ways: https via the Cloudflare Tunnel (Secure
    # required) and plain http on the LAN (a Secure cookie would be dropped
    # by the browser entirely, silently breaking the séance socket).
    response.set_cookie(
        SESSION_COOKIE_NAME,
        raw_token,
        httponly=True,
        samesite="lax",
        secure=request.url.scheme == "https",
        max_age=int(SESSION_TTL.total_seconds()),
    )
    return user


@router.post("/logout", status_code=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT)
async def logout(
    request: Request,
    response: Response,
    qm_session: str | None = Cookie(default=None, alias=SESSION_COOKIE_NAME),
    db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
):
    if qm_session is not None:
        token_hash = hash_token(qm_session)
        session = await db.scalar(select(AuthSession).where(AuthSession.token_hash == token_hash))
        if session is not None:
            await db.delete(session)
            await db.commit()
    response.delete_cookie(
        SESSION_COOKIE_NAME,
        httponly=True,
        samesite="lax",
        secure=request.url.scheme == "https",
    )


@router.get("/me", response_model=UserOut)
async def me(
    user: User = Depends(get_current_user), db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)
):
    result = await db.execute(
        select(UnlockRecord.unlock_key).where(UnlockRecord.user_id == user.id)
    )
    unlock_keys = [row[0] for row in result.all()]
    return UserOut(
        id=user.id, username=user.username, essence=user.essence, unlocks=unlock_keys
    )