import secrets from datetime import datetime, timezone from fastapi import APIRouter, Cookie, Depends, HTTPException, Request, Response, status from sqlalchemy import select from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession from app.db import get_db from app.deps import SESSION_COOKIE_NAME, get_current_user from app.models.auth_session import AuthSession, SESSION_TTL, generate_session_token, hash_token from app.models.unlock import UnlockRecord from app.models.user import User from app.rate_limit import RateLimiter, resolve_client_ip from app.schemas import LoginRequest, RegisterRequest, UserOut from app.security import hash_password, verify_password router = APIRouter(prefix="/auth", tags=["auth"]) _DUMMY_PASSWORD_HASH = hash_password("dummy-password-for-timing-safety") # Guest creation writes a real user row per call — without a per-IP cap a # single client could fill the users table. resolve_client_ip (not the raw # socket peer) because internet traffic arrives via the Cloudflare Tunnel. guest_limiter = RateLimiter(max_requests=5, window_seconds=3600) # 4 hex chars = 65k names; a full retry budget failing means the wanderer # namespace is effectively exhausted, not that we got unlucky. _GUEST_NAME_ATTEMPTS = 8 @router.post("/register", response_model=UserOut, status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED) async def register(payload: RegisterRequest, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)): existing = await db.scalar(select(User).where(User.username == payload.username)) if existing is not None: raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_409_CONFLICT, detail="username taken") user = User( username=payload.username, password_hash=hash_password(payload.password), email=payload.email, ) db.add(user) await db.commit() await db.refresh(user) return user @router.post("/guest", response_model=UserOut, status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED) async def guest( request: Request, response: Response, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db), ): client_ip = resolve_client_ip( request.headers, request.client.host if request.client else None ) if not guest_limiter.allow(client_ip): raise HTTPException( status.HTTP_429_TOO_MANY_REQUESTS, "the veil admits only so many wanderers — return later", ) for _ in range(_GUEST_NAME_ATTEMPTS): username = f"wanderer-{secrets.token_hex(2)}" existing = await db.scalar(select(User).where(User.username == username)) if existing is None: break else: raise HTTPException( status.HTTP_503_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE, "the mist is too crowded — try again", ) # A guest is a real user: the password is random and never disclosed, so # the row is unreachable via /auth/login but works everywhere else. user = User( username=username, password_hash=hash_password(secrets.token_urlsafe(32)), ) db.add(user) await db.commit() await db.refresh(user) raw_token, token_hash = generate_session_token() session = AuthSession( user_id=user.id, token_hash=token_hash, expires_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc) + SESSION_TTL, ) db.add(session) await db.commit() # Same dual-scheme cookie rule as /auth/login (https tunnel vs LAN http). response.set_cookie( SESSION_COOKIE_NAME, raw_token, httponly=True, samesite="lax", secure=request.url.scheme == "https", max_age=int(SESSION_TTL.total_seconds()), ) return user @router.post("/login", response_model=UserOut) async def login( payload: LoginRequest, request: Request, response: Response, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db), ): user = await db.scalar(select(User).where(User.username == payload.username)) if user is None: verify_password(payload.password, _DUMMY_PASSWORD_HASH) raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="invalid credentials") if not verify_password(payload.password, user.password_hash): raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, detail="invalid credentials") raw_token, token_hash = generate_session_token() session = AuthSession( user_id=user.id, token_hash=token_hash, expires_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc) + SESSION_TTL, ) db.add(session) await db.commit() # The app is reached two ways: https via the Cloudflare Tunnel (Secure # required) and plain http on the LAN (a Secure cookie would be dropped # by the browser entirely, silently breaking the séance socket). response.set_cookie( SESSION_COOKIE_NAME, raw_token, httponly=True, samesite="lax", secure=request.url.scheme == "https", max_age=int(SESSION_TTL.total_seconds()), ) return user @router.post("/logout", status_code=status.HTTP_204_NO_CONTENT) async def logout( request: Request, response: Response, qm_session: str | None = Cookie(default=None, alias=SESSION_COOKIE_NAME), db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db), ): if qm_session is not None: token_hash = hash_token(qm_session) session = await db.scalar(select(AuthSession).where(AuthSession.token_hash == token_hash)) if session is not None: await db.delete(session) await db.commit() response.delete_cookie( SESSION_COOKIE_NAME, httponly=True, samesite="lax", secure=request.url.scheme == "https", ) @router.get("/me", response_model=UserOut) async def me( user: User = Depends(get_current_user), db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db) ): result = await db.execute( select(UnlockRecord.unlock_key).where(UnlockRecord.user_id == user.id) ) unlock_keys = [row[0] for row in result.all()] return UserOut( id=user.id, username=user.username, essence=user.essence, unlocks=unlock_keys )