Resolved conflict in main.py: combined both workstreams' router imports
and registrations (device_router from G, inventory_router from C).
143/143 backend tests pass after cleaning stray pollution from an
earlier parallel workstream run against the shared test DB.
Implements the backend REST surface and WS wiring for
docs/superpowers/specs/2026-07-23-character-depth-ghost-log-design.md's
Workstream C:
- New models: UnlockRecord (unlocks), InventoryItem (inventory_items),
Sigil (sigils) — brand-new tables, picked up by main.py's existing
create_all.
- New app/inventory.py: unlock price table, item drop table/odds,
essence economy constants, sigil design validation, and an atomic
(row-locked) purchase_unlock() that guards against double-spend races.
- New app/routes/inventory.py: GET unlocks/items/sigils, POST sigils
(validates the placeholder {points, rune} shape, points capped at 12),
POST unlocks/{unlock_key} (402 on insufficient essence, 404 on unknown
key, idempotent re-buy).
- GET /auth/me now includes unlocks: list[str] and essence: int.
- ws.py: wires essence trickle + item_drop rolls into the one trigger
point that exists in this worktree today (_handle_summon, covering
every successful summon plus high-rarity summons); the other two
contract trigger points (correct judgment, successful ritual) belong
to Workstream B's not-yet-landed ritual/judgment WS handlers, which
should call app.inventory's same helpers once they land.
- User.essence: int added (Workstream B owns this column per the spec;
added here per orchestrator instruction so this workstream is
independently testable — merge controller reconciles the duplicate
edit).
Also fast-forwarded this worktree's branch onto master (it had fallen
behind several commits) so the files this workstream depends on
(shop.py, ws.py, entities.py, etc.) were actually present to build
against.
Tests: 109 passed (drop-roll statistical sanity with seeded RNG,
inventory/sigil CRUD, purchase success/insufficient-funds/idempotency/
unknown-key paths, /auth/me shape, ws summon-trickle and item-drop
wiring).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Implements the backend half of the ESP32-P4 sensor node spec's pairing,
ingestion, and live-broadcast contract:
- New Device model (backend/app/models/device.py): id, user_id FK, name,
token_hash (unique+indexed), created_at, last_seen_at. Reuses
generate_session_token()/hash_token() from auth_session.py verbatim for
the one-time raw pairing token / stored hash.
- POST /api/device, GET /api/device (session-cookie authenticated REST
pairing endpoints) and POST /api/device/telemetry (device bearer-token
authenticated ingestion, per-device rate limited, 16KB body cap, 64
reading cap, strict shape validation — never a 500 on garbage input) in
backend/app/routes/device.py.
- /ws/device-feed live dashboard WS (qm_session cookie authenticated),
fanning out ingested readings to the owning user's connected dashboard
sockets via an in-process dict[user_id, connections] registry, each with
its own send-queue + single sender task (mirrors app.ws's
SeanceState/_sender convention).
- last_seen_at updates on every successful ingestion.
- _process_reading(device, reading) left as an explicit no-op handoff point
for Workstream K's summon-pipeline integration.
Backend suite: 102 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Addresses three Important-severity review findings inherited from Task 4's
plan reference code:
- login() now sets secure=True on the session cookie (safe behind the
Cloudflare Tunnel, which terminates TLS at the edge).
- logout() looks up and deletes the matching AuthSession row before
clearing the cookie, so a leaked raw token can no longer be replayed
after logout.
- login() always performs exactly one verify_password call regardless of
whether the username exists (against a module-level dummy hash for
nonexistent users), removing the timing oracle that let unauthenticated
requests distinguish registered from unregistered usernames.
Adds two tests: nonexistent-username login rejection, and logout revoking
the session server-side. Also adjusts two cookie-propagation touch points
in test_auth.py to manually re-inject the qm_session cookie, since
httpx's cookie jar won't auto-attach a Secure cookie to the test
transport's plain http://test base_url (a real browser talking to the
HTTPS tunnel edge wouldn't have this problem).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013PphXq1s43DNRj1uWKGXof
