Commit Graph

7 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Indiana
f5320fcdec feat: guest passage — slip through as a wanderer
POST /auth/guest mints a real user row (wanderer-<4 hex>, collision
retry, unusable random password) and issues the normal session cookie,
per-IP rate limited at 5/hour. EnterPage gains the guest action;
the séance shows a dismissible claim-a-name note for wanderer- users.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 17:18:16 +00:00
Indiana
ff68379772 feat: unlocks, inventory items, sigils, drops, and essence (Workstream C)
Implements the backend REST surface and WS wiring for
docs/superpowers/specs/2026-07-23-character-depth-ghost-log-design.md's
Workstream C:

- New models: UnlockRecord (unlocks), InventoryItem (inventory_items),
  Sigil (sigils) — brand-new tables, picked up by main.py's existing
  create_all.
- New app/inventory.py: unlock price table, item drop table/odds,
  essence economy constants, sigil design validation, and an atomic
  (row-locked) purchase_unlock() that guards against double-spend races.
- New app/routes/inventory.py: GET unlocks/items/sigils, POST sigils
  (validates the placeholder {points, rune} shape, points capped at 12),
  POST unlocks/{unlock_key} (402 on insufficient essence, 404 on unknown
  key, idempotent re-buy).
- GET /auth/me now includes unlocks: list[str] and essence: int.
- ws.py: wires essence trickle + item_drop rolls into the one trigger
  point that exists in this worktree today (_handle_summon, covering
  every successful summon plus high-rarity summons); the other two
  contract trigger points (correct judgment, successful ritual) belong
  to Workstream B's not-yet-landed ritual/judgment WS handlers, which
  should call app.inventory's same helpers once they land.
- User.essence: int added (Workstream B owns this column per the spec;
  added here per orchestrator instruction so this workstream is
  independently testable — merge controller reconciles the duplicate
  edit).

Also fast-forwarded this worktree's branch onto master (it had fallen
behind several commits) so the files this workstream depends on
(shop.py, ws.py, entities.py, etc.) were actually present to build
against.

Tests: 109 passed (drop-roll statistical sanity with seeded RNG,
inventory/sigil CRUD, purchase success/insufficient-funds/idempotency/
unknown-key paths, /auth/me shape, ws summon-trickle and item-drop
wiring).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-24 03:02:20 +00:00
Indiana
c372427ced feat: matrix/graph data views, wire-generated anomalies, http cookie fix
- auth: session cookie Secure only over https — plain-http LAN access was
  silently dropping the cookie, killing WS auth ('connection unstable')
- wire ghost: server-side spike detection on jitter baseline (3σ + 2.5×mean,
  20KB/s floor, 20s throttle) — wire anomalies now flood every session with
  zero hardware, pushed to clients as {type:'anomaly'} frames
- telemetry cadence 3-5s for live graphs; ambient whispers unchanged
- frontend: MATRIX view (data-rain interleaved with live utterances/anomaly/
  telemetry strings), GRAPHS view (scrolling jitter/variance/dns lines +
  anomaly markers + counters), BOARD/MATRIX/GRAPHS switcher
- connection banner: 'connecting' is now neutral 'tuning the veil…', only
  unstable/closed warns
- db: recreated quantumancy(+_test) as UTF8 (was SQL_ASCII — crashed on
  non-ASCII spirit text); README quickstart updated
- i18n: seance.views.* EN/ES
2026-07-21 00:02:41 +00:00
Indiana
ed5313158d fix: address final-review hygiene items (pydantic config, cookie alias, argon2 exception scope)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013PphXq1s43DNRj1uWKGXof
2026-07-20 16:00:35 +00:00
Indiana
3758594896 fix: harden login/logout — secure cookie, server-side session revocation, timing-safe login
Addresses three Important-severity review findings inherited from Task 4's
plan reference code:

- login() now sets secure=True on the session cookie (safe behind the
  Cloudflare Tunnel, which terminates TLS at the edge).
- logout() looks up and deletes the matching AuthSession row before
  clearing the cookie, so a leaked raw token can no longer be replayed
  after logout.
- login() always performs exactly one verify_password call regardless of
  whether the username exists (against a module-level dummy hash for
  nonexistent users), removing the timing oracle that let unauthenticated
  requests distinguish registered from unregistered usernames.

Adds two tests: nonexistent-username login rejection, and logout revoking
the session server-side. Also adjusts two cookie-propagation touch points
in test_auth.py to manually re-inject the qm_session cookie, since
httpx's cookie jar won't auto-attach a Secure cookie to the test
transport's plain http://test base_url (a real browser talking to the
HTTPS tunnel edge wouldn't have this problem).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013PphXq1s43DNRj1uWKGXof
2026-07-20 15:34:12 +00:00
Indiana
a0723b5237 feat: add login, session cookies, and get_current_user 2026-07-20 15:26:58 +00:00
Indiana
cfffc7ff59 feat: add user model and registration endpoint 2026-07-20 15:14:31 +00:00