feat: add per-IP rate limiting to WS LLM triggers
Per-account limits alone don't stop one account script-hitting Ollama from many source IPs. Adds matching per-IP limiters alongside the existing per-account ones for fragment/question/ summon triggers, per spec's dual per-account-and-per-IP requirement. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013PphXq1s43DNRj1uWKGXof
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@@ -53,6 +53,16 @@ fragment_limiter = RateLimiter(max_requests=30, window_seconds=60)
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question_limiter = RateLimiter(max_requests=6, window_seconds=60)
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summon_limiter = RateLimiter(max_requests=4, window_seconds=60)
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# Per-IP limiters for the same trigger points (spec §5). Ollama is a shared,
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# single-instance, CPU-only resource — per-account limits alone don't stop
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# one compromised/scripted account from hammering it across many source IPs,
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# nor do they protect the resource from many accounts sharing one IP. IP
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# thresholds are looser than the per-account ones since a single IP can
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# legitimately host multiple accounts on a shared network.
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fragment_ip_limiter = RateLimiter(max_requests=60, window_seconds=60)
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question_ip_limiter = RateLimiter(max_requests=12, window_seconds=60)
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summon_ip_limiter = RateLimiter(max_requests=8, window_seconds=60)
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AUDIO_DIR = Path(settings.data_dir) / "audio"
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@@ -65,6 +75,7 @@ def _audio_dir() -> Path:
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class SeanceState:
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user_id: uuid.UUID
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session_id: uuid.UUID
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client_ip: str
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send_queue: asyncio.Queue = field(default_factory=asyncio.Queue)
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mode: str = "unknown"
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language: str = "en"
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@@ -91,6 +102,10 @@ def serialize_entity(entity: Entity) -> dict:
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}
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def _client_ip(websocket: WebSocket) -> str:
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return websocket.client.host if websocket.client else "unknown"
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async def _authenticate(websocket: WebSocket) -> uuid.UUID | None:
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raw_token = websocket.cookies.get(SESSION_COOKIE_NAME)
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if raw_token is None:
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@@ -227,7 +242,12 @@ async def _summon(state: SeanceState, channel: str) -> tuple[Entity, bool]:
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async def _handle_summon(state: SeanceState) -> None:
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if not summon_limiter.allow(str(state.user_id)):
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# Short-circuits: an account already over its own cap never gets far
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# enough to spend from the IP budget too.
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if not (
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summon_limiter.allow(str(state.user_id))
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and summon_ip_limiter.allow(state.client_ip)
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):
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await state.send_queue.put(
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{
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"type": "error",
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@@ -266,7 +286,10 @@ async def _handle_anomaly(state: SeanceState, message: dict) -> None:
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await state.send_queue.put({"type": "status", "state": "attuning"})
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return
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if not fragment_limiter.allow(str(state.user_id)):
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if not (
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fragment_limiter.allow(str(state.user_id))
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and fragment_ip_limiter.allow(state.client_ip)
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):
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return # anomalies during a crowded veil just pass unheard
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try:
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@@ -279,7 +302,10 @@ async def _handle_anomaly(state: SeanceState, message: dict) -> None:
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async def _handle_question(state: SeanceState, text: str) -> None:
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if not question_limiter.allow(str(state.user_id)):
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if not (
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question_limiter.allow(str(state.user_id))
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and question_ip_limiter.allow(state.client_ip)
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):
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await state.send_queue.put(
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{
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"type": "error",
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@@ -390,7 +416,11 @@ async def session_socket(websocket: WebSocket) -> None:
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await db.commit()
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await db.refresh(contact_session)
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state = SeanceState(user_id=user_id, session_id=contact_session.id)
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state = SeanceState(
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user_id=user_id,
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session_id=contact_session.id,
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client_ip=_client_ip(websocket),
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)
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sender = asyncio.create_task(_sender(state, websocket))
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await state.send_queue.put({"type": "session", "id": str(contact_session.id)})
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@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import app.ws
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from app.entities import fallback_profile
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from app.models.contact_session import ContactSession
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from app.models.event import Event
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from app.rate_limit import RateLimiter
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class FakeSpiritService:
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@@ -175,3 +176,59 @@ async def test_same_signature_recontacts_same_entity(sync_client):
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assert second_frame["entity"]["name"] == first
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assert second_frame["is_new"] is False
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assert second_frame["entity"]["contact_count"] == 2
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_summon_rate_limited_per_account(sync_client, monkeypatch):
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# Swap in a tight, test-scoped limiter so this doesn't depend on (or
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# pollute) the shared module-level budget other tests draw from.
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monkeypatch.setattr(
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app.ws, "summon_limiter", RateLimiter(max_requests=2, window_seconds=60)
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)
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_login(sync_client, "account-limited")
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with _ws_connect(sync_client, sync_client.cookies.get("qm_session")) as ws:
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_read_until(ws, "session")
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for _ in range(2):
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ws.send_json({"type": "summon"})
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_read_until(ws, "entity")
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_read_until(ws, "utterance", kind="greeting")
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ws.send_json({"type": "summon"})
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rejection = _read_until(ws, "error")
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assert rejection["code"] == "rate_limited"
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assert rejection["message"] == (
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"The veil is crowded. The spirits need a moment before another summoning."
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)
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_summon_rate_limited_per_ip_even_with_fresh_account(
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sync_client, monkeypatch
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):
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# Starve only the IP bucket; the per-account limiter stays at its
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# production default so each account below has plenty of its own budget
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# left. This proves the IP limiter alone can reject a request — the
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# gap the per-account-only limiters left open.
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monkeypatch.setattr(
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app.ws, "summon_ip_limiter", RateLimiter(max_requests=1, window_seconds=60)
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)
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_login(sync_client, "ip-limited-a")
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with _ws_connect(sync_client, sync_client.cookies.get("qm_session")) as ws:
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_read_until(ws, "session")
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ws.send_json({"type": "summon"})
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_read_until(ws, "entity") # spends the single per-IP slot
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# A different account — its own per-account budget is untouched — but
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# every connection in this test shares the same (simulated) source IP,
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# which is already spent.
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_login(sync_client, "ip-limited-b")
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with _ws_connect(sync_client, sync_client.cookies.get("qm_session")) as ws:
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_read_until(ws, "session")
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ws.send_json({"type": "summon"})
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rejection = _read_until(ws, "error")
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assert rejection["code"] == "rate_limited"
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assert rejection["message"] == (
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"The veil is crowded. The spirits need a moment before another summoning."
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)
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