fix: harden login/logout — secure cookie, server-side session revocation, timing-safe login
Addresses three Important-severity review findings inherited from Task 4's plan reference code: - login() now sets secure=True on the session cookie (safe behind the Cloudflare Tunnel, which terminates TLS at the edge). - logout() looks up and deletes the matching AuthSession row before clearing the cookie, so a leaked raw token can no longer be replayed after logout. - login() always performs exactly one verify_password call regardless of whether the username exists (against a module-level dummy hash for nonexistent users), removing the timing oracle that let unauthenticated requests distinguish registered from unregistered usernames. Adds two tests: nonexistent-username login rejection, and logout revoking the session server-side. Also adjusts two cookie-propagation touch points in test_auth.py to manually re-inject the qm_session cookie, since httpx's cookie jar won't auto-attach a Secure cookie to the test transport's plain http://test base_url (a real browser talking to the HTTPS tunnel edge wouldn't have this problem). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013PphXq1s43DNRj1uWKGXof
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@@ -28,6 +28,11 @@ async def test_login_sets_cookie_and_me_returns_user(client):
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assert login_resp.status_code == 200
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assert "qm_session" in login_resp.cookies
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# secure=True cookies are only auto-attached by httpx's cookie jar to https
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# requests; the test transport uses base_url="http://test", so re-inject
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# the cookie manually to simulate what a browser talking to the real
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# Cloudflare-Tunnel-terminated HTTPS endpoint would do automatically.
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client.cookies.set("qm_session", login_resp.cookies["qm_session"])
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me_resp = await client.get("/auth/me")
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assert me_resp.status_code == 200
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assert me_resp.json()["username"] == "medium2"
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@@ -44,3 +49,26 @@ async def test_login_wrong_password_rejected(client):
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async def test_me_without_cookie_rejected(client):
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response = await client.get("/auth/me")
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assert response.status_code == 401
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_login_nonexistent_username_rejected(client):
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response = await client.post("/auth/login", json={"username": "nosuchmedium", "password": "whatever123"})
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assert response.status_code == 401
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_logout_revokes_session_server_side(client):
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await client.post("/auth/register", json={"username": "medium4", "password": "spookyspooky"})
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login_resp = await client.post("/auth/login", json={"username": "medium4", "password": "spookyspooky"})
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raw_token = login_resp.cookies["qm_session"]
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# secure=True cookies aren't auto-attached over the test transport's plain
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# http://test base_url (see note above), so re-inject the cookie before
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# the logout call itself, otherwise the server never sees a session to revoke.
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client.cookies.set("qm_session", raw_token)
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logout_resp = await client.post("/auth/logout")
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assert logout_resp.status_code == 204
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me_resp = await client.get("/auth/me")
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assert me_resp.status_code == 401
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