Files
casino/pkg/ledger/ledger.go
drjones f2c02e2bde fix(ledger): reject posting sets that overflow the zero-sum check
An adversarial posting set of two MaxInt64 legs plus one of 2 wraps to
zero in int64 arithmetic, so the balance check passed and the ledger
minted 18 quintillion millisatoshis from nothing. The sum is now
accumulated in big.Int, per-account balance arithmetic is checked for
wraparound, and the audit totals parse through big.Int so a corrupt
ledger reports a clear error rather than failing to scan.

Adds room package tests (0% -> covered) and ledger edge cases.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-05 15:43:21 +00:00

276 lines
8.9 KiB
Go

// Package ledger implements append-only double-entry accounting.
//
// Invariants, enforced here and again by database constraints and triggers:
// - every transaction's postings sum to exactly zero
// - no account balance may go negative
// - rows are never updated or deleted; corrections are compensating entries
//
// Every balance change is explained by a posting that records what happened,
// when, which round it belonged to, and the balance either side of it.
package ledger
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"math/big"
"sort"
"time"
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
)
var (
ErrUnbalanced = errors.New("ledger: postings do not sum to zero")
ErrInsufficientFunds = errors.New("ledger: insufficient funds")
ErrEmptyTransaction = errors.New("ledger: transaction has no postings")
ErrNonPositiveAmount = errors.New("ledger: amount must be positive")
)
// Posting is a single leg of a transaction. Positive credits, negative debits.
type Posting struct {
AccountID int64
AmountMsat int64
}
// Entry is a posting as seen from one account's history.
type Entry struct {
TransactionID int64
Kind string
RoundID *int64
AmountMsat int64
BalanceBefore int64
BalanceAfter int64
CreatedAt time.Time
}
type Ledger struct{ pool *pgxpool.Pool }
func New(pool *pgxpool.Pool) *Ledger { return &Ledger{pool: pool} }
// Post writes one balanced transaction atomically.
//
// Accounts are locked in ascending id order so that concurrent transactions
// touching the same accounts cannot deadlock, and so a balance read cannot be
// stale by the time the posting is written.
func (l *Ledger) Post(ctx context.Context, kind string, roundID *int64, postings []Posting) (int64, error) {
if len(postings) == 0 {
return 0, ErrEmptyTransaction
}
// The zero-sum check must be overflow-safe. Accumulating into an int64
// lets a crafted posting set wrap to zero — two legs of MaxInt64 and one
// of 2 sum to 0 in wrapping arithmetic — which would mint money out of
// nothing. big.Int has no such boundary.
sum := new(big.Int)
for _, p := range postings {
sum.Add(sum, big.NewInt(p.AmountMsat))
}
if sum.Sign() != 0 {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("%w: sum is %s", ErrUnbalanced, sum.String())
}
tx, err := l.pool.Begin(ctx)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
defer tx.Rollback(ctx)
var txID int64
if err := tx.QueryRow(ctx,
`INSERT INTO transactions (kind, round_id) VALUES ($1, $2) RETURNING id`,
kind, roundID).Scan(&txID); err != nil {
return 0, err
}
ordered := append([]Posting(nil), postings...)
sort.Slice(ordered, func(i, j int) bool {
return ordered[i].AccountID < ordered[j].AccountID
})
for _, p := range ordered {
// Lock the account row first, then read its latest balance. Taking the
// lock before the read is what serializes concurrent spends.
var allowNegative bool
if err := tx.QueryRow(ctx,
`SELECT allow_negative FROM accounts WHERE id = $1 FOR UPDATE`,
p.AccountID).Scan(&allowNegative); err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("locking account %d: %w", p.AccountID, err)
}
var before int64
if err := tx.QueryRow(ctx,
`SELECT COALESCE(
(SELECT balance_after FROM postings
WHERE account_id = $1 ORDER BY id DESC LIMIT 1), 0)`,
p.AccountID).Scan(&before); err != nil {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("reading balance of account %d: %w", p.AccountID, err)
}
// Detect wraparound before trusting the result: a credit that
// overflows would otherwise land as a negative balance, and a debit
// that underflows as a positive one.
after := before + p.AmountMsat
if (p.AmountMsat > 0 && after < before) || (p.AmountMsat < 0 && after > before) {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("ledger: amount %d overflows the balance of account %d (%d)",
p.AmountMsat, p.AccountID, before)
}
if after < 0 && !allowNegative {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("%w: account %d holds %d, needs %d",
ErrInsufficientFunds, p.AccountID, before, -p.AmountMsat)
}
if _, err := tx.Exec(ctx,
`INSERT INTO postings
(transaction_id, account_id, amount_msat, balance_before, balance_after)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5)`,
txID, p.AccountID, p.AmountMsat, before, after); err != nil {
return 0, err
}
}
if err := tx.Commit(ctx); err != nil {
return 0, err
}
return txID, nil
}
// Transfer moves funds between two accounts. This is the peer-to-peer path.
func (l *Ledger) Transfer(ctx context.Context, from, to int64, amountMsat int64) (int64, error) {
if amountMsat <= 0 {
return 0, ErrNonPositiveAmount
}
return l.Post(ctx, "transfer", nil, []Posting{
{AccountID: from, AmountMsat: -amountMsat},
{AccountID: to, AmountMsat: amountMsat},
})
}
// Deposit credits a player from the Lightning bridge account.
func (l *Ledger) Deposit(ctx context.Context, player int64, amountMsat int64) (int64, error) {
if amountMsat <= 0 {
return 0, ErrNonPositiveAmount
}
bridge, err := l.AccountByName(ctx, "lightning_bridge")
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
return l.Post(ctx, "deposit", nil, []Posting{
{AccountID: bridge, AmountMsat: -amountMsat},
{AccountID: player, AmountMsat: amountMsat},
})
}
// Withdraw debits a player back to the Lightning bridge account.
func (l *Ledger) Withdraw(ctx context.Context, player int64, amountMsat int64) (int64, error) {
if amountMsat <= 0 {
return 0, ErrNonPositiveAmount
}
bridge, err := l.AccountByName(ctx, "lightning_bridge")
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
return l.Post(ctx, "withdraw", nil, []Posting{
{AccountID: player, AmountMsat: -amountMsat},
{AccountID: bridge, AmountMsat: amountMsat},
})
}
// Balance returns the account's current balance in millisatoshis.
func (l *Ledger) Balance(ctx context.Context, accountID int64) (int64, error) {
var bal int64
err := l.pool.QueryRow(ctx,
`SELECT COALESCE(
(SELECT balance_after FROM postings
WHERE account_id = $1 ORDER BY id DESC LIMIT 1), 0)`,
accountID).Scan(&bal)
return bal, err
}
// History returns an account's postings, newest first.
func (l *Ledger) History(ctx context.Context, accountID int64, limit int) ([]Entry, error) {
rows, err := l.pool.Query(ctx,
`SELECT p.transaction_id, t.kind, t.round_id,
p.amount_msat, p.balance_before, p.balance_after, p.created_at
FROM postings p
JOIN transactions t ON t.id = p.transaction_id
WHERE p.account_id = $1
ORDER BY p.id DESC
LIMIT $2`, accountID, limit)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer rows.Close()
var out []Entry
for rows.Next() {
var e Entry
if err := rows.Scan(&e.TransactionID, &e.Kind, &e.RoundID,
&e.AmountMsat, &e.BalanceBefore, &e.BalanceAfter, &e.CreatedAt); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
out = append(out, e)
}
return out, rows.Err()
}
// EnsurePlayer returns the account id for a public key, creating it if needed.
func (l *Ledger) EnsurePlayer(ctx context.Context, pubkey []byte) (int64, error) {
var id int64
err := l.pool.QueryRow(ctx,
`INSERT INTO accounts (kind, pubkey) VALUES ('player', $1)
ON CONFLICT (pubkey) DO UPDATE SET pubkey = EXCLUDED.pubkey
RETURNING id`, pubkey).Scan(&id)
return id, err
}
// AccountByName resolves a system account such as "house_pot".
func (l *Ledger) AccountByName(ctx context.Context, name string) (int64, error) {
var id int64
err := l.pool.QueryRow(ctx,
`SELECT id FROM accounts WHERE name = $1`, name).Scan(&id)
if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("ledger: no account named %q", name)
}
return id, err
}
// TotalIssued is the value held inside the system by players and the house —
// every account except the external Lightning bridge. It changes only when
// funds genuinely enter or leave, never through internal play.
func (l *Ledger) TotalIssued(ctx context.Context) (int64, error) {
return l.sumBalances(ctx, `WHERE NOT a.allow_negative`)
}
// ConservationCheck sums every account including the bridge. Because each
// transaction sums to zero, this must always be exactly zero. A non-zero
// result means the books are corrupt, and is the top-level audit alarm.
func (l *Ledger) ConservationCheck(ctx context.Context) (int64, error) {
return l.sumBalances(ctx, ``)
}
// sumBalances totals account balances.
//
// Postgres SUM() over bigint returns numeric, which can exceed int64 even
// though no single balance can. Scanning it as text and parsing through
// big.Int means a corrupt ledger reports a clear error instead of a scan
// failure — the alarm must survive the very condition it exists to detect.
func (l *Ledger) sumBalances(ctx context.Context, where string) (int64, error) {
var text string
err := l.pool.QueryRow(ctx,
`SELECT COALESCE(SUM(b.balance_msat), 0)::text
FROM account_balances b
JOIN accounts a ON a.id = b.account_id `+where).Scan(&text)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
total, ok := new(big.Int).SetString(text, 10)
if !ok {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("ledger: unparseable balance total %q", text)
}
if !total.IsInt64() {
return 0, fmt.Errorf("ledger: balance total %s exceeds int64; the books are corrupt", text)
}
return total.Int64(), nil
}