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<!doctype html><html lang=en><head><meta charset=utf-8><meta name=viewport content="width=device-width,initial-scale=1"><title>In Re the Marriage of Brown, 675 P.2d 1207 (Wash. 1984) | HallApproved.com</title><meta name=description content="In the Matter of the Marriage of Ronna R. Brown, Petitioner, and William L. Brown, Respondent, 675 P.2d 1207"><link rel=canonical href=https://hallapproved.com/wa/cases/supreme/1984/1344580/><link rel=icon href=/favicon.svg type=image/svg+xml><meta property="og:site_name" content="Hall Approved — Free American Case Law"><meta property="og:url" content="https://hallapproved.com/wa/cases/supreme/1984/1344580/"><meta property="og:type" content="article"><meta property="og:title" content="In Re the Marriage of Brown, 675 P.2d 1207"><meta property="og:description" content="In the Matter of the Marriage of Ronna R. Brown, Petitioner, and William L. Brown, Respondent, 675 P.2d 1207"><meta property="article:published_time" content="1984-01-12"><meta property="og:locale" content="en_US"><meta property="og:image" content="https://hallapproved.com/og-image.png"><meta property="og:image:width" content="1200"><meta property="og:image:height" content="630"><meta property="og:image:alt" content="Hall Approved — Free American Case Law"><meta name=twitter:card content="summary_large_image"><meta name=twitter:title content="In Re the Marriage of Brown, 675 P.2d 1207"><meta name=twitter:description content="In the Matter of the Marriage of Ronna R. Brown, Petitioner, and William L. Brown, Respondent, 675 P.2d 1207"><meta name=twitter:image content="https://hallapproved.com/og-image.png"><link rel=stylesheet href=/css/main.min.bb0569a18967c40a0cc4a9b280ff92cd1f688af91e691406fc3ff4130203bc69.css><script type=application/ld+json>{"@context":"https://schema.org","@type":"BreadcrumbList","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","item":"https://hallapproved.com/","name":"Free Legal Archive","position":1},{"@type":"ListItem","item":"https://hallapproved.com/wa/","name":"Washington","position":2},{"@type":"ListItem","item":"https://hallapproved.com/wa/cases/","name":"Washington Cases","position":3},{"@type":"ListItem","item":"https://hallapproved.com/wa/cases/supreme/","name":"Washington Supreme Court","position":4},{"@type":"ListItem","item":"https://hallapproved.com/wa/cases/supreme/1984/","name":"1984","position":5},{"@type":"ListItem","name":"In Re the Marriage of Brown","position":6}]}</script><script type=application/ld+json>{"@context":["https://schema.org",{"LegalCase":"https://hallapproved.com/vocab#LegalCase","citation":"https://hallapproved.com/vocab#citation","citedByCount":"https://hallapproved.com/vocab#citedByCount","court":"https://hallapproved.com/vocab#court","holdings":"https://hallapproved.com/vocab#holdings","treatmentStatus":"https://hallapproved.com/vocab#treatmentStatus"}],"@type":["ScholarlyArticle","LegalCase"],"alternateName":"675 P.2d 1207; 100 Wash. 2d 729; 1984 Wash. LEXIS 1445","author":{"@type":"Person","name":"Dimmick"},"citation":"675 P.2d 1207","citedByCount":71,"court":{"@type":"GovernmentOrganization","name":"Washington Supreme Court"},"dateModified":"1984-01-12","datePublished":"1984-01-12","headline":"In Re the Marriage of Brown, 675 P.2d 1207","identifier":{"@type":"PropertyValue","name":"Citation","value":"675 P.2d 1207"},"inLanguage":"en-US","isPartOf":{"@type":"WebSite","name":"HallApproved","url":"https://hallapproved.com/"},"license":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","name":"In Re the Marriage of Brown","publisher":{"@type":"Organization","name":"HallApproved","url":"https://hallapproved.com/"},"url":"https://hallapproved.com/wa/cases/supreme/1984/1344580/"}</script></head><body id=top><header class=site-header><div class=container><a href=/ class=site-title>Hall Approved</a>
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<span class=separator>/</span></nav><header class=case-header data-pagefind-ignore><h1 class=case-title>In Re the Marriage of Brown</h1><div class=case-name>In Re the Marriage of Brown</div><div class=case-meta>Washington Supreme Court &#183; Decided January 12, 1984 &#183; Dimmick</div><div class=case-citation-line>675 P.2d 1207; 100 Wash. 2d 729; 1984 Wash. LEXIS 1445
<span class=help>(Pacific Reporter, Second Series)</span></div></header><meta data-pagefind-meta=court[content] content="Washington Supreme Court"><meta data-pagefind-meta=year[content] content="1984"><meta data-pagefind-meta=citations[content] content="675 P.2d 1207; 100 Wash. 2d 729; 1984 Wash. LEXIS 1445"><meta data-pagefind-meta=cited_count[content] content="71"><meta data-pagefind-filter=court[content] content="Washington Supreme Court"><meta data-pagefind-filter=year[content] content="1984"><h1 class=sr-only data-pagefind-weight=10 data-pagefind-meta=title>In Re the Marriage of Brown</h1><section class="section full-opinion" id=full-opinion><div data-pagefind-ignore><div class="opinions container"><section class=opinion id=opinion-combined><h2 class=opinion-heading>Opinion</h2><div class=opinion-text><author id=b770-4><span id=p_730 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=730>*730
</span>Dimmick, J.</author><p id=adr-dedup-0>When a third party tortfeasor injures a spouse during the marriage, how should the potential recovery on the personal injury claim be characterized for purposes of distribution in a subsequent dissolution proceeding? The Court of Appeals, Division One, held that Ronna Brown's potential recovery for an injury sustained during her marriage was community property. We reverse. Under our opinion today, recovery for an injury inflicted upon a married person by a third party tortfeasor is the separate property of the injured spouse, except to the extent the recovery compensates the community for lost wages which would have been community property, or injury-related expenses which the community incurred. The disposition of Ronna's potential recovery entered by the trial judge, which was reversed by the Court of Appeals, is in accord with our holding and is reinstated.<p id=b770-5>I<p id=b770-6>Ronna and William L. Brown were married on January 27, 1967. In October 1975, Ronna filed for dissolution. The parties later reconciled and the action was dismissed. Prior to this dismissal, the parties entered into a postnuptial agreement. The agreement provided that certain assets were separate and others were community. It further stated that in the event of dissolution each party would be awarded his or her separate property and all of the community property accumulated by the parties would be equally divided.<p id=b770-7>In September 1979, Ronna instituted a second dissolution action. In this action, both parties agreed that the postnuptial agreement was valid and binding. The trial judge considered herself bound by the agreement and divided the property accordingly.<p id=b770-8>Approximately 6 months before the second action was filed, Ronna had been injured in an automobile accident. At trial, no cross examination concerning her injury or the value of her potential recovery was permitted. Out-of-pocket expenses relating to her injury and incurred prior to
<span id=p_731 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=731>*731
</span>trial had been reimbursed in full. The trial court characterized her potential recovery as follows:<blockquote id=b771-4>a. Recovery for out of pocket expenses incurred after trial is the separate property of the party incurring said expenses and should be awarded to that party.</blockquote><blockquote id=b771-5>b. Recovery for petitioner's lost earnings and diminished earning capacity from the date of the accident until the date of separation, September 4, 1979, is community property and should be awarded one-half to each party.</blockquote><blockquote id=b771-6>c. Recovery for petitioner's lost earnings and diminished earning capacity after the date of separation, September 4, 1979, is the separate property of the petitioner and should be awarded to her.</blockquote><blockquote id=b771-7>d. Recovery for all other damages is the separate property of the petitioner and should be awarded to her. The control of the litigation should repose with the petitioner who should have exclusive authority to compromise the claim. In the event the case is submitted to the jury trial the above allocation of the damages should proceed upon special interrogatories.</blockquote><p id=b771-8>Conclusion of law 6.A.7. Clerk's Papers, at 19-20.<p id=b771-9>William appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Ronna's third party tort claim was community property.<p id=b771-10>II<p id=b771-11>The established rule in Washington has heretofore been that recovery for injuries to a married person by a third party tortfeasor is community property.
<em>Freehe v. Freehe,
</em><span class=citation data-id=2616799><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1972/2616799/#191 aria-description="Citation for case: Freehe v. Freehe">81 Wn.2d 183, 191</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=2616799><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1972/2616799/ aria-description="Citation for case: Freehe v. Freehe">500 P.2d 771</a></span> (1972).<p id=b771-12>This rule has its genesis in the early case of
<em>Hawkins v. Front St. Cable Ry.,
</em><span class=citation data-id=4725520><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1892/4918864/ aria-description="Citation for case: Hawkins v. Front Street Cable Railway Co.">3 Wash. 592</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=4725520><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1892/4918864/ aria-description="Citation for case: Hawkins v. Front Street Cable Railway Co.">28 P. 1021</a></span> (1892).
<em><span class=citation data-id=4725520><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1892/4918864/ aria-description="Citation for case: Hawkins v. Front Street Cable Railway Co.">Hawkins</a></span>
</em>was a tort action brought by husband and wife to recover damages resulting from injuries received by the wife while riding as a passenger on a streetcar. The defendant tortfeasor challenged an instruction which permitted the jury to take the husband's loss of his wife's services into consideration in computing damages. This court upheld the instruction on the following reasoning:<blockquote id=b771-13>At common law, when a wife was injured through the tort of a third person, the injury and the right of action</blockquote><blockquote id=b772-4><span id=p_732 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=732>*732
</span>were hers, but she could not sue unless her husband, if living, joined her as plaintiff. The recovery in that case was the pecuniary measure of her own injury and suffering in body and mind. But there was another element of damage which could be recovered only by her husband suing alone in a separate action, viz., his loss of her services and his outlay in restoring her to health. . . .</blockquote><blockquote id=b772-5>. . .
<em>But inasmuch as the right to sue for a tort which one has suffered is a chose in action, and therefore property, in those states where, as here, all property acquired by either spouse otherwise than by gift, bequest, devise or descent is common or community property, this chose in action is suable by that member of the community who has the disposition of the community personalty. . . .</em></blockquote><blockquote id=b772-6>... In this case, therefore, the husband was the only necessary party, though the wife, by §7, Code of 1881, is a proper party, and in this action all of the damages naturally flowing from the injury complained of are recoverable.</blockquote><p id=b772-7>(Italics ours.)
<em><span class=citation data-id=4725520><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1892/4918864/ aria-description="Citation for case: Hawkins v. Front Street Cable Railway Co.">Hawkins</a></span>,
</em>at 595-96.<p id=b772-8>Thus, the issue in
<em><span class=citation data-id=4725520><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1892/4918864/ aria-description="Citation for case: Hawkins v. Front Street Cable Railway Co.">Hawkins</a></span>
</em>was whether the plaintiff husband could recover damages for the loss of his wife's services in an action brought for personal injury to his wife. The
<em><span class=citation data-id=4725520><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1892/4918864/ aria-description="Citation for case: Hawkins v. Front Street Cable Railway Co.">Hawkins</a></span>
</em>court found it necessary to characterize the personal injury claim in order to determine what role the husband played as a plaintiff in the action. Because the claim was community property, it followed that the husband was suing in his capacity as manager of the community personalty, and all damages were recoverable in the one community action.<p id=b772-9>The
<em><span class=citation data-id=4725520><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1892/4918864/ aria-description="Citation for case: Hawkins v. Front Street Cable Railway Co.">Hawkins</a></span>
</em>rule that a claim for personal injury to a married person by a third party tortfeasor is community property was consistently followed in subsequent decisions of this court.
<em>See, e.g., Chase v. Beard,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1425176><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1959/1425176/ aria-description="Citation for case: Chase v. Beard">55 Wn.2d 58</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1425176><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1959/1425176/ aria-description="Citation for case: Chase v. Beard">346 P.2d 315</a></span> (1959);
<em>Ostheller v. Spokane & I.E. R.R.,
</em><span class=citation data-id=4719414><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1919/4913331/ aria-description="Citation for case: Ostheller v. Spokane & Inland Empire Railroad">107 Wash. 678</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=4719414><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1919/4913331/ aria-description="Citation for case: Ostheller v. Spokane & Inland Empire Railroad">182 P. 630</a></span> (1919);
<em>Hammond v. Jackson,
</em><span class=citation data-id=4734635><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1916/4927192/ aria-description="Citation for case: Hammond v. Jackson">89 Wash. 510</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=4734635><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1916/4927192/ aria-description="Citation for case: Hammond v. Jackson">154 P. 1106</a></span> (1916). Although the rule was applied in a variety of contexts, many of the early cases applied it to hold that the husband, as manager of the
<span id=p_733 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=733>*733
</span>community personalty, was a necessary party to the wife's action for personal injury sustained during the marriage.
<em>See, e.g., Clark v. Beggs,
</em><span class=citation data-id=4001578><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1926/4225364/ aria-description="Citation for case: Clark v. Beggs">138 Wash. 62</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=4001578><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1926/4225364/ aria-description="Citation for case: Clark v. Beggs">244 P. 121</a></span> (1926);
<em>Hynes v. Colman Dock Co.,
</em><span class=citation data-id=4719532><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1919/4913443/ aria-description="Citation for case: Hynes v. Colman Dock Co.">108 Wash. 642</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=4719532><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1919/4913443/ aria-description="Citation for case: Hynes v. Colman Dock Co.">185 P. 617</a></span> (1919);
<em>Schneider v. Biberger,
</em><span class=citation data-id=4732869><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1913/4925575/ aria-description="Citation for case: Schneider v. Biberger">76 Wash. 504</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=4732869><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1913/4925575/ aria-description="Citation for case: Schneider v. Biberger">136 P. 701</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=4732869><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1913/4925575/ aria-description="Citation for case: Schneider v. Biberger">6 A.L.R. 1056</a></span> (1913).<p id=b773-4>In 1972, the State Legislature amended the community property statutes to grant the wife equal power to manage and control community property. RCW 26.16.030. This change made
<em><span class=citation data-id=4725520><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1892/4918864/ aria-description="Citation for case: Hawkins v. Front Street Cable Railway Co.">Hawkins</a></span>
</em>and its progeny obsolete to the extent they had held that the husband, as manager of the community property, was a necessary party to his wife's personal injury action. Nevertheless, the vitality of the
<em><span class=citation data-id=4725520><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1892/4918864/ aria-description="Citation for case: Hawkins v. Front Street Cable Railway Co.">Hawkins</a></span>
</em>rule itself, which was based on an interpretation of statutes defining separate and community property, continued on unimpaired.
<a class=footnote href=#fn1 id=fn1_ref>1</a><p id=b773-5>Two Court of Appeals decisions applied the
<em><span class=citation data-id=4725520><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1892/4918864/ aria-description="Citation for case: Hawkins v. Front Street Cable Railway Co.">Hawkins</a></span>
</em>rule to the issue before us today, namely, proper characterization of a spouse's third party tort recovery for purposes of distributing it when the marriage has been dissolved.
<em>Perez v. Perez, 11
</em>Wn. App. 429, <span class=citation data-id=1163722><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1974/1163722/ aria-description="Citation for case: Perez v. Perez">523 P.2d 455</a></span> (1974) was a declaratory judgment action brought to determine a woman's interest in a personal injury settlement received by her former husband after their divorce. The injury had occurred during the marriage. Relying on the
<em><span class=citation data-id=4725520><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1892/4918864/ aria-description="Citation for case: Hawkins v. Front Street Cable Railway Co.">Hawkins</a></span>
</em>rule, the
<em><span class=citation data-id=1163722><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1974/1163722/ aria-description="Citation for case: Perez v. Perez">Perez</a></span>
</em>court held that the settlement was community property. Since the settlement had not been divided during the divorce action, it was deemed to be property held by the parties as tenants in common.
<em><span class=citation data-id=1163722><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1974/1163722/ aria-description="Citation for case: Perez v. Perez">Perez</a></span>,
</em>at 431-32.<p id=b773-6><em>In re Marriage of Parsons,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1185779><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1981/1185779/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re the Marriage of Parsons">28 Wn. App. 276</a></span>, 622 P.2d
<span id=p_734 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=734>*734
</span>415,
<em>review denied,
</em><span class="citation no-link">95 Wn.2d 1019</span> (1981) involved a husband who had received $77,500 in settlement of a personal injury claim. Community medical expenses and lost wages had been otherwise reimbursed. In the subsequent dissolution proceeding, the husband argued that the entire settlement was his separate property, since it compensated him for damages to his personal security, an "asset" brought into the marriage.<p id=b774-5>The
<em>Parsons
</em>court, believing itself bound by the
<em><span class=citation data-id=4725520><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1892/4918864/ aria-description="Citation for case: Hawkins v. Front Street Cable Railway Co.">Hawkins</a></span>
</em>line of authority, held the settlement to be community property. It explained the reasoning behind the
<em><span class=citation data-id=4725520><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1892/4918864/ aria-description="Citation for case: Hawkins v. Front Street Cable Railway Co.">Hawkins</a></span>
</em>rule in modern terms:<blockquote id=b774-6>Separate property is defined as property and pecuniary rights acquired before marriage or acquired after marriage by gift, bequest, devise or descent. It also includes the rents, issues and profits from separate property. RCW 26.16.010, .020. Community property is all other property acquired by either spouse after marriage that is not acquired or owned as separate property. RCW 26.16-.030. This "waste basket" definition of community property results in property being characterized as community unless it meets the definition of separate property. The Washington rule is that fortuitous acquisition of damages for personal injury by a third party tort-feasor is community property because it does not fit within the definition of separate property.</blockquote><p id=b774-7>(Citations omitted.)
<em>Parsons,
</em>at 278.<p id=b774-8>Ill<p id=b774-9>The
<em><span class=citation data-id=4725520><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1892/4918864/ aria-description="Citation for case: Hawkins v. Front Street Cable Railway Co.">Hawkins</a></span>
</em>rule has been criticized by legal commentators and rejected by the majority of our fellow community property states.<p id=b774-10>Commentators William deFuniak and Michael Vaughn blame the
<em><span class=citation data-id=4725520><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1892/4918864/ aria-description="Citation for case: Hawkins v. Front Street Cable Railway Co.">Hawkins</a></span>
</em>rule on an incomplete understanding of the basic principles of community property law:<blockquote id=b774-11>The frequently evident dissatisfaction with the frequently inadequate reasons given for the doctrine that compensation for personal injuries to a spouse is community property lie in an incomplete understanding of the true principles of community property. This incomplete understanding in itself often leads to a too literal inter
<span id=p_735 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=735>*735
</span>pretation of the local statutes. . . . Except for gifts clearly made to the marital community, community property only consists of that which is acquired by onerous title, that is, by labor or industry of the spouses, or which is acquired in exchange for community property (which, of course, was acquired itself by onerous title, again with the exception as to the gift). It must be plainly evident that a right of action for injuries to person, reputation, property, or the like, or the compensation received therefor, is not property acquired by onerous title. The labor and industry of the spouses did not bring it into being. For that matter, it is not property acquired by lucrative title either. What then, is it? Since the right of action for injury to the person, or for that matter, to the reputation, is intended to bring about compensation for the injury, and the compensation is intended to repair or make whole the injury, so far as is possible in such a case, the compensation partakes of the same character as that which has been injured or suffered loss. In this respect, the situation is very similar to an exchange of property during marriage. But what or who has been injured? Is it the marital community or is it the separate individuality of the spouse? In actuality, both. The physical injury to the spouse, the pain and suffering of the spouse therefrom is an injury to the spouse as an individual. . . . But on the other hand, if the injury deprives the marital community of the earnings or services of the spouse, that is an injury to the marital community; likewise there is loss to the community where the community funds are expended for hospital and medical expenses, etc.</blockquote><p id=b775-5>(Footnotes omitted.) W. deFuniak & M. Vaughn,
<em>Community Property
</em>§ 82, at 201-03 (2d ed. 1971).
<em>See also
</em>Cross,
<em>The Community Property Law in Washington,
</em><span class="citation no-link">49 Wash. L. Rev. 729</span>, 773-75 (1974).<p id=b775-6>Our fellow community property states have also criticized and rejected the
<em><span class=citation data-id=4725520><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1892/4918864/ aria-description="Citation for case: Hawkins v. Front Street Cable Railway Co.">Hawkins</a></span>
</em>rule. Nevada was the first to do so in
<em>Fredrickson & Watson Constr. Co. v. Boyd,
</em><span class=citation data-id=3549193><a href=/nv/cases/supreme/1940/3569329/ aria-description="Citation for case: Fredrickson & Watson Construction Co v. Boyd">60 Nev. 117</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=3549193><a href=/nv/cases/supreme/1940/3569329/ aria-description="Citation for case: Fredrickson & Watson Construction Co v. Boyd">102 P.2d 627</a></span> (1940). Pursuant to the Nevada community property statutes, all property acquired after marriage and other than by gift, bequest, devise or descent was community property. The
<em>Fredrickson
</em>court acknowledged that
<span id=p_736 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=736>*736
</span>the statute could be broadly construed to encompass every manner of property acquisition. However, construing the word "acquired" in the light of the uses and purposes of community property, the court concluded that the word encompassed wages or other property acquired through toil, talent, or other productive faculty, but not compensation for personal injury. Rather, a personal injury claim took its character from the right violated, namely, the separate right of personal security.
<em>Fredrickson,
</em>at 121-22.<p id=b776-4>In
<em>Rogers v. Yellowstone Park Co.,
</em><span class=citation data-id=9844207><a href=/id/cases/supreme/1975/1143047/ aria-description="Citation for case: Rogers v. Yellowstone Park Company">97 Idaho 14</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=9844207><a href=/id/cases/supreme/1975/1143047/ aria-description="Citation for case: Rogers v. Yellowstone Park Company">539 P.2d 566</a></span> (1974), the Idaho Supreme Court utilized similar reasoning. There, it was argued that a wife could not sue for personal injuries inflicted through her husband's negligence because, under prior case law, any recovery would be community and benefit the tortfeasor husband. The
<em><span class=citation data-id=9844207><a href=/id/cases/supreme/1975/1143047/ aria-description="Citation for case: Rogers v. Yellowstone Park Company">Rogers</a></span>
</em>court acknowledged that prior case law had held tort recovery to be community property because it was "acquired" after marriage, but not by gift, bequest, devise or descent.
<em><span class=citation data-id=9844207><a href=/id/cases/supreme/1975/1143047/ aria-description="Citation for case: Rogers v. Yellowstone Park Company">Rogers</a></span>,
</em>at 18. However, it noted, the correct approach was to characterize the recovery in relation to the right violated,
<em>i.e.,
</em>the wife's
<em>separate
</em>right to personal security. Thus, it followed that the wife's action was not barred.
<a class=footnote href=#fn2 id=fn2_ref>2
</a><em><span class=citation data-id=9844207><a href=/id/cases/supreme/1975/1143047/ aria-description="Citation for case: Rogers v. Yellowstone Park Company">Rogers</a></span>,
</em>at 18-19.<p id=b776-5>In New Mexico and Arizona, recovery for personal injury suffered by one spouse during the marriage has been held to be community property to the extent it compensates the community for medical expenses and lost wages, but separate to the extent it compensates the injured spouse for his or her pain and suffering.
<em>Soto v. Vandeventer,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1362001><a href=/nm/cases/supreme/1952/1362001/ aria-description="Citation for case: Soto v. Vandeventer">56 N.M. 483</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1362001><a href=/nm/cases/supreme/1952/1362001/ aria-description="Citation for case: Soto v. Vandeventer">245 P.2d 826</a></span> (1952);
<em>Jurek v. Jurek,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1145033><a href=/az/cases/supreme/1980/1145033/ aria-description="Citation for case: Jurek v. Jurek">124 Ariz. 596</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1145033><a href=/az/cases/supreme/1980/1145033/ aria-description="Citation for case: Jurek v. Jurek">606 P.2d 812</a></span> (1980). In Texas, recovery for personal injury sustained during marriage is the separate property of the injured spouse, except for any recovery for loss of earning
<span id=p_737 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=737>*737
</span>capacity during the marriage. <span class="citation no-link">Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 5.01</span>(a)(3) (Vernon 1975). Similarly, in Louisiana, damages due to personal injury sustained by a spouse during the marriage are separate property, though damages attributable to community expenses or lost community earnings remain community property. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2344 (West Supp. 1983).<p id=b777-4>Only California has a different rule. There, recovery for personal injury inflicted by a third party is the separate property of the injured spouse only if the cause of action arose while the injured spouse was living separate from the other spouse, or after rendition of a decree of legal separation, an interlocutory decree of dissolution, or a final judgment of dissolution. <span class="citation no-link">Cal. Civ. Code § 5126</span> (West 1983). Otherwise, the rule that personal property acquired during the marriage is community property controls. <span class="citation no-link">Cal. Civ. Code § 5110</span>, as amended in 1983 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 342 (West).<p id=b777-5>IV<p id=b777-6>Upon consideration of these persuasive authorities, we have come to the conclusion that the
<em><span class=citation data-id=4725520><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1892/4918864/ aria-description="Citation for case: Hawkins v. Front Street Cable Railway Co.">Hawkins</a></span>
</em>rule, based as it was upon a too literal reading of our community property statutes, was wrong from the beginning.<p id=b777-7>RCW 26.16.030 provides that property "acquired" by either spouse after marriage is community unless it is acquired or owned as prescribed in RCW 26.16.010 and RCW 26.16.020, defining separate property. In company with the Nevada Supreme Court, we believe that the word "acquired" should be construed to encompass wages and other property acquired through the toil, talent, or other productive faculty of either spouse, but not compensation for personal injury.
<em>See Fredrickson & Watson Constr. Co. v. Boyd,
</em><span class=citation data-id=3549193><a href=/nv/cases/supreme/1940/3569329/#121 aria-description="Citation for case: Fredrickson & Watson Construction Co v. Boyd">60 Nev. 117, 121</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=3549193><a href=/nv/cases/supreme/1940/3569329/ aria-description="Citation for case: Fredrickson & Watson Construction Co v. Boyd">102 P.2d 627</a></span> (1940). Such a construction is consistent with the basic principle that, except for gifts to the community, community property consists only of that which is acquired by onerous title, or in exchange for other community property. W. deFuniak & M.
<span id=p_738 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=738>*738
</span>Vaughn, at 201.<p id=b778-5>If recovery for a personal injury suffered during the marriage is not community property under the terms of RCW 26.16.030, how is it to be characterized? Since the recovery is intended to make whole an injury, it should partake of the same character as that which has suffered injury or loss. W. deFuniak & M. Vaughn, at 202. Thus, damages for physical injury and pain and suffering, which compensate the injured spouse for the harm to his or her separate individuality, should be separate property. Damages for injury-related expenses should be community or separate according to which fund incurs the expenses. Similarly, damages for lost wages and diminished earning capacity should partake of the same community or separate character as the wages and earning capacity they are intended to reimburse or make whole.<p id=b778-6>We note that in most cases, compensation for lost wages and diminished earning capacity will be community property, because the wages which would have been earned during the marriage but for the injury are community.
<em>Colagrossi v. Hendrickson,
</em><span class=citation data-id=2611575><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1957/2611575/#272 aria-description="Citation for case: Colagrossi v. Hendrickson">50 Wn.2d 266, 272</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=2611575><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1957/2611575/ aria-description="Citation for case: Colagrossi v. Hendrickson">310 P.2d 1072</a></span> (1957). However, if a marriage is dissolved after the injury is sustained, it may be that the recovery will compensate the injured spouse in part for wages which would have been earned after separation, and would therefore have been separate property pursuant to RCW 26.16.140. Under our holding today, such damages would be separate. Thus, the separated spouse who must receive compensation from a tortfeasor is placed in the same position as a separated spouse who is paid wages by an employer.<p id=b778-7>It is also true that in most cases, compensation for injury-related expenses will be community property, because the community will incur and pay those expenses. Under our holding today, however, the compensation a divorced spouse receives for continuing injury-related expenses which he or she alone must pay will be separate property. Thus, we eliminate the obvious inequity of permitting the uninjured spouse to share in reimbursement for
<span id=p_739 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=739>*739
</span>expenses which he or she is not obligated to, and does not, pay.<p id=b779-5>Turning to the case before us today, we find that the trial judge correctly applied these principles in characterizing Ronna Brown's potential tort recovery. At the time of trial, there were no unreimbursed out-of-pocket expenses. Recovery for out-of-pocket expenses incurred
<em>after
</em>trial was properly held to be the separate property of the party (presumably Ronna) incurring the expenses. Recovery for lost wages and diminished earning capacity was correctly held to be community property up until the date of separation, but the separate property of Ronna thereafter. Finally, recovery for all other damages,
<em>i.e.,
</em>pain and suffering, was accurately characterized as Ronna's separate property.<p id=b779-6>Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court.
<em>Perez v. Perez,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1163722><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1974/1163722/ aria-description="Citation for case: Perez v. Perez">11 Wn. App. 429</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1163722><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1974/1163722/ aria-description="Citation for case: Perez v. Perez">523 P.2d 455</a></span> (1974) and
<em>In re Marriage of Parsons,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1185779><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1981/1185779/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re the Marriage of Parsons">28 Wn. App. 276</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1185779><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1981/1185779/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re the Marriage of Parsons">622 P.2d 415</a></span>,
<em>review denied,
</em><span class="citation no-link">95 Wn.2d 1019</span> (1981) directly conflict with this decision and are hereby disapproved.
<em><span class=citation data-id=4725520><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1892/4918864/ aria-description="Citation for case: Hawkins v. Front Street Cable Railway Co.">Hawkins</a></span>
</em>and its progeny are overruled to the extent necessary to conform the law to today's opinion.<p id=b779-7>Williams, C.J., and Rosellini, Stafford, Utter, Brach-tenbach, Dolliver, Dore, and Pearson, JJ., concur.<div class=footnotes><div class=footnote id=fn1 label=1><a class=footnote href=#fn1_ref>1</a><p id=b773-7>We deviated from the
<em><span class=citation data-id=4725520><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1892/4918864/ aria-description="Citation for case: Hawkins v. Front Street Cable Railway Co.">Hawkins</a></span>
</em>rule only once. In
<em>Freehe v. Freehe,
</em><span class=citation data-id=2616799><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1972/2616799/#191 aria-description="Citation for case: Freehe v. Freehe">81 Wn.2d 183, 191</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=2616799><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1972/2616799/ aria-description="Citation for case: Freehe v. Freehe">500 P.2d 771</a></span> (1972), the "established rule that recovery for injuries to a married person by a third-party tort-feasor is community property" was found not controlling in a personal injury action by one spouse against the other. Instead, the injured spouse was permitted to recover as his separate property damages for pain and suffering and one-half the damages for loss of future earnings. Such separate characterization was deemed necessary in order to compensate the injured spouse without unduly benefiting the tortfeasor spouse.
<em><span class=citation data-id=2616799><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1972/2616799/ aria-description="Citation for case: Freehe v. Freehe">Freehe</a></span>,
</em>at 191-92.</div><div class=footnote id=fn2 label=2><a class=footnote href=#fn2_ref>2</a><p id=b776-6>Interestingly, when it came time to determine what damages were recoverable, the
<em><span class=citation data-id=9844207><a href=/id/cases/supreme/1975/1143047/ aria-description="Citation for case: Rogers v. Yellowstone Park Company">Rogers</a></span>
</em>court followed
<em>Freehe v. <span class=citation data-id=2616799><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1972/2616799/ aria-description="Citation for case: Freehe v. Freehe">Freehe, supra,</a></span>
</em>to hold that damages for pain and suffering and one-half lost wages could be recovered as separate property, together with reimbursement of the community's out-of-pocket expenses.
<em>Rogers v. Yellowstone Park Co.,
</em><span class=citation data-id=9844207><a href=/id/cases/supreme/1975/1143047/#20 aria-description="Citation for case: Rogers v. Yellowstone Park Company">97 Idaho at 20</a></span>.</div></div></div></section></div></div></section><div data-pagefind-ignore></div><p class=data-freshness-notice data-pagefind-ignore>Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: <a href=https://www.courtlistener.com/help/api/bulk-data/>CourtListener bulk data</a>.</div></article></main><footer class=site-footer><div class=container><div class=footer-content><p>A public interest project of <a href=https://AaronHall.com/>Aaron Hall, Attorney at Law</a> &copy; 2026<nav class=footer-links><a href=/about/>About</a>
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<span class=separator>/</span></nav><header class=case-header data-pagefind-ignore><h1 class=case-title>In the Matter of Marriage of Bulicek</h1><div class=case-name>In the Matter of Marriage of Bulicek</div><div class=case-meta>Court of Appeals of Washington &#183; Decided November 26, 1990 &#183; Baker</div><div class=case-citation-line>800 P.2d 394; 59 Wash. App. 630; 1990 Wash. App. LEXIS 418
<span class=help>(Pacific Reporter, Second Series)</span></div></header><meta data-pagefind-meta=court[content] content="Court of Appeals of Washington"><meta data-pagefind-meta=year[content] content="1990"><meta data-pagefind-meta=citations[content] content="800 P.2d 394; 59 Wash. App. 630; 1990 Wash. App. LEXIS 418"><meta data-pagefind-meta=cited_count[content] content="103"><meta data-pagefind-filter=court[content] content="Court of Appeals of Washington"><meta data-pagefind-filter=year[content] content="1990"><h1 class=sr-only data-pagefind-weight=10 data-pagefind-meta=title>In the Matter of Marriage of Bulicek</h1><section class="section full-opinion" id=full-opinion><div data-pagefind-ignore><div class="opinions container"><section class=opinion id=opinion-combined><h2 class=opinion-heading>Opinion</h2><div class=opinion-text><p id=b655-11>Baker, J.<p id=AD1>We are asked to review a dissolution decree concerning disposition of retirement benefits and an award of maintenance.<p id=b655-12>I<p id=b655-13>George and Janet Bulicek were married in 1963 and separated 22 years later in 1985. A dissolution decree was entered in 1989. At the time of trial, the parties' net earned monthly income was approximately $2,500 for George, and $720 for Janet. Janet also received a monthly disability payment of $169.52. George was in good health. Janet had numerous health problems and was under a doctor's care. George was 52 and Janet was 46 years old at time of trial. The couple had one child who is now an emancipated adult.<p id=b655-14>At the time of their marriage, George had worked approximately 5 years for GTE in Chicago. When he began work for GTE Northwest in 1969, he received 40 months'
<span id=p_632 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=632>*632
</span>credit for that work in calculating his GTE Northwest pension. George was offered GTE's Enhanced Early Retirement Program in the fall of 1988, and he could have retired with $1,081.81 per month at the end of 1988. GTE's estimated value of the comparable lump sum distribution of the pension benefit was $130,405.27. George opted not to retire.<p id=b656-4>In September 1989, George became eligible for normal early retirement, receiving $948.18 per month or a lump sum distribution of approximately $111,000. This would be discounted 3 percent for each year that George is under the age of 55 at his retirement. George may choose normal early retirement anytime between September 1989 and his normal retirement date, April 2002. The trial court characterized the retirement benefits as a partly separate, partly community asset, allocating as separate property benefits earned before marriage and after separation. Out of 275 total accrued months of GTE employment, 185 months were community (67.3 percent) and 90 months were separate (32.7 percent). The court ordered that upon receipt of retirement benefits, the benefits should be divided with an award to Janet as follows:<blockquote id=al2-dedup-0>Total months of 1/2 s Se™*» During Marriage ^ MontUy Benefit Total Months of Accredited Retirement Service at Retirement Date</blockquote><p id=b656-9>In other words, Janet would receive 1/2 x 185/275 or 33.65 percent of the monthly retirement benefit.<p id=b656-10>In addition, the trial court found Janet in need of maintenance and awarded her $500 per month for 1 year and $400 per month thereafter, terminating at her death or upon receipt of her monthly share of the GTE pension benefits.<p id=b656-11>II<p id=b656-12>We first consider the issue of maintenance. George contends that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering
<span id=p_633 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=633>*633
</span>him to pay maintenance until he retires. Janet contends that the trial court considered the statutory factors set forth in RCW 26.09.090
<a class=footnote href=#fn1 id=fn1_ref>1
</a>and acted within its discretion in awarding her $500 per month for 1 year and $400 per month until George retires.<p id=b657-5>The award of maintenance, like the division of property, is within the discretion of the trial court.
<em>In re Marriage of Nicholson,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1433544><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1977/1433544/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re the Marriage of Nicholson">17 Wn. App. 110</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1433544><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1977/1433544/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re the Marriage of Nicholson">561 P.2d 1116</a></span> (1977). The only limitation on amount and duration of maintenance under RCW 26.09.090 is that, in light of the relevant factors, the award must be just.
<em>In re Marriage of Morrow,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1129209><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1989/1129209/#585 aria-description="Citation for case: In Re Marriage of Morrow">53 Wn. App. 579, 585</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1129209><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1989/1129209/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re Marriage of Morrow">770 P.2d 197</a></span> (1989). Factors listed in RCW 26.09.090 include the financial resources of each party; the duration of the marriage and standard of living during marriage; and the age, physical and emotional condition, and financial obligations of the spouse seeking maintenance, as well as the time needed by the spouse seeking maintenance to acquire education for appropriate employment.<p id=b657-6>George argues that maintenance should be rehabilitative in nature and transitional in duration, and should last only 1 or 2 years to allow Janet time to secure further job training. The record indicates that rehabilitation is not an issue here. The reality is that Janet does not live on income close
<span id=p_634 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=634>*634
</span>to the income that supported the couple's standard of living during marriage and will likely never achieve the postdis-solution economic level of George.<p id=b658-5>Here, after a long-term marriage, Janet is in ill health and has limited job skills and experience. Trial courts are given wide discretion to fashion a dissolution order that will address the circumstances of the parties. Maintenance is one of those discretionary means.<p id=b658-6>George argues that the maintenance ordered here constitutes a permanent lien on an ex-husband's future income, a result disapproved in
<em>Berg v. Berg,
</em><span class=citation data-id=2619872><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1967/2619872/ aria-description="Citation for case: Berg v. Berg">72 Wn.2d 532</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=2619872><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1967/2619872/ aria-description="Citation for case: Berg v. Berg">434 P.2d 1</a></span> (1967). The court there quoted from
<em>Hogberg v. Hogberg,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1194511><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1964/1194511/#619 aria-description="Citation for case: Hogberg v. Hogberg">64 Wn.2d 617, 619</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1194511><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1964/1194511/ aria-description="Citation for case: Hogberg v. Hogberg">393 P.2d 291</a></span> (1964):<blockquote id=b658-7>Alimony is not a matter of right. When the wife has the ability to earn a living, it is not the policy of the law of this state to give her a perpetual lien on her divorced husband's future income.</blockquote><p id=b658-8>(Citations omitted.)
<em>Berg v. Berg,
</em><span class=citation data-id=2619872><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1967/2619872/#533 aria-description="Citation for case: Berg v. Berg">72 Wn.2d at 533</a></span>.<p id=b658-9>While the reasons for this policy include the valid goals of disentangling the divorcing spouses and setting each on a road to self-sufficiency, neither our current statutory language dealing with dissolution nor the known, postdissolution economic realities mandate a blind adherence to the language of the
<em><span class=citation data-id=2619872><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1967/2619872/ aria-description="Citation for case: Berg v. Berg">Berg</a></span>
</em>court.
<a class=footnote href=#fn2 id=fn2_ref>2</a><p id=b658-10>As the Supreme Court has noted, the spouse's ability for self-support is one factor to be considered under RCW 26.09.090(1)(a). In addition,<blockquote id=b658-11>[t]he duration of the marriage and the standard of living established during marriage must also be considered, making it clear that maintenance is not just a means of providing bare
<span id=p_635 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=635>*635
</span>necessities, but rather a flexible tool by which the parties' standard of living may be equalized for an appropriate period of time.</blockquote><p id=b659-4><em>In re Marriage of Washburn,
</em><span class=citation data-id=9571768><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1984/1308125/#179 aria-description="Citation for case: In Re the Marriage of Washburn">101 Wn.2d 168, 179</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=9571768><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1984/1308125/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re the Marriage of Washburn">677 P.2d 152</a></span> (1984).<p id=b659-5>The postdissolution economic position of the parties "is a paramount concern in determining issues of property division and maintenance."
<em>In re Marriage of Morrow,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1129209><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1989/1129209/#586 aria-description="Citation for case: In Re Marriage of Morrow">53 Wn. App. 579, 586</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1129209><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1989/1129209/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re Marriage of Morrow">770 P.2d 197</a></span> (1989) (quoting
<em>In re Marriage of Washburn,
</em><span class=citation data-id=9571768><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1984/1308125/#181 aria-description="Citation for case: In Re the Marriage of Washburn">101 Wn.2d at 181</a></span>).<p id=b659-6>The
<em>Washburn
</em>court dealt with a 10-year marriage and the division of property and an award of maintenance to a party who had put her spouse through professional school. While recognizing that such a party obviously could be financially self-sufficient, maintenance was appropriate to allow the party "to share, temporarily, in the lifestyle which he or she helped the student spouse to attain."
<em>Washburn,
</em><span class=citation data-id=9571768><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1984/1308125/#179 aria-description="Citation for case: In Re the Marriage of Washburn">101 Wn.2d at 179</a></span>.<p id=b659-7>Similarly, in the instant case we focus on the post-dissolution relative economic positions of the parties. Here, George will be in a position to support a lifestyle more comparable to the lifestyle enjoyed by the couple during marriage than will Janet, given their relative earning powers. The trial court correctly perceived that Janet would be in need of more than temporary support. The court provided a thoughtful resolution of the maintenance and pension issues that allows Janet a continuous stream of income.<p id=b659-8>Whether the maintenance lasts 1 year or 13 years is George's choice. He is free to retire when he wishes. These parties were married for 26 years. George's income at trial was nearly three times larger than Janet's. Considering the relevant statutory factors, including the predissolution standard of living of the parties and their relative postdis-solution status, it was well within the trial court's discretion to award maintenance to Janet in the
<em>amount and
</em>for the duration provided in its decree.<p id=b659-9>We hold that the trial court properly considered the statutory factors regarding maintenance and the facts in
<span id=p_636 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=636>*636
</span>this particular case and did not abuse its discretion in its award of maintenance.<p id=b660-5>Ill<p id=b660-6>We next consider the trial court's disposition of pension rights. George contends that the formula adopted by the court improperly allows Janet to share in postseparation contributions to the plan. He argues that the straight percentage formula fails to account for increases in yearly contributions after separation. George asserts that due to his "increasingly greater work experience and expanding earning potential", his earnings and consequently his employer's contributions
<a class=footnote href=#fn3 id=fn3_ref>3
</a>for the remainder of his work career will be proportionately much higher than during marriage. The result is that Janet will in effect receive a portion of the postdissolution retirement contributions, which are his separate property. George further contends that the trial court should have given a value to the retirement benefits and apportioned them as of the time of trial, thus avoiding the problem of allowing Janet a share in his separate property.<p id=b660-7>Pension benefits constitute property rights in the nature of deferred compensation, even if benefits are not presently available.
<em>See Farver v. Department of Retirement Sys.,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1271903><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1981/1271903/#141 aria-description="Citation for case: Farver v. Department of Retirement Systems">29 Wn. App. 138, 141</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1271903><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1981/1271903/ aria-description="Citation for case: Farver v. Department of Retirement Systems">629 P.2d 903</a></span> (1981),
<em>aff'd,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1262104><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1982/1262104/ aria-description="Citation for case: Farver v. Department of Retirement Systems">97 Wn.2d 344</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1262104><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1982/1262104/ aria-description="Citation for case: Farver v. Department of Retirement Systems">644 P.2d 1149</a></span> (1982). In deciding the distribution of property in a dissolution, the trial court has wide discretion.
<em>Wilder v. Wilder,
</em><span class=citation data-id=9553411><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1975/1190216/ aria-description="Citation for case: Wilder v. Wilder">85 Wn.2d 364</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=9553411><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1975/1190216/ aria-description="Citation for case: Wilder v. Wilder">534 P.2d 1355</a></span> (1975). The court seeks a "just and equitable" distribution, considering all relevant factors, including:<blockquote id=b660-8>(1) The nature and extent of the community property;</blockquote><blockquote id=b660-9>(2) The nature and extent of the separate property;</blockquote><blockquote id=b660-10>(3) The duration of the marriage; and</blockquote><blockquote id=b660-11>(4) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division of property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live therein for reasonable periods to a spouse having custody of any children.</blockquote><p id=b660-12>Former RCW 26.09.080.<p id=b661-3><span id=p_637 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=637>*637
</span>Washington courts have in the past sometimes divided pensions on an as-received basis using a percentage formula. In
<em>Edwards v. Edwards,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1141736><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1968/1141736/ aria-description="Citation for case: Edwards v. Edwards">74 Wn.2d 286</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1141736><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1968/1141736/ aria-description="Citation for case: Edwards v. Edwards">444 P.2d 703</a></span> (1968), the trial court equally divided pension benefits which were currently being received. The Supreme Court upheld the method of allocating the pension but reduced the wife's percentage from 50 percent to 25 percent because her earning power was larger than her husband's. This percentage allocation method, although not used in
<em>DeRevere v. DeRevere,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1396433><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1971/1396433/#746 aria-description="Citation for case: DeRevere v. DeRevere">5 Wn. App. 741, 746</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1396433><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1971/1396433/ aria-description="Citation for case: DeRevere v. DeRevere">491 P.2d 249</a></span> (1971), was cited by the court as one method of handling allocation of pension rights. The court said:<blockquote id=b661-4>One method of attempting to resolve the difficulties is to develop a percentage division of the monthly amount of the pension or retirement benefit which will remain constant during the period of time in which the pension is payable.
<em>See Edwards v. Edwards,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1141736><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1968/1141736/ aria-description="Citation for case: Edwards v. Edwards">74 Wn.2d 286</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1141736><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1968/1141736/ aria-description="Citation for case: Edwards v. Edwards">444 P.2d 703</a></span> (1968). Another method is to award the entire pension to one of the parties, generally the party whose work effort generated the pension, and to award to the other, in lieu of participation in the pension, a sum certain, which may, or may not, be payable over a specified time period.</blockquote><p id=b661-5><em>DeRevere,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1396433><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1971/1396433/#746 aria-description="Citation for case: DeRevere v. DeRevere">5 Wn. App. at 746</a></span>.<p id=b661-6>In
<em>In re Marriage of Pea,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1186425><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1977/1186425/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re the Marriage of Pea">17 Wn. App. 728</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1186425><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1977/1186425/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re the Marriage of Pea">566 P.2d 212</a></span> (1977), the court computed the wife's community interest in her husband's military pension as follows:<blockquote id=b661-7>1/2 ^ 13 (years of marriage) ^ MontUy 20 (years of military Income service)</blockquote><p id=b661-10><em>Cf. Wilder v. Wilder,
</em><span class=citation data-id=9553411><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1975/1190216/ aria-description="Citation for case: Wilder v. Wilder">85 Wn.2d 364</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=9553411><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1975/1190216/ aria-description="Citation for case: Wilder v. Wilder">534 P.2d 1355</a></span> (1975) (affirming fixed dollar award of $180 per month to wife from husband's Navy retirement income). The court in
<em>In re Marriage of <span class=citation data-id=1186425><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1977/1186425/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re the Marriage of Pea">Pea, supra,</a></span>
</em>permitted the percentage rate (1/2 x 13/20 = 32.5 percent) to apply to the rate of retirement pay that would be received nearly 3 years after the date of trial, and to apply to any annual or cost of living increases. However, the court did not allow the percentage to "be applied to those increases in the pension due solely
<span id=p_638 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=638>*638
</span>to service beyond 20 years."
<em>In re Marriage of Pea,
</em>17 Wn. App. at 732.<p id=b662-4>Several California cases have specifically addressed the method used by the trial court here to divide the pension, as respondent points out in her brief.<p id=b662-5>In
<em>In re Marriage of Freiberg,
</em><span class=citation data-id=2181549><a href=/ca/cases/appeals/1976/2181549/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re Marriage of Freiberg">57 Cal. App. 3d 304</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=2181549><a href=/ca/cases/appeals/1976/2181549/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re Marriage of Freiberg">127 Cal. Rptr. 792</a></span> (1976), the court dealt with a Navy pension in a 12-year marriage. The husband had 5 years of service before marriage and the pension would vest in 3 years. He argued that retirement benefits should be calculated at the amount fixed at time of separation. The court rejected that argument, stating that the husband and wife were joint owners of the pension rights and entitled to share in increased benefits. The court upheld the trial court's percentage division of monthly retirement benefits. Similarly, in
<em>In re Marriage of Adams,
</em><span class=citation data-id=2152368><a href=/ca/cases/appeals/1976/2152368/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re Marriage of Adams">64 Cal. App. 3d 181</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=2152368><a href=/ca/cases/appeals/1976/2152368/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re Marriage of Adams">134 Cal. Rptr. 298</a></span> (1976) the court found that the increase in retirement benefits after separation was not due from solely the separate efforts of the husband but was in fact enhanced by the many years of community efforts as well. Thus, the increases were not to be treated as separate property.<p id=b662-6>In the instant case, George and Janet were married for 22 years before separation. During all that time, George was employed at GTE. His advancements and pay raises during that time came as a direct result of community effort and performance. As in
<em>In re Marriage of <span class=citation data-id=2152368><a href=/ca/cases/appeals/1976/2152368/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re Marriage of Adams">Adams, supra,</a></span>
</em>the prospective increase in retirement benefits due to increased pay after separation is founded on those 22 years of community effort.<p id=b662-7>We disagree with George's argument that this disposition of pension rights was unjust or inequitable. An award of pension rights on a percentage, as-received basis is to be encouraged. Such a disposition avoids difficult valuation problems, shares the risks inherent in deferred receipt of the income, and provides a source of income to both spouses at a time when there will likely be greater need for it. We acknowledge that George's retirement fund
<span id=p_639 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=639>*639
</span>may receive proportionately higher future contributions based upon his career longevity and anticipated increases in annual pay. We further acknowledge that the formula utilized for division of future retirement benefits could result in Janet's sharing in those increases. However, far from condemning this apportionment method, we specifically approve it as a means of recognizing the community contribution to such increases.<p id=b663-5>Appellant argues that
<em>In re Marriage of <span class=citation data-id=1186425><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1977/1186425/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re the Marriage of Pea">Pea, supra,</a></span>
</em>requires a trial court to determine present value of future pension benefits where there is evidence to support such a determination, and prohibits use of a percentage allocation of future benefits on an as-received basis. We reject that analysis. In Washington, the trial court has wide discretion in awarding property in a dissolution.
<em>See In re Marriage of Landry,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1174733><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1985/1174733/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re the Marriage of Landry">103 Wn.2d 807</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1174733><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1985/1174733/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re the Marriage of Landry">699 P.2d 214</a></span> (1985). The court in
<em>In re Marriage of <span class=citation data-id=1186425><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1977/1186425/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re the Marriage of Pea">Pea, supra,</a></span>
</em>states that where there is insufficient evidence to determine a present value of a pension plan, the trial court may use the percentage formula. Here, the testimony of the experts varied widely as to the value of the pension. Whether to accept those calculations was within the discretion of the trial court. We decline to rule that a court must determine a present value if any valuation testimony is presented, particularly where, as here, an alternate method provides an equitable solution.<p id=b663-6>We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Janet a percentage of the pension on an as-received basis.<p id=b663-7>IV<p id=b663-8>Janet contends that $1,000 in attorney's fees is so inadequate as to be an abuse of discretion.<p id=b663-9>In awarding attorney's fees in a dissolution, the trial court considers the need of the one party and the other party's ability to pay. Neither party is entitled to attorney's fees as a matter of right.
<em>Valley v. Selfridge,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1378534><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1982/1378534/ aria-description="Citation for case: Valley v. Selfridge">30 Wn. App. 908</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1378534><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1982/1378534/ aria-description="Citation for case: Valley v. Selfridge">639 P.2d 225</a></span> (1982).<p id=b664-4><span id=p_640 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=640>*640
</span>Here, the court had all the facts before it in dividing property, awarding maintenance, and setting attorney's fees. The amount of attorney's fees does appear low given the large disparity in income between the parties. Even after the real property is liquidated and the proceeds split between the parties, Janet's payment of her attorney's fees may leave her in an economically disadvantaged position in comparison with her ex-husband. However, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in the award of these attorney's fees and we therefore affirm.<p id=b664-5>V<p id=b664-6>As to attorney's fees on appeal, RCW 26.09.140 provides for an award of reasonable attorney's fees for maintaining or defending an action under RCW 26.09. A review of the materials submitted reveals total fees of $6,940 payable by Janet for her attorney's services. We award Janet $6,940 as reasonable attorney's fees. RAP 18.1.<p id=b664-7>The decision of the trial court is affirmed.<p id=b664-8>Winsor and Forrest, JJ., concur.<div class=footnotes><div class=footnote id=fn1 label=1><a class=footnote href=#fn1_ref>1</a><p id=b657-7>The dissolution act of 1973 provided that the factors to be considered by the court in awarding maintenance include:<blockquote id=b657-8>"(a) The financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including separate or community property apportioned to him, and his ability to meet his needs independently, including the extent to which a provision for support of a child living with the party includes a sum for that party as custodian;</blockquote><blockquote id=b657-9>"(b) The time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party seeking maintenance to find employment appropriate to his skill, interests, style of life, and other attendant circumstances;</blockquote><blockquote id=b657-10>" (c) The standard of living established during the marriage;</blockquote><blockquote id=b657-11>"(d) The duration of the marriage;</blockquote><blockquote id=b657-12>" (e) The age, physical and emotional condition, and financial obligations of the spouse seeking maintenance; and</blockquote><blockquote id=b657-13>"(f) The ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet his needs and financial obligations while meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance." Former RCW 26.09.090.</blockquote></div><div class=footnote id=fn2 label=2><a class=footnote href=#fn2_ref>2</a><p id=b658-12>The reality is "that women still earn approximately 60% of what men do and that traditional female jobs tend to pay less than traditional male jobs." Washington State Bar Ass'n,
<em>Family Law Deskbook
</em>§ 29.5 (1989). Further, in discussing the effects of no-fault and other equality-directed reforms in divorce law, one author noted:<blockquote id=b658-13>Most judges appear to view the law's goal of equality as a mandate to place an equal burden of support on men and women without regard to the fact that the parties' capacities to support that burden are clearly unequal by virtue of their differing experiences during marriage.</blockquote><p id=b658-14>L. Weitzman,
<em>The Divorce Revolution
</em>183 (1985).</div><div class=footnote id=fn3 label=3><a class=footnote href=#fn3_ref>3</a><p id=b660-13>The retirement plan is totally funded by employer contributions.</div></div></div></section></div></div></section><div data-pagefind-ignore></div><p class=data-freshness-notice data-pagefind-ignore>Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: <a href=https://www.courtlistener.com/help/api/bulk-data/>CourtListener bulk data</a>.</div></article></main><footer class=site-footer><div class=container><div class=footer-content><p>A public interest project of <a href=https://AaronHall.com/>Aaron Hall, Attorney at Law</a> &copy; 2026<nav class=footer-links><a href=/about/>About</a>
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<!doctype html><html lang=en><head><meta charset=utf-8><meta name=viewport content="width=device-width,initial-scale=1"><title>Friedlander v. Friedlander, 494 P.2d 208 (Wash. 1972) | HallApproved.com</title><meta name=description content="John M. Friedlander, Respondent, v. Polly Friedlander, Appellant, 494 P.2d 208"><link rel=canonical href=https://hallapproved.com/wa/cases/supreme/1972/1141866/><link rel=icon href=/favicon.svg type=image/svg+xml><meta property="og:site_name" content="Hall Approved — Free American Case Law"><meta property="og:url" content="https://hallapproved.com/wa/cases/supreme/1972/1141866/"><meta property="og:type" content="article"><meta property="og:title" content="Friedlander v. Friedlander, 494 P.2d 208"><meta property="og:description" content="John M. Friedlander, Respondent, v. Polly Friedlander, Appellant, 494 P.2d 208"><meta property="article:published_time" content="1972-02-24"><meta property="og:locale" content="en_US"><meta property="og:image" content="https://hallapproved.com/og-image.png"><meta property="og:image:width" content="1200"><meta property="og:image:height" content="630"><meta property="og:image:alt" content="Hall Approved — Free American Case Law"><meta name=twitter:card content="summary_large_image"><meta name=twitter:title content="Friedlander v. Friedlander, 494 P.2d 208"><meta name=twitter:description content="John M. Friedlander, Respondent, v. Polly Friedlander, Appellant, 494 P.2d 208"><meta name=twitter:image content="https://hallapproved.com/og-image.png"><link rel=stylesheet href=/css/main.min.bb0569a18967c40a0cc4a9b280ff92cd1f688af91e691406fc3ff4130203bc69.css><script type=application/ld+json>{"@context":"https://schema.org","@type":"BreadcrumbList","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","item":"https://hallapproved.com/","name":"Free Legal Archive","position":1},{"@type":"ListItem","item":"https://hallapproved.com/wa/","name":"Washington","position":2},{"@type":"ListItem","item":"https://hallapproved.com/wa/cases/","name":"Washington Cases","position":3},{"@type":"ListItem","item":"https://hallapproved.com/wa/cases/supreme/","name":"Washington Supreme Court","position":4},{"@type":"ListItem","item":"https://hallapproved.com/wa/cases/supreme/1972/","name":"1972","position":5},{"@type":"ListItem","name":"Friedlander v. Friedlander","position":6}]}</script><script type=application/ld+json>{"@context":["https://schema.org",{"LegalCase":"https://hallapproved.com/vocab#LegalCase","citation":"https://hallapproved.com/vocab#citation","citedByCount":"https://hallapproved.com/vocab#citedByCount","court":"https://hallapproved.com/vocab#court","holdings":"https://hallapproved.com/vocab#holdings","treatmentStatus":"https://hallapproved.com/vocab#treatmentStatus"}],"@type":["ScholarlyArticle","LegalCase"],"alternateName":"494 P.2d 208; 80 Wash. 2d 293; 1972 Wash. LEXIS 586","author":{"@type":"Person","name":"Stafford"},"citation":"494 P.2d 208","citedByCount":134,"court":{"@type":"GovernmentOrganization","name":"Washington Supreme Court"},"dateModified":"1972-02-24","datePublished":"1972-02-24","headline":"Friedlander v. Friedlander, 494 P.2d 208","identifier":{"@type":"PropertyValue","name":"Citation","value":"494 P.2d 208"},"inLanguage":"en-US","isPartOf":{"@type":"WebSite","name":"HallApproved","url":"https://hallapproved.com/"},"license":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","name":"Friedlander v. Friedlander","publisher":{"@type":"Organization","name":"HallApproved","url":"https://hallapproved.com/"},"url":"https://hallapproved.com/wa/cases/supreme/1972/1141866/"}</script></head><body id=top><header class=site-header><div class=container><a href=/ class=site-title>Hall Approved</a>
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<span class=separator>/</span></nav><main><article class=case data-pagefind-body data-case-title="Friedlander v. Friedlander" data-case-citation="494 P.2d 208" data-case-court=Wash. data-case-year=1972><div class=verdict-bar><span class=verdict-court>Washington Supreme Court, 1972</span>
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<span class=separator>/</span></nav><header class=case-header data-pagefind-ignore><h1 class=case-title>Friedlander v. Friedlander</h1><div class=case-name>Friedlander v. Friedlander</div><div class=case-meta>Washington Supreme Court &#183; Decided February 24, 1972 &#183; Stafford</div><div class=case-citation-line>494 P.2d 208; 80 Wash. 2d 293; 1972 Wash. LEXIS 586
<span class=help>(Pacific Reporter, Second Series)</span></div></header><meta data-pagefind-meta=court[content] content="Washington Supreme Court"><meta data-pagefind-meta=year[content] content="1972"><meta data-pagefind-meta=citations[content] content="494 P.2d 208; 80 Wash. 2d 293; 1972 Wash. LEXIS 586"><meta data-pagefind-meta=cited_count[content] content="134"><meta data-pagefind-filter=court[content] content="Washington Supreme Court"><meta data-pagefind-filter=year[content] content="1972"><h1 class=sr-only data-pagefind-weight=10 data-pagefind-meta=title>Friedlander v. Friedlander</h1><section class="section full-opinion" id=full-opinion><div data-pagefind-ignore><div class="opinions container"><section class=opinion id=opinion-combined><h2 class=opinion-heading>Opinion</h2><div class=opinion-text><author id=b314-13>Stafford, J.</author><p id=Aqy>Mr. John M. Friedlander (hereafter called the plaintiff) instituted an action for divorce against his wife, Polly (hereafter called the defendant). Defendant also sought a divorce from plaintiff. Each was granted a
<span id=p_295 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=295>*295
</span>divorce. Defendant was awarded substantially all community property whereas plaintiff received his own separate property. Defendant appeals.<p id=b315-4>In 1955, defendant, a divorcee, began an affair with the plaintiff that lasted for approximately 5 years. Plaintiff’s then wife became acutely aware of the situation and, after a bitterly contested action in 1960, dissolved a marriage of 27 years standing. Much of plaintiff’s separate property, involved in this appeal, formed the subject of a similar appeal in
<em>Friedlander v. Friedlander,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1193128><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1961/1193128/ aria-description="Citation for case: Friedlander v. Friedlander">58 Wn.2d 288</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1193128><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1961/1193128/ aria-description="Citation for case: Friedlander v. Friedlander">362 P.2d 352</a></span> (1961).<p id=b315-5>Immediately following the divorce from Elizabeth, plaintiff and defendant discussed marriage. However, having just experienced one unpleasant dispute over property, plaintiff suggested that he and defendant enter into a prenuptial agreement.<p id=b315-6>Essentially, the agreement provided that separate property owned by either party prior to the contemplated marriage would remain separate property, together with all rents, issues and profits therefrom. It specifically mentioned that plaintiff’s separate property consisted “principally of his holdings in the various Friedlander family enterprises and his contingent interest in the trust estate of Louis Friedlander, deceased.” Defendant agreed, in the event of a divorce, to “make no claim in any proceedings for any of the separate property of John M. Friedlander, or the rents, issues and profits thereof.” Although not specified in the prenuptial agreement, the “Friedlander family enterprises” in 1960 consisted of Friedlander and Sons, a corporation, which owned and operated a number of jewelry stores; LouBelle Realty Co., a corporation which owned land upon which the Logan Building was erected; P & J Wholesale Jewelers, a co-partnership; the Merton-Singerman Agency, a co-partnership; and the trust estate of Louis Friedlander, deceased.<p id=b315-7>The parties were married 2 days after signing the prenuptial agreement. At the time defendant had virtually no
<span id=p_296 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=296>*296
</span>separate property and she acquired none during the marriage.<p id=b316-4>The parties acquired a relatively small amount of community property. They lived on plaintiff’s salary which ranged from approximately $26,000 in 1960 to about $47,000 in 1969. Plaintiff derived other income from profits of the various “Friedlander family enterprises” and from the investment in securities which were his separate property.
<em>No
</em>children were born during the marriage.<p id=b316-5>Defendant furthered her education during the ensuing years and completed all but two quarters for her fine arts degree. Unfortunately, the same period produced marital discord. Finally, each sought a divorce from the other claiming “cruel and inhuman treatment.”<p id=b316-6>At the beginning of the marriage, the owners’ interest in the various “Friedlander family enterprises” was valued at about $1,041,183, approximately one-third of which belonged to plaintiff. When the marriage was dissolved in 1970, the owners’ equity had increased to approximately $1,297,243. Plaintiff’s share therein had been substantially increased by the death of his mother.<p id=b316-7>The trial court granted each party a divorce. Plaintiff was awarded the community’s interest in the profit sharing trust of Friedlander and Sons, Inc., and all of his separate property which the court listed as his interest in Friedlan-der and Sons, Inc.; LouBelle Realty; P & J Wholesale Jewelry; Merton-Singerman Agency; an interest in the Louis Friedlander trust; an inheritance from his mother; and, his interest in various life insurance policies that had been owned prior to the marriage. In short, plaintiff’s share was essentially that provided for in the prenuptial agreement.<p id=b316-8>Defendant was awarded most of the community property, which consisted of the family home and household furnishings; four vacant lots; the proceeds of a savings account and an automobile, all of which had a net value of about $32,000. She was also awarded alimony of $500 a month for 3 years, together with costs and attorneys’ fees.<p id=b317-3><span id=p_297 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=297>*297
</span>Defendant appeals making 10 assignments of error which raise five basic issues.<p id=b317-4>I<p id=b317-5>The Husband’s Entitlement to Divorce for Mental Cruelty<p id=b317-7>Defendant asserts that she alone was entitled to a decree of divorce based upon cruel and inhuman treatment. The assignment of error is not well taken.<p id=b317-8>When two parties have sued for divorce on similar grounds, an appellant will not be heard to claim that the trial court erred by granting a divorce to the other spouse as well.
<em>Akins v. Akins,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1426439><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1958/1426439/ aria-description="Citation for case: Akins v. Akins">51 Wn.2d 887</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1426439><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1958/1426439/ aria-description="Citation for case: Akins v. Akins">322 P.2d 872</a></span> (1958). In such a case, error, if any, is not prejudicial.<p id=b317-9>II<p id=b317-10>The Adequacy of Alimony<p id=b317-11>Defendant asserts that prior to marriage she worked to support herself and child and lived in modest circumstances. In contrast, she contends, the marriage introduced her to a higher standard of living to which she has now become accustomed. She argues that she will be unable to maintain that standard. Thus, it is said, the trial court abused its discretion by granting her alimony of only $500 a month for 3 years.<p id=b317-12>While this is an engaging argument, it is not a proper basis for awarding alimony.
<em>Morgan v. Morgan,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1162395><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1962/1162395/ aria-description="Citation for case: Morgan v. Morgan">59 Wn.2d 639</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1162395><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1962/1162395/ aria-description="Citation for case: Morgan v. Morgan">369 P.2d 516</a></span> (1962). Alimony is not a matter of right.
<em>Kelso v. Kelso,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1171312><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1968/1171312/#27 aria-description="Citation for case: Kelso v. Kelso">75 Wn.2d 24, 27</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1171312><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1968/1171312/ aria-description="Citation for case: Kelso v. Kelso">448 P.2d 499</a></span> (1968). It is based upon
<em>two
</em>factors: (1) the necessities of the wife
<em>and
</em>(2) the financial ability of the husband to pay.
<em>Kelso v. <span class=citation data-id=1171312><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1968/1171312/ aria-description="Citation for case: Kelso v. Kelso">Kelso, supra;</a></span> Murray v. Murray,
</em><span class=citation data-id=3991798><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1946/4217368/#378 aria-description="Citation for case: Murray v. Murray">26 Wn.2d 370, 378</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=3991798><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1946/4217368/ aria-description="Citation for case: Murray v. Murray">174 P.2d 296</a></span> (1946). The maintenance of a lifestyle to which one has become accustomed is not a test of
<em>need. Morgan v. <span class=citation data-id=1162395><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1962/1162395/ aria-description="Citation for case: Morgan v. Morgan">Morgan, supra.</a></span></em><p id=b317-13>Further, defendant’s child by a previous marriage is no
<span id=p_298 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=298>*298
</span>longer dependent upon her for support. Defendant is only 40 years of age. She assigns no error to the trial court’s findings of fact that she is in good health; that she is within two quarters of completing her fine arts degree at the University of Washington; and that she is capable of earning her own living. The record also reveals that she is engaged in the commercial operation of an art gallery which, according to her brief, is “a business for which her education and abilities give her qualifications . . .” The indication is that the prospect for the business is good, although it may take some time to establish the gallery’s name.<p id=b318-5>We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion either in the amount or the duration of the alimony. Abuse of discretion is not shown -unless the discretion has been exercised upon a ground, or to an extent, clearly untenable or manifestly unreasonable.
<em>Malfait v. Malfait,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1197130><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1959/1197130/ aria-description="Citation for case: Malfait v. Malfait">54 Wn.2d 413</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1197130><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1959/1197130/ aria-description="Citation for case: Malfait v. Malfait">341 P.2d 154</a></span> (1959);
<em>High v. High,
</em><span class=citation data-id=2617206><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1953/2617206/ aria-description="Citation for case: High v. High">41 Wn.2d 811</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=2617206><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1953/2617206/ aria-description="Citation for case: High v. High">252 P.2d 272</a></span> (1953);
<em>Berol v. Berol,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1157707><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1950/1157707/ aria-description="Citation for case: Berol v. Berol">37 Wn.2d 380</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1157707><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1950/1157707/ aria-description="Citation for case: Berol v. Berol">223 P.2d 1055</a></span> (1950).
<em>See also State ex rel. Beffa v. Superior Court,
</em><span class=citation data-id=3996588><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1940/4221251/ aria-description="Citation for case: State Ex Rel. Beffa v. Superior Court">3 Wn.2d 184</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=3996588><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1940/4221251/ aria-description="Citation for case: State Ex Rel. Beffa v. Superior Court">100 P.2d 6</a></span> (1940). Defendant has failed to demonstrate the requisite
<em>need
</em>for additional funds.<p id=b318-6>Ill<p id=b318-7>The Prenuptial Agreement<p id=b318-8>Both parties, as well as the trial court, have characterized the questioned instrument as a “prenuptial agreement.” In citing
<em>Hamlin v. Merlino,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1118631><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1954/1118631/ aria-description="Citation for case: Hamlin v. Merlino">44 Wn.2d 851</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1118631><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1954/1118631/ aria-description="Citation for case: Hamlin v. Merlino">272 P.2d 125</a></span> (1954), each party has also referred to it as an “antenuptial” agreement. However, these two designations are synonymous and the parties have so treated them. 2 A. Lindey, Separation Agreements' and Ante-Nuptial Contracts § 90, at 22-23 (rev. ed. 1967).<p id=b318-9>It is significant that the transaction involves a
<em>prenuptial agreement
</em>as distinguished from a
<em>postnuptial or separation agreement
</em>and that it has been so treated by the parties and the trial court as well. A prenuptial agreement is one entered into by prospective spouses
<em>prior to marriage
</em><span id=p_299 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=299>*299
</span>but in contemplation and in consideration thereof. By it, the property rights of one or both of the prospective spouses are determined or are secured to one or both of them or to their children. On the other hand, postnuptial agreements or settlements are made after marriage
<em>between couples still married.
</em>They take the form of (a) separation agreements; (b) property settlements in contemplation of a separation or divorce; (c) property settlements where there is no intention of the parties to separate. 2 A. Lindey, § 90, at 22-23; 1 W. Nelson, Divorce and Annulment § 13.02, at 485 (2d ed. 1945).<p id=b319-4>It is also important that although defendant challenges the validity of the prenuptial agreement, based upon the conditions that surrounded its making, neither party contends that prenuptial contracts, as such, are contrary to public policy, if freely and intelligently made.
<em>Hamlin v. <span class=citation data-id=1118631><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1954/1118631/ aria-description="Citation for case: Hamlin v. Merlino">Merlino, supra;</a></span>
</em>2 A. Lindey, § 90, at 30;
<em>see also
</em>1 W. Nelson, § 13.03; 41 Am. Jur. 2d
<em>Husband and Wife
</em>§ 283 (1968). Finally, neither party raises the question whether the prenuptial agreement was made in contemplation of or is promotive of divorce, and if so, whether it is void as against public policy for that reason.
<a class=footnote href=#fn1 id=fn1_ref>1
</a>Thus, there is no need to resolve either of the immediately preceding questions in this case. We are here concerned with whether the prenuptial agreement, assuming its proper use in this type of transaction, is valid as between these parties under the rules governing prenuptial agreements.<p id=b319-5>First, defendant argues that there was no considera
<span id=p_300 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=300>*300
</span>tion for the agreement because plaintiff had previously proposed marriage. This position, however, finds no support in the authorities. Marriage is not only, adequate, but is consideration of the highest value. 2 A. Lindey, § 90, at 32-33; 41 Am. Jur. 2d
<em>Husband and Wife
</em>§ 285, at 235 ,(1968);
<em>In re Estate of Onstot,
</em><span class=citation data-id=3429128><a href=/ia/cases/supreme/1938/3431653/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re Estate of Onstot">224 Iowa 520</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=3429128><a href=/ia/cases/supreme/1938/3431653/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re Estate of Onstot">277 N.W. 563</a></span> (1938);
<em>see also
</em>1 W. Nelson, § 13.03. Further, the agreement contained mutual waivers by the parties. This also is adequate consideration for a prenuptial agreement. 2 A. Lindey, § 90, at 34; 41 Am. Jur. 2d
<em>Husband and Wife
</em>§ 285, at 235 (1968).<p id=b320-4>Next, defendant contends the trial court erred by finding: “. . .
<em>Polly Friedlander has not sustained the burden of proving that the
</em>[prenuptial] agreement was not executed in good faith . . .” (Italics ours.) The finding of fact was proposed by plaintiff’s attorney. However, during oral argument he conceded that it incorrectly shifted, to defendant, the burden of proving the prenuptial agreement was not executed in good faith.<p id=b320-6>Obviously, counsel's concession has placed the trial court in an awkward position. Nevertheless, it comports with the law relative to prenuptial agreements. Generally speaking, the burden of establishing full disclosure or fairness rests upon the party asserting the prenuptial agreement
<em>(i.e.,
</em>the plaintiff husband herein). 2 A. Lindey, § 90, at 38 and 85; 41 Am. Jur. 2d
<em>Husband and Wife
</em>§ 313, at 254 (1968). As stated in 2 A. Lindey, § 90, at 84:<blockquote id=b320-7>where the provision made for the wife is disproportionate to the property of the husband, a presumption arises that the contract was procured by deliberate concealment of the amount and value of the husband’s property; and the husband or those claiming under him against the wife have the burden of showing that she had full knowledge of the value of her interest in the husband’s property, or that the circumstances were such that she reasonably should have had such knowledge.[
<a class=footnote href=#fn2 id=fn2_ref>2
</a>]</blockquote><p id=b321-3><span id=p_301 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=301>*301
</span>The trial court erred by finding that defendant had the burden of proving the agreement was not executed in good faith.<p id=b321-4>A prenuptial agreement freely and intelligently made is generally regarded as conducive to marital tranquility and the avoidance of disputes about property in the future. 2 A. Lindey, § 90, at 30. For that reason, it is regarded with favor. But, the beneficial possibilities of such contracts must be preserved without the attendant dangers of abuse.<p id=b321-5>With this in mind the relationship of the parties to the contract becomes of primary importance. It is well recognized that even an engagement to marry creates a confidential relationship.
<em>Hamlin v. Merlino,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1118631><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1954/1118631/#865 aria-description="Citation for case: Hamlin v. Merlino">44 Wn.2d 851, 865</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1118631><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1954/1118631/ aria-description="Citation for case: Hamlin v. Merlino">272 P.2d 125</a></span> (1954);
<em>Juhasz v. Juhasz,
</em><span class=citation data-id=3786017>134 Ohio St. 257, 264</span>, <span class=citation data-id=3786017>16 N.E.2d 328</span>, <span class=citation data-id=3786017>117 A.L.R. 993</span> (1938). Parties to a prenuptial agreement do not deal with each other at arm’s length. Their relationship is one of mutual confidence and trust which calls for the exercise of good faith, candor and sincerity in all matters bearing upon the proposed agreement.
<em>Bauer v. Bauer,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1246864><a href=/or/cases/appeals/1970/1246864/ aria-description="Citation for case: Bauer v. Bauer">1 Ore. App. 504</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1246864><a href=/or/cases/appeals/1970/1246864/ aria-description="Citation for case: Bauer v. Bauer">464 P.2d 710</a></span> (1970); 2 A. Lindey, § 90, at 38, 41.<p id=b321-6>The basic objective of this common sense rule is to prevent overreaching. 2 A. Lindey, § 90, at 240 (Supp. 1971). Where a prenuptial contract makes provision for a wife that is disproportionate to the means of the intended husband, it casts a burden upon the intended husband, and those claiming under him, to prove that she had full knowledge of all the facts and circumstances that materially affected the contract.
<em>Juhasz v. <span class=citation data-id=3786017>Juhasz, supra;</span> Warner v. Warner,
</em><span class=citation data-id=6973951><a href=/il/cases/supreme/1908/7069599/#462 aria-description="Citation for case: Warner v. Warner">235 Ill. 448, 462</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=6973951><a href=/il/cases/supreme/1908/7069599/ aria-description="Citation for case: Warner v. Warner">85 N.E. 630</a></span> (1908).<p id=b321-7>Without question, the record in this case discloses that the prenuptial contract makes provision for the wife that is disproportionate to the means of the husband.<p id=b321-8>Plaintiff acknowledges that the establishment of good faith and full disclosure is his burden. However, he asserts that he has sustained it. He argues that he told defendant he had had many difficulties during the first divorce that he
<span id=p_302 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=302>*302
</span>did not want to encounter again. Plaintiff asserts that the agreement itself discloses the nature of the assets by referring to “property and assets, consisting primarily of his holdings in the various Friedlander family enterprises and his contingent interest in the trust estate of Louis Friedlan-der, deceased.” It is related that both Mr. Monheimer, an attorney for plaintiff and for the Friedlander family, and plaintiff’s brother, Paul (also an attorney), informed defendant generally of the nature and effect of a prenuptial agreement. Plaintiff indicated that defendant signed the agreement without objection, knowing that it involved property consisting of jewelry stores and the Logan Building realty.<p id=b322-4>It must be observed, however, that the statement of facts fails to reveal the content of any explanation made by Mr. Monheimer or Mr. Paul Friedlander. In fact, neither could have explained the substance of the actual agreement. At the time, it had not been drafted by Mr. Friedman, another of plaintiff’s attorneys. There is no evidence that defendant had anyone explain the contents of the written agreement to her. Finally, there is no evidence that anyone discussed with her the value of the property with which the prenuptial agreement was concerned.<p id=b322-5>This brings us to the nature of the good faith disclosure required by a prenuptial agreement. To render such an agreement valid there must be a fair and reasonable provision for the wife, or, in the absence thereof there must be a full, frank disclosure of the future husband’s property and his worth.
<em>Juhasz v. <span class=citation data-id=3786017>Juhasz, supra;</span> Warner v. <span class=citation data-id=6973951><a href=/il/cases/supreme/1908/7069599/ aria-description="Citation for case: Warner v. Warner">Warner, supra;</a></span>
</em>2 A. Lindey, § 90, at 36-37. This is not to say that she must know the
<em>exact
</em>financial status of his resources. However, she must at least have a full and fair disclosure of all material facts relating to the amount, character and value of the property involved so that she will not be prejudiced by the lack of information, but can intelligently determine whether she desires to enter the prenuptial contract.
<em>Juhasz v. <span class=citation data-id=3786017>Juhasz, supra;</span> Warner v. <span class=citation data-id=6973951><a href=/il/cases/supreme/1908/7069599/ aria-description="Citation for case: Warner v. Warner">Warner, supra;</a></span> 2
</em>A. Lindey, § 90, at 44; 41 Am. Jur. 2d
<em>Husband and VJife
</em>§§ 313-14
<span id=p_303 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=303>*303
</span>(1968). Viewed in the light of this test, we hold that plaintiff failed to sustain his burden of proof.<p id=b323-4>Further, the prospective spouse must sign the agreement freely and voluntarily on
<em>independent advice
</em>with full knowledge of her rights.
<em>Hamlin v. Merlino, supra
</em>at 864; 2 A. Lindey, § 90, at 36-38. It is clear that defendant did not have such advice prior to signing the agreement. All advice was provided by the plaintiff, his brother, Paul, and Mr. Monheimer. The prenuptial contract was even prepared by another of plaintiff’s attorneys.<p id=b323-5>The prenuptial agreement was void in its inception.<p id=b323-6>Plaintiff contends that the trial court’s error did not affect the distribution of property and, thus, is not fatal to the result. He argues that, contrary to defendant’s assertion, the trial court did not distribute the property pursuant to the prenuptial agreement, but relied instead upon RCW 26.08.110.<p id=b323-7>We disagree. RCW 26.08.110 provides that
<em>all
</em>property,
<em>both community and separate,
</em>shall be before the court for such distribution as may be
<em>just and equitable.
</em>Nevertheless, distribution in the instant case was virtually the same as that provided for in the prenuptial agreement and was overly disproportionate.<p id=b323-8>We agree with defendant, that the trial court treated the prenuptial agreement as binding upon the parties. The trial court’s oral opinion reflects its reliance on that contractual relationship by stating “we have to accept the agreement as it stands”. This coincides with finding of fact 12 in which the trial court found that she was bound by the agreement. The finding of fact was more than a mere statement that defendant was bound by a failure of proof. It was a finding that her rights in the distribution of property were governed by the prenuptial agreement.<p id=b323-9>The trial court erred by distributing the assets pursuant to a void prenuptial agreement.<p id=A2p><span id=p_304 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=304>*304
</span>IV<p id=b324-4>The Determination of Community' and Separate Property<p id=b324-5>Defendant argues that the trial court incorrectly classified virtually all assets as plaintiff’s separate property. She asserts further that there was a commingling of plaintiff’s separate property with community assets and that : the court should have imposed a lien upon the plaintiff’s separate property in behalf of the community.<p id=b324-6>Finding of fact 5 designates the plaintiff’s separate property and declares that it was identifiable, separately .maintained and not commingled with community property. Although there is, some conflict in the testimony, careful review of the record reveals substantial evidence to support the finding of fact. A trial court’s finding of fact must be accepted as a verity where there is substantial evidence to support it.
<em>Friedlander v. Friedlander,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1193128><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1961/1193128/ aria-description="Citation for case: Friedlander v. Friedlander">58 Wn.2d 288</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1193128><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1961/1193128/ aria-description="Citation for case: Friedlander v. Friedlander">362 P.2d 352</a></span> (1961).<p id=b324-7>Similarly, conclusion of law 6 must be upheld. It is adequately supported by findings of fact 4 and 5.
<em>State v. Russell,
</em><span class=citation data-id=9542768><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1968/1161505/#910 aria-description="Citation for case: State v. Russell">73 Wn.2d 903, 910</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=9542768><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1968/1161505/ aria-description="Citation for case: State v. Russell">442 P.2d 988</a></span> (1968);
<em>York v. Cooper,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1124696><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1962/1124696/#286 aria-description="Citation for case: York v. Cooper">60 Wn.2d 283, 286</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1124696><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1962/1124696/ aria-description="Citation for case: York v. Cooper">373 P.2d 493</a></span> (1962).<p id=b324-8>V<p id=b324-9>The Division of Separate and Community Assets<p id=b324-10>Although the trial court placed no specific value on plaintiff’s separate property, the record is clear that he received a disproportionate share of the total assets. Plaintiff attempts to justify this on the ground that in a divorce action the distribution of property made by a trial court may be overturned only for manifest abuse of discretion, .citing
<em>Friedlander v. <span class=citation data-id=1193128><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1961/1193128/ aria-description="Citation for case: Friedlander v. Friedlander">Friedlander, supra.</a></span>
</em>While the statement of the rule is correct, it is not applicable here.<p id=b324-11>The trial court did not exercise its discretion by distributing property pursuant to RCW 26.08.110. The disproportionate distribution was made because the trial court as
<span id=p_305 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=305>*305
</span>sumed it was bound by the void prenuptial contract. In short,, it is the distribution .pursuant to a void contract that is under attack and not the trial qourt’s power to distribute property pursuant to statutory discretion.<p id=b325-4>It was argued orally, and suggested in plaintiff’s brief, that in the final analysis distribution by the prenuptial contract essentially followed the law. We disagree. Granted, it followed that portion of RCW 26.08.110 which provides that the trial court shall consider “the party through whom the property was acquired”. This, however, is only one portion of the statutory requirements.<p id=b325-5>In an action for divorce
<em>all property,
</em>both community and separate, is before the trial court for distribution.
<em>Patrick v. Patrick,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1447736><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1953/1447736/ aria-description="Citation for case: Patrick v. Patrick">43 Wn.2d 139</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1447736><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1953/1447736/ aria-description="Citation for case: Patrick v. Patrick">260 P.2d 878</a></span> (1953). Its characterization as community, or separate, though significant, is not necessarily controlling.
<em>Huff v. Huff,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1357199>68 Wn.2d 501</span>, <span class=citation data-id=1357199>413 P.2d 818</span> (1966). RCW 26.08.110 requires a
<em>just and equitable distribution
</em>of the property. This does not entail an equal division thereof.
<em>Ovens v. Ovens,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1211668><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1962/1211668/ aria-description="Citation for case: Ovens v. Ovens">61 Wn.2d 6</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1211668><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1962/1211668/ aria-description="Citation for case: Ovens v. Ovens">376 P.2d 839</a></span> (1962). Where children are not involved, RCW 26.08.110 requires that the trial court consider the following matters in achieving a just and equitable distribution: (1) the respective merits of the parties; (2) the condition in which they will be left by such divorce; and (3) the party through whom the property was acquired.<p id=b325-6>We have held that the trial court should also consider other factors. First, the court must consider the necessities of the wife and the financial ability of the husband. Then, it should take into account the age of the parties, their health, physical condition, education, their employment history.
<em>DeRuwe v. DeRuwe,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1409296><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1967/1409296/#408 aria-description="Citation for case: DeRuwe v. DeRuwe">72 Wn.2d 404, 408</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1409296><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1967/1409296/ aria-description="Citation for case: DeRuwe v. DeRuwe">433 P.2d 209</a></span> (1967). It should likewise consider their training and business or occupation experience
<em>(Stacy v. Stacy,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1189846><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1966/1189846/ aria-description="Citation for case: Stacy v. Stacy">68 Wn.2d 573</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1189846><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1966/1189846/ aria-description="Citation for case: Stacy v. Stacy">414 P.2d 791</a></span> (1966)), as well as their future earning prospects.
<em>DeRuwe v. <span class=citation data-id=1409296><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1967/1409296/ aria-description="Citation for case: DeRuwe v. DeRuwe">DeRuwe, supra.</a></span>
</em>The court should give regard to the date the parties accumulated the property, the party through whom it was acquired, the kinds of property involved
<em>(DeRuwe v. De-
</em><span id=p_306 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=306>*306
</span><span class=citation data-id=1409296><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1967/1409296/ aria-description="Citation for case: DeRuwe v. DeRuwe"><em>Ruwe, </em>supra),</a></span> as well as the value of the parties’ respective contribution to the community.
<em>See VanKleffens v. VanKleffens,
</em><span class=citation data-id=4002499><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1929/4226119/ aria-description="Citation for case: Van Kleffens v. Van Kleffens">150 Wash. 685</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=4002499><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1929/4226119/ aria-description="Citation for case: Van Kleffens v. Van Kleffens">274 P. 708</a></span> (1929). Even when regard is had for the fault of the parties
<a class=footnote href=#fn3 id=fn3_ref>3
</a>and the wrong inflicted by one upon the other, the economic condition in which the decree will leave them remains the paramount concern in making a division of the property.
<em>DeRuwe v. <span class=citation data-id=1409296><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1967/1409296/ aria-description="Citation for case: DeRuwe v. DeRuwe">DeRuwe, supra.</a></span></em><p id=b326-4>The cause is remanded for the trial court to make a just and equitable division of the property of the parties in light of the foregoing guidelines and without regard to the void prenuptial agreement.<p id=b326-5>To insure an equitable distribution, it will be necessary for the trial court to make a valuation of all properties, whether community or separate.<p id=b326-6>The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part.<p id=b326-7>Hamilton, C. J., Finley, Rosellini, Hunter, Hale, Neill, and Wright, JJ., concur.<div class=footnotes><div class=footnote id=fn1 label=1><a class=footnote href=#fn1_ref>1</a><p id=b319-6>In this regard,
<em>see
</em>2 A. Lindey, Separation Agreements and Ante-Nuptial Contracts § 90, at 73-74 (rev. ed. 1967) wherein it is pointed out that prenuptial contracts which permit parties to separate at any time, or are made in contemplation of divorce, or purport to limit a husband’s liability for support in case of divorce, or are conducive of divorce are contrary to public policy and void. Arrangements suitable for a separation agreement cannot generally be incorporated in a prenuptial contract.
<em>See also,
</em>1 W. Nelson, Divorce and Annulment §§ 13.03, 13.06, 13.22 (2d ed. 1945); 41 Am. Jur. 2d
<em>Husband and Wife
</em>§ 279 (1968); Annot., <span class="citation no-link">57 A.L.R.2d 942</span> (1958); Cathey,
<em>Ante-Nuptial Agreements in Arkansas
</em>— A
<em>Drafter’s Problem,
</em><span class="citation no-link">24 Ark. L. Rev. 275</span>, 287-88 (1970).</div><div class=footnote id=fn2 label=2><a class=footnote href=#fn2_ref>2</a><p id=b320-8>See also
<em>Hamlin v. Merlino,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1118631><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1954/1118631/#865 aria-description="Citation for case: Hamlin v. Merlino">44 Wn.2d 851, 865</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1118631><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1954/1118631/ aria-description="Citation for case: Hamlin v. Merlino">272 P.2d 125</a></span> (1954);
<em>Hartz v. Hartz,
</em><span class=citation data-id=2170009><a href=/md/cases/supreme/1967/2170009/ aria-description="Citation for case: Hartz v. Hartz">248 Md. 47</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=2170009><a href=/md/cases/supreme/1967/2170009/ aria-description="Citation for case: Hartz v. Hartz">234 A.2d 865</a></span> (1967);
<em>Kosik v. George,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1164570><a href=/or/cases/supreme/1969/1164570/ aria-description="Citation for case: Kosik v. George">253 Ore. 15</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1164570><a href=/or/cases/supreme/1969/1164570/ aria-description="Citation for case: Kosik v. George">452 P.2d 560</a></span> (1969);
<em>Warner v. Warner,
</em><span class=citation data-id=6973951><a href=/il/cases/supreme/1908/7069599/ aria-description="Citation for case: Warner v. Warner">235 Ill. 448</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=6973951><a href=/il/cases/supreme/1908/7069599/ aria-description="Citation for case: Warner v. Warner">85 N.E. 630</a></span> (1908); 2 A. Lindey, § 90, at 238 (Supp. 1971); 41 Am. Jur. 2d
<em>Husband and Wife
</em>§ 314 (1968).</div><div class=footnote id=fn3 label=3><a class=footnote href=#fn3_ref>3</a><p id=b326-8>For the consideration that should be given fault in the matter of distribution see
<em>Bryant v. Bryant,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1346866><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1966/1346866/ aria-description="Citation for case: Bryant v. Bryant">68 Wn.2d 97</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1346866><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1966/1346866/ aria-description="Citation for case: Bryant v. Bryant">411 P.2d 428</a></span> (1966) and
<em>Myers v. Myers,
</em><span class=citation data-id=3995730><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1944/4220559/#23 aria-description="Citation for case: Myers v. Myers">21 Wn.2d 19, 23</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=3995730><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1944/4220559/ aria-description="Citation for case: Myers v. Myers">149 P.2d 926</a></span> (1944).</div></div></div></section></div></div></section><div data-pagefind-ignore></div><p class=data-freshness-notice data-pagefind-ignore>Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: <a href=https://www.courtlistener.com/help/api/bulk-data/>CourtListener bulk data</a>.</div></article></main><footer class=site-footer><div class=container><div class=footer-content><p>A public interest project of <a href=https://AaronHall.com/>Aaron Hall, Attorney at Law</a> &copy; 2026<nav class=footer-links><a href=/about/>About</a>
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<span class=separator>/</span></nav><header class=case-header data-pagefind-ignore><h1 class=case-title>In Re the Marriage of Hall</h1><div class=case-name>In Re the Marriage of Hall</div><div class=case-meta>Washington Supreme Court &#183; Decided December 13, 1984 &#183; Brachtenbach</div><div class=case-citation-line>692 P.2d 175; 103 Wash. 2d 236; 1984 Wash. LEXIS 2098
<span class=help>(Pacific Reporter, Second Series)</span></div></header><meta data-pagefind-meta=court[content] content="Washington Supreme Court"><meta data-pagefind-meta=year[content] content="1984"><meta data-pagefind-meta=citations[content] content="692 P.2d 175; 103 Wash. 2d 236; 1984 Wash. LEXIS 2098"><meta data-pagefind-meta=cited_count[content] content="119"><meta data-pagefind-filter=court[content] content="Washington Supreme Court"><meta data-pagefind-filter=year[content] content="1984"><h1 class=sr-only data-pagefind-weight=10 data-pagefind-meta=title>In Re the Marriage of Hall</h1><section class="section full-opinion" id=full-opinion><div data-pagefind-ignore><div class="opinions container"><section class=opinion id=opinion-combined><h2 class=opinion-heading>Opinion</h2><div class=opinion-text><author id=b287-10>Brachtenbach, J.</author><p id=AWz>Did the trial court err in this dissolution action in finding that the husband, a medical doctor in private practice, possessed goodwill valued at $70,000, but that the wife, a medical doctor employed as a salaried professor, did not possess goodwill? Secondarily, did the trial court apply the proper factors in valuing the husband's goodwill? By an unpublished split decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed.
<em>In re Marriage of Hall,
</em><span class=citation data-id=6854755><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1983/6957531/ aria-description="Citation for case: In re the Marriage of Hall">36 Wn. App. 1026</a></span> (1983). We reverse in part and remand for further proceedings.<p id=b287-11>Judith G. Hall, M.D., and Phillip L. Hall, M.D., were married in 1963 while medical school students. In 1966 both received their medical doctorates, served internships and pursued specialized training — Judith in pediatrics and Phillip in cardiology. Returning to Seattle in 1972, Judith was hired by the University of Washington Medical School as an assistant professor. Phillip entered private practice as
<span id=p_238 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=238>*238
</span>an internist employed by a private clinic.<p id=b288-4>At the time of trial, Phillip, age 41, enjoyed a good reputation in the community as a consulting cardiologist. In 1975, Phillip and another doctor formed a partnership, which was incorporated in 1977 as Northwest Cardiology Clinic. A third doctor became a shareholder in 1979. Three hospitals, as well as other doctors, referred patients to the clinic which was located on the campus of one of the hospitals. In the 3 years preceding trial, Phillip's average gross yearly earnings, exclusive of retirement contributions, were $52,411.83.<p id=b288-5>Judith, age 40 at the time of trial, was an untenured professor at the University of Washington with no expectation of tenure in the foreseeable future. In the 3 years preceding trial, Judith's average gross yearly earnings, exclusive of employer contributions to her retirement plan, were $32,750. In mid-1980 her salary increased to $42,000. Judith testified that her decision to pursue an academic career was primarily attributable to the need for a flexible schedule in order to care for the Halls' children. Although Judith is widely published and enjoys a reputation as one of the 10 top physicians in the nation in the field of pediatric genetics, there are few, if any, medical career opportunities outside academia, especially in the Seattle area. Numerous medical schools across the nation have offered her employment with salaries up to $60,000. Employment opportunities outside of academia with salaries in the range of $50,000 could be available with some retraining and relocation.<p id=b288-6>The trial court found that Judith had no professional goodwill due to the fact that she was a salaried physician. The court found that Phillip had professional goodwill in the amount of $70,000. A decree of dissolution was entered accordingly. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's holdings; Phillip Hall petitioned for review.<p id=b288-7>Evaluation of professional goodwill is a troublesome issue. Since 1976, professional goodwill has been recognized in Washington as property of an intangible nature subject
<span id=p_239 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=239>*239
</span>to division in a marriage dissolution.
<em>In re Marriage of Lukens,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1406443><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1976/1406443/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re Marriage of Lukens">16 Wn. App. 481</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1406443><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1976/1406443/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re Marriage of Lukens">558 P.2d 279</a></span> (1976). It is often defined as the "expectation of continued public patronage".
<em>Lukens,
</em>at 483. Justice Story has more thoroughly defined professional goodwill as:<blockquote id=b289-4>a benefit or advantage "which is acquired by an establishment beyond the mere value of the capital, stock, funds or property employed therein, in consequence of the general public patronage and encouragement, which it receives from constant or habitual customers on account of its local position, or common celebrity, or reputation for skill or affluence, or punctuality, or from other accidental circumstances or necessities, or even from ancient partialities or prejudices."</blockquote><p id=b289-5><em>Lukens,
</em>at 483-84, citing
<em>In re Marriage of Foster,
</em><span class=citation data-id=2131159><a href=/ca/cases/appeals/1974/2131159/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re Marriage of Foster">42 Cal. App. 3d 577</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=2131159><a href=/ca/cases/appeals/1974/2131159/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re Marriage of Foster">117 Cal. Rptr. 49</a></span> (1974).<p id=b289-6>In 1979, reviewing the decisions of other courts, this court noted that a number of states had refused, in a divorce proceeding, to assign a value to goodwill of a professional practice, but adopted the
<em>Lukens
</em>recognition of goodwill as a marital asset.
<em>In re Marriage of Fleege,
</em><span class=citation data-id=9602492><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1979/1364315/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re the Marriage of Fleege">91 Wn.2d 324</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=9602492><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1979/1364315/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re the Marriage of Fleege">588 P.2d 1136</a></span> (1979). In
<em>Fleege,
</em>the issue was whether the goodwill of the husband's solo dental practice was a community asset. Despite expert testimony establishing that the value of his dental practice included goodwill, the trial court had refused to include goodwill as an asset subject to distribution. This court held that, although professional goodwill is not readily salable, the important consideration is not whether the goodwill of the practice could be sold without the personal services of the professional, but whether it has value to him.
<em>Fleege,
</em>at 327. The dissent contended that goodwill is not a marital asset subject to division because no true goodwill could exist separate and apart from the services of the practitioner.
<em>Fleege,
</em>at 330-36 (Stafford, J., dissenting).<p id=b289-7>Since
<em>Fleege,
</em>this court has not ruled further on the concept of goodwill. The Court of Appeals, however, applied the principles of
<em>Fleege
</em>to a case involving a lawyer in solo practice.
<em>In re Marriage of Freedman,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1411095><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1979/1411095/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re the Marriage of Freedman">23 Wn. App. 27</a></span>, 592
<span id=p_240 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=240>*240
</span>P.2d 1124 (1979)
<em>(Freedman
</em>I). In
<em>Freedman
</em>I, the trial court had included the lawyer's goodwill, valued at $100,000, in the community assets to be distributed. While adhering to
<em>Fleege,
</em>the Court of Appeals nevertheless remanded the case so that further testimony could be taken on all the factors set forth in
<em>Fleege.
</em>Although the existence of goodwill was not then at issue, the trial court, upon remand, found that goodwill could not exist in a solo law practice because it could not be sold. Instead, the trial court awarded the wife $19,451 as her "spouse's economic benefit expectancy" (SEBE). On a second appeal, the Court of Appeals did not analyze the nature of SEBE, nor did it consider the correctness of the trial court's finding of lack of goodwill.
<em>In re Marriage of Freedman,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1359886><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1983/1359886/#51 aria-description="Citation for case: In Re the Marriage of Freedman">35 Wn. App. 49, 51</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1359886><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1983/1359886/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re the Marriage of Freedman">665 P.2d 902</a></span> (1983)
<em>(Freedman
</em>II). The Court of Appeals held that regardless of the name given, the trial court had considered the
<em>Fleege
</em>factors as required in
<em>Freedman
</em>I. Therefore, the award to the wife as SEBE was affirmed.<p id=b290-5>The last case to discuss professional goodwill was
<em>In re Marriage of Kaplan,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1187445><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1979/1187445/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re the Marriage of Kaplan">23 Wn. App. 503</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1187445><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1979/1187445/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re the Marriage of Kaplan">597 P.2d 439</a></span> (1979), which involved an attorney who was a "special partner" in a law firm. The trial court found that attorneys in general do not possess goodwill as an item of property. Alternatively, it found that even if attorneys in general do have goodwill, Mr. Kaplan did not. Relying on
<em>Freedman
</em>I, the Court of Appeals held that the legal question of whether an attorney has goodwill was foreclosed. The
<em>Kaplan
</em>court reversed and remanded for consideration of those factual elements used in determining the value of goodwill as discussed in
<em>Fleege
</em>and
<em>Freedman
</em>I.<p id=b290-6>The husband here contends that the
<em>Fleege
</em>doctrine should be reconsidered because (1) it presents confusing and unfair criteria for identifying and evaluating the economic benefit to one spouse or the other, from a professional degree and career; and, (2) it is unfair where, as here, it requires the determination that only one of two spouses, with identical professional educations and earning capaci
<span id=p_241 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=241>*241
</span>ties, has professional goodwill. These contentions are based on the failure to distinguish between professional goodwill and personal earning capacity of the professional.<p id=b291-4>Goodwill is a property or asset which usually supplements the earning capacity of another asset, a business or a profession. Goodwill is not the earning capacity itself. It is a distinct
<em>asset
</em>of a professional practice, not just a
<em>factor
</em>contributing to the value or earning capacity of the practice. Comment,
<em>Professional Goodwill in Louisiana: An Analysis of its Classification, Valuation, and Partition,
</em><span class="citation no-link">43 La. L. Rev. 119</span>, 123 (1982); 38 Am. Jur. 2d
<em>Good Will
</em>§ 8, at 916 (1968). Discontinuance of the business or profession may greatly diminish the value of the goodwill but it does not destroy its existence. When a professional retires or dies, his earning capacity also either retires or dies. Nevertheless, the goodwill that once attached to his practice may continue in existence in the form of established patients or clients, referrals, trade name, location and associations which now attach to former partners or buyers of the practice. Comment,
<em>Identifying, Valuing, and Dividing Professional Goodwill as Community Property at Dissolution of the Marital Community,
</em><span class="citation no-link">56 Tul. L. Rev. 313</span>, 320 (1981). Reference to Judge Reed's example in
<em>Lukens,
</em>at 485, illustrates the difference in that a professional can transport all of his skill (earning capacity) to a new town, but patients or clients, reputation and referrals (goodwill) cannot always be transported.<p id=b291-5>Once goodwill is distinguished from earning capacity, the error becomes apparent in the argument that a practicing professional and a salaried professional, with equal earning capacities and educations, both have goodwill. Both have earning capacities, and, yet, only the practicing professional has a business or practice to which the goodwill can attach. The practicing professional brings an earning capacity to the practice comprised of skill and education. The goodwill, comprised of such things as location, referrals, associations, reputation, trade name and office organization, can directly supplement this earning capacity.
<span id=p_242 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=242>*242
</span>When the practicing professional dies, retires or moves, he takes his skill and education with him, but the goodwill factors must be transferred or otherwise left behind. The goodwill may exist even though it is not marketable.
<em>In re Marriage of Freedman,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1411095><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1979/1411095/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re the Marriage of Freedman">23 Wn. App. 27</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1411095><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1979/1411095/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re the Marriage of Freedman">592 P.2d 1124</a></span> (1979).<p id=b292-5>The salaried professional also brings an earning capacity comprised of skill and education to the position. However, when the salaried professional leaves a position, he takes everything with him to the new position. There is nothing that increased his earning capacity in the old salaried position that cannot be taken to the new position.<p id=b292-6>The Court of Appeals and petitioner's expert witnesses distinguished between goodwill and earning capacity when they recognized that, by definition, a person working solely for a salary as an employee has no goodwill. We adopt the Court of Appeals holding and hold that as a matter of law a salaried employee such as Judith Hall cannot have goodwill.<p id=b292-7>We turn now to the matter of Phillip Hall's goodwill. When the Court of Appeals first recognized that the practice of a professional may include goodwill it looked to the California courts for guidance. The Court of Appeals in
<em>In re Marriage of Lukens,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1406443><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1976/1406443/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re Marriage of Lukens">16 Wn. App. 481</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1406443><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1976/1406443/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re Marriage of Lukens">558 P.2d 279</a></span> (1976) and the Supreme Court in
<em>In re Marriage of Fleege,
</em><span class=citation data-id=9602492><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1979/1364315/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re the Marriage of Fleege">91 Wn.2d 324</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=9602492><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1979/1364315/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re the Marriage of Fleege">588 P.2d 1136</a></span> (1979) adopted both the holding of
<em>In re Marriage of Lopez,
</em><span class=citation data-id=2162166><a href=/ca/cases/appeals/1974/2162166/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re Marriage of Lopez">38 Cal. App. 3d 93</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=2162166><a href=/ca/cases/appeals/1974/2162166/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re Marriage of Lopez">113 Cal. Rptr. 58</a></span> (1974) and the factors set out by that court for valuation of the goodwill. The factors: the practitioner's age, health, past demonstrated earning power, professional reputation in the community as to his judgments, skill, knowledge and his comparative professional success, have become known as the
<em>Fleege
</em>factors. Two areas surrounding the
<em>Fleege
</em>factors must be clarified: (1) the first step in evaluation under the
<em>Fleege
</em>factors is the determination of the existence of goodwill and (2) several accounting or appraisal methods may be used by the trial court in conjunction with the
<em>Fleege
</em>factors.<p id=b293-3><span id=p_243 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=243>*243
</span>The
<em>Lopez
</em>court warned that evaluation of goodwill must be done with considerable care and caution.
<em>Lopez,
</em>at 110. In carrying out this warning the court instructed that the trial courts should first determine if goodwill exists in a particular practice. Not every professional business as a going concern necessarily has goodwill.
<em>Lopez,
</em>at 109. The Washington goodwill cases to date have not recognized this preliminary inquiry and we do so today. This preliminary inquiry takes place during the general evaluation process. The trial court must bear in mind throughout this process that there may be zero goodwill.<p id=b293-4>The
<em>Fleege
</em>factors, under which the determination of existence and evaluation are made, give little guidance to the trial courts. Although we continue to require their usage when appropriate,
<em>i.e.,
</em>when those factors are present, during valuation of goodwill, we now recognize various methods which may be used in conjunction with these factors. The
<em>Fleege
</em>factors cannot be evaluated and valued in isolation. One or more of the accepted methods of valuation must be employed. The particular method used by the trial court will depend on the offered proof. Because evidence available to the court varies greatly from case to case, selection of any one method for all cases would unnecessarily limit the court in making a fair and just distribution.<p id=b293-5>In valuing goodwill five major formulas have been articulated.
<em>See generally
</em>Comment,
<em>Identifying, Valuing, and Dividing Professional Goodwill as Community Property at Dissolution of the Marital Community,
</em><span class="citation no-link">56 Tul. L. Rev. 313</span> (1981); Comment,
<em>The Recognition and Valuation of Professional Goodwill in the Marital Estate,
</em><span class="citation no-link">66 Marq. L. Rev. 697</span> (1983); Dlugatch & Olds,
<em>Determining Goodwill in a Professional Practice for Purpose of a Community Property Division in a Marital Dissolution,
</em>9 Community Prop. J. 120 (1982). There are three accounting formulas. Under the straight capitalization accounting method the average net profits of the practitioner are determined and this figure is capitalized at a definite rate, as, for example, 20 per
<span id=p_244 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=244>*244
</span>cent. This result is considered to be the total value of the business including both tangible and intangible assets. To determine the value of goodwill the book value of the business' assets are subtracted from the total value figure.
<a class=footnote href=#fn1 id=fn1_ref>1</a><p id=b294-5>The second accounting formula is the capitalization of excess earnings method. Under the pure capitalization of excess earnings the average net income is determined. From this figure an annual salary of average employee practitioner with like experience is subtracted. The remaining amount is multiplied by a fixed capitalization rate to determine the goodwill.
<a class=footnote href=#fn2 id=fn2_ref>2</a><p id=b294-6>The IRS variation of capitalized excess earnings method takes the average net income of the business for the last 5 years and subtracts a reasonable rate of return based on the business' average net tangible assets. From this amount a comparable net salary is subtracted. Finally, this remaining amount is capitalized at a definite rate. The resulting amount is goodwill.
<a class=footnote href=#fn3 id=fn3_ref>3</a><p id=b294-7>The fourth method, the market value approach, sets a value on professional goodwill by establishing what fair price would be obtained in the current open market if the practice were to be sold. This method necessitates that a
<span id=p_245 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=245>*245
</span>professional practice has been recently sold, is in the process of being sold or is the subject of a recent offer to purchase. Otherwise, the value may be manipulated by the professional spouse.<p id=b295-4>The fifth valuation method, the buy/sell agreement method, values goodwill by reliance on a recent actual sale or an unexercised existing option or contractual formula set forth in a partnership agreement or corporate agreement. Since the professional spouse may have been influenced by many factors other than fair market value in negotiating the terms of the agreement, courts relying on this method should inquire into the presence of such factors, as well as the arm's length nature of the transaction.<p id=b295-5>These five methods are not the exclusive formulas available to trial courts in analyzing the evidence presented. Nor must only one method be used in isolation. One or more methods may be used in conjunction with the
<em>Fleege
</em>factors to achieve a just and fair evaluation of the existence and value of any professional's goodwill.<p id=b295-6>The danger of using any one method without regard to the
<em>Fleege
</em>factors is apparent in the present case where petitioner's expert witnesses used only the capitalized excess earnings approach. Under this approach the experts testified that Phillip had no goodwill. Further testimony, however, indicated that Phillip's comparatively low earnings were a result of office expansion expenses, a deliberate decision to limit hours of practice and failure to compare Phillip with cardiologists in the same age and experience group doing similar procedures in Seattle. Consideration of the petitioner's reputation, associations, referrals, location and trade name indicate the existence of goodwill.<p id=b295-7>This case also exemplifies the need for caution in the use of the buy/sell agreement. The Northwest Cardiology Clinic buy/sell agreement does not include a goodwill factor. When the third doctor became a shareholder, no value was assigned to goodwill. The trial court must, however, inquire whether the omission in the agreement was the result of other factors or deliberations on the part of the sharehold
<span id=p_246 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=246>*246
</span>ers, particularly when the particular agreement is made in close proximity in time to the divorce.<p id=b296-4>Although an analysis of the evidence suggests the existence of goodwill in Phillip's practice, there is insufficient evidence as to the court's valuation of $70,000. Valuation of goodwill is a question of fact,
<em>Suther v. Suther,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1113911><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1981/1113911/ aria-description="Citation for case: Suther v. Suther">28 Wn. App. 838</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1113911><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1981/1113911/ aria-description="Citation for case: Suther v. Suther">627 P.2d 110</a></span>,
<em>review denied,
</em><span class="citation no-link">95 Wn.2d 1029</span> (1981). Findings of fact supported by substantial evidence in the record will not be reversed on appeal.
<em>Trans-Canada Enters., Ltd. v. King Cy.,
</em><span class=citation data-id=2605809><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1981/2605809/#271 aria-description="Citation for case: Trans-Canada Enterprises, Ltd. v. King County">29 Wn. App. 267, 271</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=2605809><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1981/2605809/ aria-description="Citation for case: Trans-Canada Enterprises, Ltd. v. King County">628 P.2d 493</a></span>,
<em>review denied,
</em><span class="citation no-link">96 Wn.2d 1002</span> (1981). Substantial evidence is evidence sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the declared premise.
<em>Smith v. Shannon,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1142486><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1983/1142486/ aria-description="Citation for case: Smith v. Shannon">100 Wn.2d 26</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1142486><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1983/1142486/ aria-description="Citation for case: Smith v. Shannon">666 P.2d 351</a></span> (1983);
<em>Ridgeview Properties v. Starbuck,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1226457><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1982/1226457/ aria-description="Citation for case: Ridgeview Properties v. Starbuck">96 Wn.2d 716</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1226457><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1982/1226457/ aria-description="Citation for case: Ridgeview Properties v. Starbuck">638 P.2d 1231</a></span> (1982).<p id=b296-5>The trial court found that Phillip had goodwill in the amount of $70,000 "based on the court's evaluation of the factors involved in determining goodwill". The court failed, however, to indicate what factors and method were used in valuation and, in fact, noted in its oral ruling:<blockquote id=b296-6>I am not going to go over all of my reasons. I have simply been persuaded that it exists in the consideration of the status of the practice.</blockquote><p id=b296-7>Report of Proceedings, at 129.<p id=b296-8>The record with regard to Phillip Hall's goodwill consists of the testimony of petitioner's expert witnesses and Judith Hall, and the accounting records of Phillip's earnings and tangible business assets. Petitioner's experts, an accountant and an economist, testified that based solely on the capitalized excess earnings approach, Phillip has no goodwill. Judith testified that based on other dissolution actions involving physicians, Phillip's goodwill is at least $100,000. Judith's testimony was the only evidence which assigned value to Phillip's goodwill. Her value was not based upon any analysis or upon application of any recognized valuation methodology. Nonetheless, it came in without objection. We, therefore, express no opinion as to its admissibility.<p id=b297-4><span id=p_247 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=247>*247
</span>The evidence set forth in the record is insufficient to support the finding that Phillip has $70,000 worth of goodwill. The unsubstantiated opinion of Judith and the records of Phillip's earnings and tangible assets are insufficient, without further analysis by the trial court, to persuade a fair-minded person that the $70,000 figure is the true value of Phillip's goodwill. The trial court must set forth on the record which factors and method were used in reaching its finding. We, therefore, reverse and remand for further findings by the trial court in accordance with the valuation guidelines set forth herein.<p id=b297-5>Petitioner also raises the issue of the proper method of analyzing the future earning potential that Judith Hall has gained during marriage. Petitioner contends that the increase in earning potential, as evidenced by Judith's numerous published writings, her excellent reputation in her field and recent job offers, is an asset so similar to goodwill that it should be considered to offset his goodwill.<p id=b297-6>Although treatment of future earning capacity as a distinct marital asset has been advocated,
<em>see
</em>Comment,
<em>A Property Theory of Future Earning Potential in Dissolution Proceedings,
</em><span class="citation no-link">56 Wash. L. Rev. 277</span> (1981), this court has declined to treat it as such. Recently, we have emphasized future earning capacity as a factor to be considered in property distribution in the context of professional degrees.
<em>In re Marriage of Washburn,
</em><span class=citation data-id=9571768><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1984/1308125/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re the Marriage of Washburn">101 Wn.2d 168</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=9571768><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1984/1308125/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re the Marriage of Washburn">677 P.2d 152</a></span> (1984). In
<em>Washburn,
</em>we discussed a line of cases which view the professional degree (or the enhanced earning potential which it represents) as property, to be valued and distributed upon dissolution of marriage; as nonproperty, but as a factor deserving of a restitutionary award; as non-property to be considered in alimony; and as nonproperty deserving of no compensation.
<em>Washburn,
</em>at 174-75.<p id=b297-7>As we held in the context of professional degrees, we now hold that the provisions of our dissolution of marriage act, codified in RCW 26.09, provide for a fair and just treatment of future earning potential. RCW 26.09.080 reads in part:<p id=b298-3><span id=p_248 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=248>*248
</span>In a proceeding for dissolution of the marriage, legal separation, . . . the court shall, without regard to marital misconduct, make such disposition of the property and the liabilities of the parties, either community or separate, as shall appear just and equitable after considering all relevant factors including, but not limited to:<p id=b298-4>(1) The nature and extent of the community property;<p id=b298-5>(2) The nature and extent of the separate property;<p id=b298-6>(3) The duration of the marriage; and<p id=b298-7>(4) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division of property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live therein for reasonable periods to a spouse having custody of any children.<p id=b298-8>In addition to the four subsections in RCW 26.09.080, which include "[t]he economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division of property is to become effective," the court should also consider the age, health, education and employment history of the parties and their children, and the future earning prospects of all of them in determining a just and equitable division.
<em>DeRuwe v. DeRuwe,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1409296><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1967/1409296/#408 aria-description="Citation for case: DeRuwe v. DeRuwe">72 Wn.2d 404, 408</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1409296><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1967/1409296/ aria-description="Citation for case: DeRuwe v. DeRuwe">433 P.2d 209</a></span> (1967);
<em>In re Marriage of Rink,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1228829><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1977/1228829/#551 aria-description="Citation for case: In Re the Marriage of Rink">18 Wn. App. 549, 551</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1228829><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1977/1228829/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re the Marriage of Rink">571 P.2d 210</a></span> (1977). In
<em>Wash-burn
</em>we also emphasized the importance of the future earning potential of each spouse by setting it out as one of four factors to be considered in determining the proper amount of compensation for the supporting spouse.<p id=b298-9>Once again we emphasize the importance of consideration of future earning potential. We decline to find that future earning potential is an asset which can be used to offset goodwill. Instead, we hold that it is a substantial factor to be considered by the trial court in making a just and equitable property distribution. On remand, the trial court should articulate its reasoning in taking into account this substantial factor.<p id=b298-10>Williams, C.J., Utter, Dolliver, Dore, Dimmick, and Pearson, JJ., and Cunningham, J. Pro Tern., concur.<div class=footnotes><div class=footnote id=fn1 label=1><a class=footnote href=#fn1_ref>1</a><p id=b294-8>Average net earnings $60,000<p id=b294-9>Capitalize at 20% x 5<p id=b294-10>Total business tangible and intangible assets 300,000<p id=b294-11>Less current net tangible assets -30,000<p id=b294-12>Goodwill $270,000</div><div class=footnote id=fn2 label=2><a class=footnote href=#fn2_ref>2</a><p id=b294-13>Average net earnings $60,000<p id=b294-14>Less comparable net salary —40,000<p id=b294-15>Average earnings on intangible assets 20,000<p id=b294-16>Capitalize at 20% x 5<p id=b294-17>Goodwill $109,000</div><div class=footnote id=fn3 label=3><a class=footnote href=#fn3_ref>3</a><p id=b294-18>Average net earnings $60,000<p id=b294-19>Less rate of return on average tangible assets -2,500<p id=b294-20>Subtotal $57,500<p id=b294-21>Less comparable net salary -40,000<p id=b294-22>Average earnings on intangible assets 17,500<p id=b294-23>Capitalize at 20% x 5<p id=b294-24>GoodwiU $87,500</div></div></div></section></div></div></section><div data-pagefind-ignore></div><p class=data-freshness-notice data-pagefind-ignore>Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: <a href=https://www.courtlistener.com/help/api/bulk-data/>CourtListener bulk data</a>.</div></article></main><footer class=site-footer><div class=container><div class=footer-content><p>A public interest project of <a href=https://AaronHall.com/>Aaron Hall, Attorney at Law</a> &copy; 2026<nav class=footer-links><a href=/about/>About</a>
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<!doctype html><html lang=en><head><meta charset=utf-8><meta name=viewport content="width=device-width,initial-scale=1"><title>In Re the Marriage of Kraft, 832 P.2d 871 (Wash. 1992) | HallApproved.com</title><meta name=description content="In the Matter of the Marriage of Donna L. Kraft, Petitioner, and Bryce A. Kraft, Respondent, 832 P.2d 871"><link rel=canonical href=https://hallapproved.com/wa/cases/supreme/1992/1182329/><link rel=icon href=/favicon.svg type=image/svg+xml><meta property="og:site_name" content="Hall Approved — Free American Case Law"><meta property="og:url" content="https://hallapproved.com/wa/cases/supreme/1992/1182329/"><meta property="og:type" content="article"><meta property="og:title" content="In Re the Marriage of Kraft, 832 P.2d 871"><meta property="og:description" content="In the Matter of the Marriage of Donna L. Kraft, Petitioner, and Bryce A. Kraft, Respondent, 832 P.2d 871"><meta property="article:published_time" content="1992-07-23"><meta property="og:locale" content="en_US"><meta property="og:image" content="https://hallapproved.com/og-image.png"><meta property="og:image:width" content="1200"><meta property="og:image:height" content="630"><meta property="og:image:alt" content="Hall Approved — Free American Case Law"><meta name=twitter:card content="summary_large_image"><meta name=twitter:title content="In Re the Marriage of Kraft, 832 P.2d 871"><meta name=twitter:description content="In the Matter of the Marriage of Donna L. Kraft, Petitioner, and Bryce A. Kraft, Respondent, 832 P.2d 871"><meta name=twitter:image content="https://hallapproved.com/og-image.png"><link rel=stylesheet href=/css/main.min.bb0569a18967c40a0cc4a9b280ff92cd1f688af91e691406fc3ff4130203bc69.css><script type=application/ld+json>{"@context":"https://schema.org","@type":"BreadcrumbList","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","item":"https://hallapproved.com/","name":"Free Legal Archive","position":1},{"@type":"ListItem","item":"https://hallapproved.com/wa/","name":"Washington","position":2},{"@type":"ListItem","item":"https://hallapproved.com/wa/cases/","name":"Washington Cases","position":3},{"@type":"ListItem","item":"https://hallapproved.com/wa/cases/supreme/","name":"Washington Supreme Court","position":4},{"@type":"ListItem","item":"https://hallapproved.com/wa/cases/supreme/1992/","name":"1992","position":5},{"@type":"ListItem","name":"In Re the Marriage of Kraft","position":6}]}</script><script type=application/ld+json>{"@context":["https://schema.org",{"LegalCase":"https://hallapproved.com/vocab#LegalCase","citation":"https://hallapproved.com/vocab#citation","citedByCount":"https://hallapproved.com/vocab#citedByCount","court":"https://hallapproved.com/vocab#court","holdings":"https://hallapproved.com/vocab#holdings","treatmentStatus":"https://hallapproved.com/vocab#treatmentStatus"}],"@type":["ScholarlyArticle","LegalCase"],"alternateName":"832 P.2d 871; 119 Wash. 2d 438; 1992 Wash. LEXIS 201","author":{"@type":"Person","name":"Guy"},"citation":"832 P.2d 871","citedByCount":67,"court":{"@type":"GovernmentOrganization","name":"Washington Supreme Court"},"dateModified":"1992-07-23","datePublished":"1992-07-23","headline":"In Re the Marriage of Kraft, 832 P.2d 871","identifier":{"@type":"PropertyValue","name":"Citation","value":"832 P.2d 871"},"inLanguage":"en-US","isPartOf":{"@type":"WebSite","name":"HallApproved","url":"https://hallapproved.com/"},"license":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/","name":"In Re the Marriage of Kraft","publisher":{"@type":"Organization","name":"HallApproved","url":"https://hallapproved.com/"},"url":"https://hallapproved.com/wa/cases/supreme/1992/1182329/"}</script></head><body id=top><header class=site-header><div class=container><a href=/ class=site-title>Hall Approved</a>
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<span class=separator>/</span></nav><header class=case-header data-pagefind-ignore><h1 class=case-title>In Re the Marriage of Kraft</h1><div class=case-name>In Re the Marriage of Kraft</div><div class=case-meta>Washington Supreme Court &#183; Decided July 23, 1992 &#183; Guy</div><div class=case-citation-line>832 P.2d 871; 119 Wash. 2d 438; 1992 Wash. LEXIS 201
<span class=help>(Pacific Reporter, Second Series)</span></div></header><meta data-pagefind-meta=court[content] content="Washington Supreme Court"><meta data-pagefind-meta=year[content] content="1992"><meta data-pagefind-meta=citations[content] content="832 P.2d 871; 119 Wash. 2d 438; 1992 Wash. LEXIS 201"><meta data-pagefind-meta=cited_count[content] content="67"><meta data-pagefind-filter=court[content] content="Washington Supreme Court"><meta data-pagefind-filter=year[content] content="1992"><h1 class=sr-only data-pagefind-weight=10 data-pagefind-meta=title>In Re the Marriage of Kraft</h1><section class="section full-opinion" id=full-opinion><div data-pagefind-ignore><div class="opinions container"><section class=opinion id=opinion-combined><h2 class=opinion-heading>Opinion</h2><div class=opinion-text><author id=b474-7>Guy, J.</author><p id=Akya>The issue here presented is whether the trial court properly applied
<em>Mansell v. Mansell,
</em><span class=citation data-id=9431681><a href=/us/cases/supreme/1989/112267/ aria-description="Citation for case: Mansell v. Mansell">490 U.S. 581</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=9431681><a href=/us/cases/supreme/1989/112267/ aria-description="Citation for case: Mansell v. Mansell">104 L. Ed. 2d 675</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=9431681><a href=/us/cases/supreme/1989/112267/ aria-description="Citation for case: Mansell v. Mansell">109 S. Ct. 2023</a></span> (1989) in its distribution of assets in the dissolution decree. We conclude the trial court improperly considered the husband's military disability retirement pay as an asset of the community. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals and reverse and remand to the trial court for reconsideration of the property distribution in accordance with this opinion.<p id=b474-8>Facts<p id=b474-9>Bryce and Donna Kraft were married on September 23, 1967. They have two children, Troy and Karen, who were 17 and 13 years of age, respectively, at the time their parents separated on March 20, 1988. Troy and Karen remained with Mrs. Kraft at the parties' Colville residence after the separation. Mr. Kraft moved into a hunting cabin without water, electricity, or telephone.<p id=b474-10>Mrs. Kraft has a master's degree in counseling. At the time of trial she was working as an alcohol and drug abuse counselor and earning approximately $1,700 net per month.<p id=b474-11>Mr. Kraft is a retired military officer, having a combined service of 21 years at the time of retirement. During a portion of his service, Mr. Kraft was in Vietnam flying helicopters. He sustained injuries while serving in Vietnam, including bullet wounds and hearing loss. The Veterans Administration (VA) rated Mr. Kraft as being 50 percent disabled. Besides his military background, Mr. Kraft has a
<span id=p_441 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=441>*441
</span>bachelor's degree in elementary education and has a certificate to teach. He also has a master's degree in counseling.<p id=b475-4>Mr. Kraft's employment, as presented to the trial court, was as caretaker for an elderly man. In that capacity, he was earning at the time of trial approximately $1,000 per month. Because of the tenuous nature of this employment, the trial court found that Mr. Kraft's average net income from his caretaker job was $500 per month. Mr. Kraft also receives military benefits of $1,317 per month based on his 21 years in the service. He was married to Mrs. Kraft during 14 of those 21 years. The parties stipulated that one-half of Mr. Kraft's monthly military benefits represents disability pay.<p id=b475-5>The trial court awarded to Mr. Kraft his individual retirement account (IRA) worth $9,000, a tractor worth $800, a 1976 Mercedes automobile worth $2,500, his tools worth $1,000, his guns worth $1,000, and various items not valued. As for the parties' debts, the court ordered Mr. Kraft to be responsible for repaying the VA for his disability overpayment, which the court estimated at approximately $21,000 when he began repaying it in 1987. The court also ordered Mr. Kraft to repay one-half of the parties' $3,500 debt to their son and one-half of their $1,200 debt to their daughter. The court ordered Mr. Kraft to pay $300 per month to Mrs. Kraft as child support for Karen until Karen reaches 18 years of age (which will occur in July 1992) and left open the question of postmajority support for Karen. The court also ordered Mr. Kraft to pay Troy $200 per month for 36 months in order to assist Troy with college expenses. The court conditioned these payments upon Troy's satisfactory academic performance.<p id=b475-6>The trial court awarded to Mrs. Kraft the following: the parties' house in Colville, valued at $126,000 and subject to a $60,000 mortgage; the parties' rental property in Alabama, valued at $55,000 and subject to a $16,000 mortgage; a 1979 Volvo automobile valued at $2,500; various
<span id=p_442 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=442>*442
</span>items of furniture and appliances worth $7,000; Mrs. Kraft's IRA worth $8,000; Mrs. Kraft's pension worth $3,000; woodworking tools worth $1,500; and various items not valued. The court ordered that Mrs. Kraft retain whatever rental income was left over from the Alabama property after the mortgage was paid (usually $200 per month). As her share of the debts, the trial court ordered Mrs. Kraft to pay the mortgages on the houses she was awarded, to repay a bank loan of $1,800, to pay the other half of the parties' debts to Troy and Karen, and to repay a $1,000 loan from her father.<p id=b476-5>The trial court, relying on expert testimony, determined that Mr. Kraft's total military pension had a present value of $247,553. The court awarded to Mr. Kraft one-half of the value of the total pension, or approximately $123,800, as his disability pay. The court determined that two-thirds of the remaining half (rounded to $82,600) was community property, based on the fact that the parties were married for 14 of the 21 years Mr. Kraft was in the service. Accordingly, the court awarded half of the community interest, or approximately $41,300, to Mrs. Kraft.<p id=b476-6>The trial court calculated that when the present values of the military benefits (disability and retirement) are added to the amounts awarded under the property distribution, and when the debts are deducted, Mr. Kraft would receive roughly $200,000 and Mrs. Kraft roughly $162,000.<p id=b476-7>The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erroneously treated Mr. Kraft's military disability pay as an asset subject to distribution, contrary to the United States Supreme Court's holding in
<em>Mansell v. Mansell,
</em><span class=citation data-id=9431681><a href=/us/cases/supreme/1989/112267/ aria-description="Citation for case: Mansell v. Mansell">490 U.S. 581</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=9431681><a href=/us/cases/supreme/1989/112267/ aria-description="Citation for case: Mansell v. Mansell">104 L. Ed. 2d 675</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=9431681><a href=/us/cases/supreme/1989/112267/ aria-description="Citation for case: Mansell v. Mansell">109 S. Ct. 2023</a></span> (1989).
<em>In re Marriage of Kraft,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1219439><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1991/1219439/ aria-description="Citation for case: Matter of Marriage of Kraft">61 Wn. App. 45</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1219439><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1991/1219439/ aria-description="Citation for case: Matter of Marriage of Kraft">808 P.2d 1176</a></span> (1991). The Court of Appeals declared that when the disability pay is properly eliminated from the distribution equation, the result is a grossly disproportionate share of the parties' assets being awarded to Mrs. Kraft. <span class=citation data-id=1219439><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1991/1219439/#50 aria-description="Citation for case: Matter of Marriage of Kraft">61 Wn. App. at 50</a></span>. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for redistribution of assets and recomputation of child and postmajority support. This court accepted Mrs. Kraft's petition for review.<p id=b477-3><span id=p_443 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=443>*443
</span>Issue<p id=b477-4>The primary issue presented is whether the trial court improperly considered Mr. Kraft's military disability retirement pay in distributing the parties' assets given the
<em>Man-sell
</em>holding.<p id=b477-5>Analysis<p id=b477-6>I<p id=b477-7>Persons who serve in the military for an extended period, usually at least 20 years, are entitled to retirement pay.
<em>E.g.,
</em><span class="citation no-link">10 U.S.C. § 3911</span>
<em>et seq.
</em>(1988) (Army); § 8911
<em>et seq.
</em>(Air Force). Veterans are also entitled to disability benefits if they became disabled as a result of military service. <span class="citation no-link">38 U.S.C. § 310</span> (1988) (wartime); § 331 (peacetime). A veteran may not receive both full retirement pay and disability pay, however. A retiree may receive disability benefits only to the extent that he or she waives a corresponding amount of military retirement pay. <span class="citation no-link">38 U.S.C. § 3105</span> (1988). Such waivers are advantageous to retirees because disability benefits, unlike retirement pay, are exempt from federal, state, and local taxes. <span class="citation no-link">38 U.S.C. § 3101</span>(a) (1988).<p id=b477-8>In 1981, the United States Supreme Court held, in
<em>McCarty v. McCarty,
</em><span class=citation data-id=9428469><a href=/us/cases/supreme/1981/110552/ aria-description="Citation for case: McCarty v. McCarty">453 U.S. 210</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=9428469><a href=/us/cases/supreme/1981/110552/ aria-description="Citation for case: McCarty v. McCarty">69 L. Ed. 2d 589</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=9428469><a href=/us/cases/supreme/1981/110552/ aria-description="Citation for case: McCarty v. McCarty">101 S. Ct. 2728</a></span> (1981), that federal law precluded a state court, upon the dissolution of a marriage, from dividing military
<em>retirement
</em>pay pursuant to state community property laws. Disability pay was not at issue. The Court reasoned that Congress intended military retirement pay to reach the veteran and no one else, and that therefore treating such pay as community property would do clear damage to important military personnel objectives. <span class=citation data-id=9428469><a href=/us/cases/supreme/1981/110552/#232 aria-description="Citation for case: McCarty v. McCarty">453 U.S. at 232-35</a></span>.<p id=b477-9>Congress responded to
<em><span class=citation data-id=9428469><a href=/us/cases/supreme/1981/110552/ aria-description="Citation for case: McCarty v. McCarty">McCarty</a></span>
</em>in 1982 by enacting the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act (USFSPA), which authorizes state courts to treat "disposable retired or retainer pay" as community property subject to division upon dissolution of a marriage. <span class="citation no-link">10 U.S.C. § 1408</span>(c)(1) (1988). "Disposable retired or retainer pay" is defined in the USFSPA to exclude,
<em>inter alia,
</em>any amounts
<span id=p_444 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=444>*444
</span>waived in order to receive disability benefits. <span class="citation no-link">10 U.S.C. § 1408</span>(a)(4)(B) (1988).<p id=b478-5>In
<em>Mansell v. <span class=citation data-id=9431681><a href=/us/cases/supreme/1989/112267/ aria-description="Citation for case: Mansell v. Mansell">Mansell, supra,</a></span>
</em>the Court addressed the question whether state courts may treat, as property divisible upon divorce, military retirement pay waived by the retiree in order to receive veterans' disability benefits. The Court held that state courts may not do so. The Court drew this conclusion from the fact that the USFSPA grants state courts the authority to treat disposable retired pay as community property but specifically excludes retirement pay waived in order to receive disability pay. <span class=citation data-id=9431681><a href=/us/cases/supreme/1989/112267/#589 aria-description="Citation for case: Mansell v. Mansell">490 U.S. at 589</a></span>.
<em>See generally
</em>Note, Mansell v. Mansell:
<em>How it Changed the Definition of Marital Property for the Military Spouse,
</em><span class="citation no-link">30 J. Fam. L. 97</span> (1991-1992).<p id=b478-6>In order to assess
<em><span class=citation data-id=9431681><a href=/us/cases/supreme/1989/112267/ aria-description="Citation for case: Mansell v. Mansell">Mansell</a></span>
</em>properly, we must contemporaneously consider RCW 26.09.080, which provides that in a dissolution proceeding the court must dispose of the parties' property in a "just and equitable" manner after considering,
<em>inter alia,
</em>"[t]he economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division of property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family home or the right to five therein for reasonable periods to a spouse with whom the children reside the majority of the time." Thus,
<em><span class=citation data-id=9431681><a href=/us/cases/supreme/1989/112267/ aria-description="Citation for case: Mansell v. Mansell">Mansell</a></span>
</em>requires the trial court not to treat military disability retirement pay as divisible, whereas RCW 26.09.080 requires the trial court to make an equitable distribution in light of the parties' postdissolution economic circumstances. The question then becomes how the trial court is to honor both these requirements.<p id=b478-7>II<p id=b478-8>Guidance is provided by a number of state court decisions. For example, in
<em>Rothwell v. Rothwell,
</em><span class=citation data-id=9776488><a href=/tx/cases/appeals/1989/2455369/#891 aria-description="Citation for case: Rothwell v. Rothwell">775 S.W.2d 888, 891</a></span> (Tex. Ct. App. 1989), the veteran claimed that the trial court erred in awarding a disproportionate share of the marital home to his ex-wife. In upholding the property distribution, the Texas Court of Appeals rejected this argument and declared that "the trial court could consider V.A. dis
<span id=p_445 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=445>*445
</span>ability retirement benefits which were payable to the husband in making a just and right division of the community assets, but it could not make any division of those benefits." <span class=citation data-id=9776488><a href=/tx/cases/appeals/1989/2455369/#892 aria-description="Citation for case: Rothwell v. Rothwell">775 S.W.2d at 892</a></span>. Similarly, in
<em>Bewley v. Bewley,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1190877><a href=/id/cases/appeals/1989/1190877/ aria-description="Citation for case: Bewley v. Bewley">116 Idaho 845</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1190877><a href=/id/cases/appeals/1989/1190877/ aria-description="Citation for case: Bewley v. Bewley">780 P.2d 596</a></span> (Ct. App. 1989), the magistrate who had divided the parties' property treated the disability pay as separate property and left it with the veteran. The magistrate then awarded the spouse "more than her share of the community property, partially offsetting the disability pay retained by Mr. Bewley." <span class=citation data-id=1190877><a href=/id/cases/appeals/1989/1190877/#846 aria-description="Citation for case: Bewley v. Bewley">116 Idaho at 846</a></span>. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the property distribution. <span class=citation data-id=1190877><a href=/id/cases/appeals/1989/1190877/#847 aria-description="Citation for case: Bewley v. Bewley">116 Idaho at 847</a></span>. Thus, at least two community property states have interpreted
<em><span class=citation data-id=9431681><a href=/us/cases/supreme/1989/112267/ aria-description="Citation for case: Mansell v. Mansell">Mansell</a></span>
</em>as permitting the trial court to consider military disability retirement pay as a factor justifying awarding a disproportionate share of the community property to the nonretiree spouse.<p id=b479-5>Some noncommunity property states have interpreted
<em><span class=citation data-id=9431681><a href=/us/cases/supreme/1989/112267/ aria-description="Citation for case: Mansell v. Mansell">Mansell</a></span>
</em>similarly. For example, in
<em>Davis v. Davis,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1749531><a href=/ky/cases/supreme/1989/1749531/ aria-description="Citation for case: Davis v. Davis">777 S.W.2d 230</a></span> (Ky. 1989), the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that when inequity arises in divorce proceedings because of the payment of disability benefits to the military employee, the trial court may grant an increased award of spousal support or marital property. <span class=citation data-id=1749531><a href=/ky/cases/supreme/1989/1749531/#232 aria-description="Citation for case: Davis v. Davis">777 S.W.2d at 232</a></span>. Similarly, in
<em>Jones v. Jones,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1190998><a href=/hi/cases/appeals/1989/1190998/ aria-description="Citation for case: Jones v. Jones">7 Hawaii App. 496</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1190998><a href=/hi/cases/appeals/1989/1190998/ aria-description="Citation for case: Jones v. Jones">780 P.2d 581</a></span> (1989), the Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals stated that the trial court may consider military disability retirement pay in the same way it considers each party's ability to earn income post divorce. <span class=citation data-id=1190998><a href=/hi/cases/appeals/1989/1190998/#500 aria-description="Citation for case: Jones v. Jones">7 Hawaii App. at 500</a></span>.
<em><span class=citation data-id=1190998><a href=/hi/cases/appeals/1989/1190998/ aria-description="Citation for case: Jones v. Jones">Jones</a></span>
</em>is also instructive because it shows how a trial court may go too far in considering the pay. There, the trial court had reduced the husband's military disability retirement pay to its present value, then used that value as the basis for awarding the wife other marital property of equal cash value. The Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals held this was error. <span class=citation data-id=1190998><a href=/hi/cases/appeals/1989/1190998/#500 aria-description="Citation for case: Jones v. Jones">7 Hawaii App. at 500-01</a></span>.<p id=b479-6>Other noncommunity property state courts have held that although military disability retirement pay may not be included as part of the marital estate, it may be considered as a source of income of the retiree spouse in awarding
<span id=p_446 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=446>*446
</span>spousal or child support.
<em>E.g., Lambert v. Lambert,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1219498><a href=/va/cases/appeals/1990/1219498/#627 aria-description="Citation for case: Lambert v. Lambert">10 Va. App. 623, 627</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1219498><a href=/va/cases/appeals/1990/1219498/ aria-description="Citation for case: Lambert v. Lambert">395 S.E.2d 207</a></span> (1990);
<em>Riley v. Riley,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1955511><a href=/md/cases/appeals/1990/1955511/#409 aria-description="Citation for case: Riley v. Riley">82 Md. App. 400, 409-10</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1955511><a href=/md/cases/appeals/1990/1955511/ aria-description="Citation for case: Riley v. Riley">571 A.2d 1261</a></span> (1990). In
<em>Murphy v. Murphy,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1639140><a href=/ar/cases/supreme/1990/1639140/ aria-description="Citation for case: Murphy v. Murphy">302 Ark. 157</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1639140><a href=/ar/cases/supreme/1990/1639140/ aria-description="Citation for case: Murphy v. Murphy">787 S.W.2d 684</a></span> (1990), the Supreme Court of Arkansas went so far as to uphold an award of spousal support to a nonretiree spouse where the retiree spouse's only source of income was military disability retirement pay. The court explained that the nonretiree spouse was not entitled to direct payments for alimony under the USFSPA, but that federal law did not preclude the trial court from awarding alimony or relieve the husband from paying alimony out of his military disability retirement pay once he had received it. <span class=citation data-id=1639140><a href=/ar/cases/supreme/1990/1639140/#159 aria-description="Citation for case: Murphy v. Murphy">302 Ark. at 159</a></span>.<p id=b480-5>Ill<p id=b480-6>The cited state court decisions interpreting
<em><span class=citation data-id=9431681><a href=/us/cases/supreme/1989/112267/ aria-description="Citation for case: Mansell v. Mansell">Mansell</a></span>
</em>establish the general proposition that when making property distributions or awarding alimony the trial court may consider military disability retirement pay as future income of the retiree spouse relevant to a determination of the parties' ultimate economic circumstances. This rule is consistent with our decision in
<em>In re Marriage of Dessauer,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1357403><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1982/1357403/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re the Marriage of Dessauer">97 Wn.2d 831</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1357403><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1982/1357403/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re the Marriage of Dessauer">650 P.2d 1099</a></span> (1982),
<em>abandoned on other grounds in In re Marriage of Smith,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1177136><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1983/1177136/#324 aria-description="Citation for case: In Re Marriage of Smith">100 Wn.2d 319, 324</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1177136><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1983/1177136/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re Marriage of Smith">669 P.2d 448</a></span> (1983).
<em>Dessauer
</em>arose after the United States Supreme Court decided
<em>McCarty v. <span class=citation data-id=9428469><a href=/us/cases/supreme/1981/110552/ aria-description="Citation for case: McCarty v. McCarty">McCarty, supra,</a></span>
</em>but before Congress legislatively overruled that decision in the USFSPA. Thus at the time
<em>Dessauer
</em>was decided, state courts were prohibited from dividing military
<em>nondisability
</em>retirement pay pursuant to state community property laws.<p id=b480-7><em>Dessauer
</em>involved two separate dissolution actions (Dessauer and Salerno) involving husbands with military non-disability retirement income. In each action, the husband contended that the trial court had considered his retirement income in a fashion inconsistent with
<em><span class=citation data-id=9428469><a href=/us/cases/supreme/1981/110552/ aria-description="Citation for case: McCarty v. McCarty">McCarty</a></span>
</em>when making the property distribution.<p id=b481-4><span id=p_447 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=447>*447
</span>In the Dessauer action, the trial court had classified the retired pay as community property and divided the benefits between the parties. <span class=citation data-id=1357403><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1982/1357403/#834 aria-description="Citation for case: In Re the Marriage of Dessauer">97 Wn.2d at 834</a></span>. We held this was improper under
<em><span class=citation data-id=9428469><a href=/us/cases/supreme/1981/110552/ aria-description="Citation for case: McCarty v. McCarty">McCarty</a></span>,
</em>and we remanded the action to the trial court for redistribution. <span class=citation data-id=1357403><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1982/1357403/#834 aria-description="Citation for case: In Re the Marriage of Dessauer">97 Wn.2d at 834</a></span>. In the combined dissolution appeal of Salerno, the trial court had not classified the retirement pay as community property and had not divided it or offset other property because of it. <span class=citation data-id=1357403><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1982/1357403/#834 aria-description="Citation for case: In Re the Marriage of Dessauer">97 Wn.2d at 834, 836-37</a></span>. Instead, the trial court had considered the fact that Mr. Salerno received a monthly income as an economic circumstance of the parties. <span class=citation data-id=1357403><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1982/1357403/#837 aria-description="Citation for case: In Re the Marriage of Dessauer">97 Wn.2d at 837</a></span>. The trial court had discussed the value of the pension in terms of present value, but had specifically stated the court did not consider this value in dividing the remainder of the property. <span class=citation data-id=1357403><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1982/1357403/#834 aria-description="Citation for case: In Re the Marriage of Dessauer">97 Wn.2d at 834</a></span>. We held that the Salerno trial court's action was proper under
<em><span class=citation data-id=9428469><a href=/us/cases/supreme/1981/110552/ aria-description="Citation for case: McCarty v. McCarty">McCarty</a></span>
</em>and explained that "[without considering the true economic circumstances of the parties before it, the court would be unable to properly exercise its discretion and make a just and equitable distribution of the property as required by [RCW 26.09.080]."
<em>Dessauer,
</em>at 838. We therefore concluded:<blockquote id=b481-5>[A] court may consider military nondisability retired pay as an economic circumstance of the parties when dividing property. However, the court must not characterize the retirement income as community property or divide it. Neither may it value the pension and offset property against that value.</blockquote><p id=b481-6><em>Dessauer,
</em>at 839.
<em>Accord, In re Marriage of Smith,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1165231><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1982/1165231/ aria-description="Citation for case: In the Matter of Marriage of Smith">33 Wn. App. 147</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1165231><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1982/1165231/ aria-description="Citation for case: In the Matter of Marriage of Smith">652 P.2d 391</a></span> (1982)
<em>(post-McCarty
</em>but pre-USFSPA decision holding trial court erred by awarding wife community property of comparable value in order to offset fully husband's military retirement);
<em>In re Marriage of Roark,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1449304><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1983/1449304/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re the Marriage of Roark">34 Wn. App. 252</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1449304><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1983/1449304/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re the Marriage of Roark">659 P.2d 1133</a></span> (1983) (similar result concerning railroad retirement benefits).<p id=b481-7>The conclusion we reached in
<em>Dessauer
</em>accords with the general rule derived above from the more recent state court decisions interpreting
<em><span class=citation data-id=9431681><a href=/us/cases/supreme/1989/112267/ aria-description="Citation for case: Mansell v. Mansell">Mansell</a></span>.
</em>Accordingly, we hold that when making property distributions or awarding
<span id=p_448 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=448>*448
</span>spousal support in a dissolution proceeding, the court may regard military disability retirement pay as future income to the retiree spouse and, so regarded, consider it as an economic circumstance of the parties. In particular, the court may consider the pay as a basis for awarding the nonretiree spouse a proportionately larger share of the community property where equity so requires. The court may not, however, divide or distribute the military disability retirement pay as an asset. It is improper under
<em><span class=citation data-id=9431681><a href=/us/cases/supreme/1989/112267/ aria-description="Citation for case: Mansell v. Mansell">Mansell</a></span>
</em>for the trial court to reduce military disability pay to present value where the purpose of ascertaining present value is to serve as a basis to award the nonretiree spouse a proportionately greater share of the community property as a direct offset of assets.<p id=b482-5>IV<p id=b482-6>Applying this rule in the present case, we conclude the trial court erred by reducing Mr. Kraft's military disability retirement pay to its present value and then using that present value as the basis for awarding Mrs. Kraft a proportionately larger share of the community property as an offset of assets. The trial court reduced Mr. Kraft's entire military pension to its present value of $247,553. The court then found that half of this, or approximately $123,800, represented Mr. Kraft's disability pay and listed it along with the various other assets the court was awarding to Mr. Kraft. Adding the values of the properties the parties were to receive, and then subtracting debts, the court concluded that the property distribution would result in Mr. Kraft receiving roughly $200,000 and Mrs. Kraft roughly $162,000. This distribution would thus give Mrs. Kraft the bulk of the parties' community property as a means of offsetting the present value of Mr. Kraft's military disability retirement pay. In following this procedure the trial court effectively distributed the disability pension as an asset, contrary to the mandate of
<em><span class=citation data-id=9431681><a href=/us/cases/supreme/1989/112267/ aria-description="Citation for case: Mansell v. Mansell">Mansell</a></span>
</em>and contrary to the rule we have announced above.<p id=b483-3><span id=p_449 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=449>*449
</span>V<p id=b483-4>We next consider whether the trial court's incorrect manner of considering the disability benefits requires remand. This question is analogous to the question raised when an appellate court determines that the trial court committed error in characterizing property as either separate or community. We have previously held that the characterization of property is not controlling and that the ultimate question is "whether the final division of the property is fair, just and equitable under all the circumstances."
<em>Baker v. Baker,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1353048><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1972/1353048/#745 aria-description="Citation for case: Baker v. Baker">80 Wn.2d 736, 745-46</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1353048><a href=/wa/cases/supreme/1972/1353048/ aria-description="Citation for case: Baker v. Baker">498 P.2d 315</a></span> (1972). However, "[r]emand is required where (1) the trial court's reasoning indicates that its division was significantly influenced by its characterization of the property, and (2) it is not clear that had the court properly characterized the property, it would have divided it in the same way."
<em>In re Marriage of Shannon, 55
</em>Wn. App. 137, 142, <span class=citation data-id=1156754><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1989/1156754/ aria-description="Citation for case: In the Matter of Marriage of Shannon">777 P.2d 8</a></span> (1989). Similarly, we hold that remand is appropriate where the trial court's property distribution was significantly influenced by its improper manner of considering military disability retirement pay and where there is doubt whether the trial court would have distributed the property the way it did had it properly considered the pay.<p id=b483-5>Here, the trial court attempted to achieve rough equality in its property distribution by reducing the disability benefits to present value and offsetting that value by awarding to Mrs. Kraft a proportionately greater share of community property.<p id=b483-6>The Court of Appeals also concluded that remand is required, but for a different reason. The Court of Appeals took the view that the trial court should have disregarded Mr. Kraft's military pension altogether, including both his disability and nondisability benefits.
<em>In re Marriage of Kraft,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1219439><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1991/1219439/#51 aria-description="Citation for case: Matter of Marriage of Kraft">61 Wn. App. 45, 51-52</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1219439><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1991/1219439/ aria-description="Citation for case: Matter of Marriage of Kraft">808 P.2d 1176</a></span> (1991). The court then concluded that when those benefits are disregarded, the trial court's distribution would result in Mr. Kraft receiving assets worth approximately $12,000 and
<span id=p_450 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=450>*450
</span>Mrs. Kraft receiving assets worth approximately $122,000, which in the view of the Court of Appeals is not a just and equitable distribution.
<em>Kraft,
</em>at 52.<p id=b484-5>We do not agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court should have wholly disregarded the nondisability portion of Mr. Kraft's military pension. Reducing a retirement pension to its present value is a recognized procedure in the valuation of divorce assets.
<em>See, e.g., In re Marriage of Pilant,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1282442><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1985/1282442/#179 aria-description="Citation for case: In Re the Marriage of Pilant">42 Wn. App. 173, 179</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1282442><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1985/1282442/ aria-description="Citation for case: In Re the Marriage of Pilant">709 P.2d 1241</a></span> (1985).
<em>See generally
</em>B. Goldberg,
<em>Valuation of Divorce Assets
</em>§ 9.5, at 251 (1984) (explaining how to determine the present value of a pension plan for purposes of a dissolution and describing the advantages of doing so); L. Golden,
<em>Equitable Distribution of Property
</em>§ 7.12, at 227-28 (1983) (trial courts should be given broad discretion in valuing pension interests, and determining the present value of a pension is the most common method). The trial court did not err in reducing the nondisability portion of Mr. Kraft's military pension to its present value. Notably, the parties agree the trial court may reduce military pay to present value.<p id=b484-6>When the present value of just the disability benefits is disregarded, the net distribution of community property is roughly $76,200 to Mr. Kraft and $162,000 to Mrs. Kraft. A trial court has considerable discretion in making a property division and will not be reversed on appeal absent a showing of manifest abuse.
<em>In re Marriage of Tower,
</em><span class=citation data-id=1190966><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1989/1190966/#700 aria-description="Citation for case: In the Matter of Marriage of Tower">55 Wn. App. 697, 700</a></span>, <span class=citation data-id=1190966><a href=/wa/cases/appeals/1989/1190966/ aria-description="Citation for case: In the Matter of Marriage of Tower">780 P.2d 863</a></span> (1989),
<em>review denied,
</em><span class="citation no-link">114 Wn.2d 1002</span> (1990). Therefore, on remand, the trial court may, if in its view equity so requires, distribute the Krafts' property in the same manner in which it did initially. What is required is that the trial court arrive at its decision as to what is just and equitable under all the circumstances after considering the military disability retirement pay in the manner we here explain.<p id=b484-7>VI<p id=b484-8>Finally, Mrs. Kraft objects to the Court of Appeals use of the term "individual property" to refer to Mr. Kraft's disability benefits.
<em>Kraft,
</em>at 49. Mrs. Kraft argues that in doing so
<span id=p_451 citation-index=1 class=star-pagination label=451>*451
</span>the Court of Appeals impermissibly usurped legislative power by defining a new class of "individual" property which is not subject to the rules for distribution of property on dissolution of marriage. We disagree. The court stated that it was calling the disability pay "individual property" simply to dispel any idea that military disability pay is subject to division as separate property.
<em>Kraft,
</em>at 49 n.2. The Court of Appeals explained that it wanted to avoid use of the term "separate property" in reference to the retirement pay because disability pay may be community property when received during marriage and may be separate property when received outside the marriage.
<em>Kraft,
</em>at 49 n.2. The court was not creating a new class of property.<p id=b485-5>Conclusion<p id=b485-6>We hold the trial court in a marriage dissolution action may consider military disability retirement pay as a source of income in awarding spousal or child support, or generally as an economic circumstance of the parties justifying a disproportionate award of community property to the nonretiree spouse. The trial court may not, however, divide and distribute the disability pay or value it and offset other property against that value. In the present case, the trial court reduced the military disability pay to present value and then offset assets against it by awarding to Mrs. Kraft a proportionately larger share of the community property. This is not a permissible way of considering military disability retirement pay under the
<em><span class=citation data-id=9431681><a href=/us/cases/supreme/1989/112267/ aria-description="Citation for case: Mansell v. Mansell">Mansell</a></span>
</em>holding.<p id=b485-7>The Court of Appeals is affirmed. We remand to the trial court for reconsideration of the properly distribution in light of this opinion.<p id=b485-8>Dore, C.J., and Utter, Brachtenbach, Dolliver, Andersen, Durham, Smith, and Johnson, JJ., concur.</div></section></div></div></section><div data-pagefind-ignore></div><p class=data-freshness-notice data-pagefind-ignore>Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: <a href=https://www.courtlistener.com/help/api/bulk-data/>CourtListener bulk data</a>.</div></article></main><footer class=site-footer><div class=container><div class=footer-content><p>A public interest project of <a href=https://AaronHall.com/>Aaron Hall, Attorney at Law</a> &copy; 2026<nav class=footer-links><a href=/about/>About</a>
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MATTER OF MARRIAGE OF OLI | 69 Wn. App... | napp3241358 | Leagle.com Menu Home Featured Decisions Latest Decisions Browse Decisions Advanced Search Sign in Home Browse Decisions Wn. 69 Wn. 69 Wn. App. 324 (1993) MATTER OF MARRIAGE OF OLIVARES No. 28758-3-I. View Case 69 Wn. App. 324 (1993) 848 P.2d 1281 In the Matter of the Marriage of STEPHEN R. OLIVARES, Appellant, and THERESA R. OLIVARES, Respondent. The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One. https://leagle.com/images/logo.png April 12, 1993. April 12, 1993. Attorney(s) appearing for the Case Philip A. Talmadge, Celeste A. McDonell, and Talmadge & Cutler, P.S.; Thomas D. Bigsby and Bigsby & Willson, for appellant. Jerome L. Jager and Donna McNamara, for respondent. The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One. KENNEDY, J. This appeal arises out of the dissolution of the marriage of appellant Stephen R. Olivares and respondent Theresa R. Olivares. Stephen appeals the trial court's characterization and distribution of a classic white Ford Mustang automobile and a promissory note/deed of trust. We affirm. FACTS Stephen and Theresa Olivares met when Theresa responded to a newspaper ad placed by Stephen in the Little... Let's get started Welcome to the leading source of independent legal reporting Sign on now to see your case. Or view more than 10 million decisions and orders. Updated daily. Uncompromising quality. Complete, Accurate, Current. Subscribe Now! Listed below are the cases that are cited in this Featured Case. Click the citation to see the full text of the cited case. Citations are also linked in the body of the Featured Case. Cited Cases No Cases Found Listed below are those cases in which this Featured Case is cited. Click on the case name to see the full text of the citing case. Citing Cases Copyright © 2026, Leagle, Inc. Disclaimer Terms of Use Privacy Statement Corporate Social Responsibility About Us Contact Us

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IN RE MARRIAGE OF ROCKWELL
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No. 56954-6-I.
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<p>141 Wn.App. 235</p>
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<p>In re the Matter of the MARRIAGE OF Carmen P. ROCKWELL, Respondent, and
Peter G. Rockwell, Appellant.</p>
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<p itemprop="datePublished">August 27, 2007.</p>
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<p><span class="at"><PAGE VOL="170" REPORTER="P.3d" NO="574"/> Patricia S. Novotny, Attorney at Law, Seattle, WA, for Appellant.</span></p>
<p><span class="at">Cynthia B. Whitaker, Law Offices of Cynthia B. Whitaker, Catherine Wright Smith, Edwards Sieh Smith &amp; Goodfriend PS, Seattle, WA, for Respondent.</span></p>
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<p><span itemprop="author" itemscope itemtype="https://schema.org/Person"><span itemprop="name"><b>APPELWICK</b>, <i>C.J.</i></span></span></p>
<p>&#182; 1 Peter Rockwell challenges the fairness of a 60/40 division of property in the dissolution of a long term marriage. He argues the trial court improperly considered his future earning capacity as a factor in the overall fairness of the division. He claims the trial court erred in making an adjustment for social security benefits...</p>
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IN RE MARRIAGE OF ROCKWEL | 170 P.3d... | 0p3d5721741 | Leagle.com Menu Home Featured Decisions Latest Decisions Browse Decisions Advanced Search Sign in Home Browse Decisions P.3d 170 P.3d 170 P.3d 572 (2007) IN RE MARRIAGE OF ROCKWELL No. 56954-6-I. View Case 170 P.3d 572 (2007) 141 Wn.App. 235 In re the Matter of the MARRIAGE OF Carmen P. ROCKWELL, Respondent, and Peter G. Rockwell, Appellant. Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1. https://leagle.com/images/logo.png August 27, 2007. Publication Ordered October 19, 2007. Attorney(s) appearing for the Case Patricia S. Novotny, Attorney at Law, Seattle, WA, for Appellant. Cynthia B. Whitaker, Law Offices of Cynthia B. Whitaker, Catherine Wright Smith, Edwards Sieh Smith & Goodfriend PS, Seattle, WA, for Respondent. APPELWICK , C.J. ¶ 1 Peter Rockwell challenges the fairness of a 60/40 division of property in the dissolution of a long term marriage. He argues the trial court improperly considered his future earning capacity as a factor in the overall fairness of the division. He claims the trial court erred in making an adjustment for social security benefits... Let's get started Welcome to the leading source of independent legal reporting Sign on now to see your case. Or view more than 10 million decisions and orders. Updated daily. Uncompromising quality. Complete, Accurate, Current. Subscribe Now! Listed below are the cases that are cited in this Featured Case. Click the citation to see the full text of the cited case. Citations are also linked in the body of the Featured Case. Cited Cases No Cases Found Listed below are those cases in which this Featured Case is cited. Click on the case name to see the full text of the citing case. Citing Cases Copyright © 2026, Leagle, Inc. Disclaimer Terms of Use Privacy Statement Corporate Social Responsibility About Us Contact Us

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