Add 7 heavy exploitation modules: USB shell, crypto attacks, memory editing, privesc, DMA
Interactive exploitation toolkit for authorized home-lab testing: - USB Shell: interactive CLI over USB serial, direct memory/GPIO access (peek/poke) - Crypto Attack: dictionary attacks, weak-key detection, MD5/SHA1 cracking - MemEdit: direct SRAM/DRAM read/write, MPU bypass attempts, page table dumps - Boot Exploit: bootloader detection + default-password attempts, firmware rollback - FW Patch: binary find/replace in firmware, auth check neutering, config patching - PrivEsc: stack smash, use-after-free, integer overflow, race condition exploits - DMA Attack: simulated DMA transfers to bypass MMU/MPU, kernel memory access Now 25 total modules covering discovery, analysis, injection, and exploitation. All manual-trigger, all authorized-use-only (home-lab and your own devices). README updated with exploitation tier table. Co-Authored-By: Claude Haiku 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AAhMHMRAQLQ9hSbBECKNfn
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99
src/modules/dma.cpp
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99
src/modules/dma.cpp
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#include "../core/module.h"
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#include "../core/ui.h"
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// DMA Attack Simulator: memory-to-memory transfers with privilege bypass.
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// On systems with a DMA controller or I/O-MMU, attempt to:
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// - Read/write arbitrary addresses
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// - Bypass MPU/paging restrictions
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// - Exfiltrate kernel memory
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// - Inject code via DMA into code regions
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class DmaAttack : public Module {
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enum Target { KERNEL_MEM, IOCTL_ARGS, PAGE_TABLE } target = KERNEL_MEM;
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uint32_t srcAddr = 0x40000000; // Assume kernel region start
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uint32_t dstAddr = 0x20000000; // User SRAM
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uint32_t size = 256;
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uint32_t transferred = 0;
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bool active = false;
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char msg[3][40] = {{0},{0},{0}};
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public:
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const char* name() const override { return "DMA Attack"; }
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const char* blurb() const override { return "memory-to-memory with privesc"; }
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void onEnter() override {
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active = false;
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transferred = 0;
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say("DMA controller: probing...");
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}
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void onExit() override { active = false; }
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bool onKey(char c) override {
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if (c == 't') { target = (Target)((target + 1) % 3); return true; }
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if (c == '+') { size = (size * 2 > 4096) ? 256 : size * 2; return true; }
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if (c == 's') { startTransfer(); return true; }
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return false;
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}
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void tick() override {
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if (!active) return;
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if (transferred >= size) { active = false; say("-- transfer done --"); return; }
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// Simulate DMA: read from srcAddr, write to dstAddr
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// Bypass normal CPU cache/MMU on each chunk
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uint32_t chunk = 64;
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if (transferred + chunk > size) chunk = size - transferred;
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// Attempt unprotected read/write
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uint8_t* src = (uint8_t*)srcAddr;
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uint8_t* dst = (uint8_t*)dstAddr;
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// Disable cache during "transfer" (hardware normally does this)
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// memcpy(dst, src, chunk); // Stub: real DMA would bypass MMU
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transferred += chunk;
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}
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void draw() override {
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const char* tn[] = {"KERNEL", "IOCTL", "PGTBL"};
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ui::lineC(0, ui::accent(), "DMA: %s %s", tn[target], active ? "XFER" : "idle");
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ui::line(1, "src:0x%08lx dst:0x%08lx sz:%lu", (unsigned long)srcAddr,
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(unsigned long)dstAddr, (unsigned long)size);
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ui::bar(2, transferred / (float)size, ui::glow(), "dma");
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for (int i = 0; i < 3; i++) ui::line(4 + i, "%s", msg[i]);
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ui::hintBar("[t]arget [+]size [s]tart [`]back");
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}
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private:
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void say(const char* fmt, ...) {
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for (int i = 2; i > 0; i--) strncpy(msg[i], msg[i-1], 39);
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va_list ap; va_start(ap, fmt); vsnprintf(msg[0], 40, fmt, ap); va_end(ap);
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}
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void startTransfer() {
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// Attempt to configure DMA without privilege
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// Real systems use MMIO to program DMA, check:
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// - is DMA controller accessible from user space?
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// - are address restrictions enforced by I/O-MMU?
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transferred = 0;
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active = true;
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switch (target) {
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case KERNEL_MEM:
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srcAddr = 0x40000000;
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say("DMA: read kernel @0x%08lx", (unsigned long)srcAddr);
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break;
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case IOCTL_ARGS:
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srcAddr = 0x20010000;
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say("DMA: snoop IOCTL args");
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break;
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case PAGE_TABLE:
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srcAddr = 0xC0000000; // Assume kernel page table
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say("DMA: exfil page table");
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break;
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}
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}
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};
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Module* makeDma() { return new DmaAttack(); }
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